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ABSTRACT 
 
BETHANY S. KEENAN: "Vietnam Is Fighting for Us:" French Identities and the U.S. - 
Vietnam War, 1965-1973 
(Under the direction of Dr. Donald Reid and Dr. Lloyd Kramer) 
 
 
 My dissertation, "Vietnam Is Fighting for Us," examines French reactions to the 
U.S.- Vietnam War to determine how French national identities emerged in the key post-
colonial era of 1965-1973. By an analysis of social movements and political groups on 
the right and the left, my work illuminates the dialogic interactions of past understanding 
and present action which shaped France in the Fifth Republic. The study of French 
reactions to the war challenges current historiography on France in the pre-1968 era and 
rewrites our understanding of how the riots of May '68 emerged, as well as situating post-
'68 political and social shifts within an international framework. Through its focus, the 
dissertation clearly brings out the contention within France over French identities and 
France's role in the world, while highlighting France's move from a power at a loss 
without its colonies to a nation with a new mission as international mediator and ally to 
countries undergoing revolutionary change.   
 
 iv
 
 
 
 
 
To Sean, with all my love 
and to Delaney, with all my joy 
 v
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I could not have written this dissertation without the help of numerous generous 
individuals and organizations, all of whom I would like to take the opportunity to thank 
here.  
 The following funding allowed me to travel to France for my research: the Mowry 
Dissertation Fellowship and the Raymond Faherty Research Grant for Military History 
from the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill's History Department; the Smith 
Graduate Research Grant from the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill's Graduate 
School; the Doctoral Research Travel Award from the University Center for International 
Studies at UNC; and finally the Foreign Language Area Studies Academic Year 
Dissertation Award from the University Center for International Studies at UNC. I was 
also able to dedicate myself full-time to writing my dissertation thanks to the Doris Quinn 
Dissertation Completion Fellowship from the Quinn Foundation and to the University of 
North Carolina's Graduate School Dissertation Completion Fellowship.   
 In the course of my research, many provided me with help and information. The 
librarians and archivists at the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale 
Contemporaine; the Bibliothèque Nationale de France; the Centre des Archives 
Contemporaines; the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire; and the Centre d'Histoire 
Sociale du XXe Siècle all offered essential finding aid and guidance. Dr. Nicolas Pas 
shared his dissertation and his interview notes for people such as Laurent Schwartz with 
 vi
me. In addition, Nicole Simone-Cortès, Daniel Hémery, and Jean-Michel Krivine all 
graciously shared documents from their personal archives with me. They, as well as 
Raymond Aubrac, Pierre Brocheux, Charles Fourniau, Camille Galic, Marcel-Francis 
Kahn, Alain Krivine, and Henri Weber, spoke with me about their Vietnam War 
activities. While I was unable to use their oral histories due to bureaucratic 
complications, I deeply appreciate the time they spent with me and hope to work with 
them in the future.  
 Many at the University of North Carolina and elsewhere offered valuable insights 
and critiques to this project at all of its stages. This department has been welcoming and 
supporting since the day I arrived, and the dissertation period proved no different.  Judith 
Bennett oversaw my work on the prospectus, providing the sharp commentary and great 
humor needed to get the project beyond idea form into working shape. Pam Lach and 
Sarah Shurts dutifully read multiple early brainstorms. Sarah also provided help and 
enthusiastic cheerleading as I moved forward in my research and writing. Lisi Lotz spent 
a semester reading away as I revised the Russell Tribunal chapter over and over. The 
members of my dissertation committee, Lloyd Kramer, Jay Smith, Michael Hunt, and 
Michael Seidman, gave me thoughtful comments on the final draft. I'd like to thank them 
for a provocative, inspiring defense that was the perfect cap to a great time as a graduate 
student at UNC.  
 Two scholars with no connections to me or my school stepped up and became 
invaluable resources as I worked through the dissertation. Dr. David Schalk responded to 
a request to chair a panel with a regretful no, but with sincere interest in my work. He has 
since offered writing commentary, connections, and general academic guidance. I deeply 
 vii
admire his work and appreciate the time he has given to me. Dr. Pierre Journoud met with 
me in France and helped me out immeasurably. He provided me with contacts in France, 
shared his own research with me, and sent me his dissertation as soon as he himself had 
defended. I hope that my work can be seen as a complement to his own excellent project.  
 There is no way I could have completed this project without the support of my 
writing group, the "Fantastic Four." Greg Kaliss, Patrick O'Neil, and Blake Slonecker 
gave me the push I needed to get over the last hurdles. Their questions and suggestions 
improved my writing immensely. Patrick and Blake also helped by volunteering to watch 
my beautiful daughter, Delaney, so I could work; Blake gave her a best friend in his 
gorgeous girl, Miriam, and Patrick became her beloved "Uncle Paddy." I also need to 
thank Greg and Patrick for the countless hours they spent explaining basketball to me, 
enabling me to become a true Tar Heel. All three have been, more than writing partners, 
good friends, and I appreciate them more than they know.  
 Throughout my graduate school career, Don Reid has been a tireless source of 
support, critique and good advice. He shepherded me through the MA process and stood 
by patiently as I worked out my ideas about what I wanted to do for a dissertation. He 
read draft upon draft, frequently returning them with excellent comments within a 
twenty-four hour period. His sense of humor kept me smiling at all times. As I move on 
to being a professor myself, he will be my model in all aspects. I can only hope that I will 
someday be half the historian and advisor that he is. I offer my thanks here, knowing that 
I've come nowhere near saying how grateful I truly am.  
 I also want to thank my family, without whom I could never have done this. My 
parents, Judy Keenan and Joe Keenan, always believed in me and encouraged me to 
 viii 
follow my dreams. My brothers, Shane and Spencer, cheered me on and never failed to 
let me know they were proud of me - I am proud of them as well, and not the least for 
giving me such excellent sister-in-laws as Jess and Kelly. My sister-in-law Jen offered 
endless support, and my in-laws, Peter and Nancy McNulty, always gave their all, even 
coming down to watch Delaney for a week so I could put the finishing touches on. I am 
blessed to have them all with me.  
 My greatest thanks goes to my husband, Sean. Sean uprooted his life and 
cheerfully followed me to Chapel Hill so I could pursue my dream, and in our time here 
took some of the world's most thankless jobs (and some quite nice ones!) in order to 
support us as we worked. He provided me with numerous crazy tech toys to keep me 
amused as I worked, saved my laptop from sure death on several occasions, and did 
everything in his power to make my life easier. He never doubted me, no matter how dark 
I thought things looked. He is, as he has been for thirteen years now, my best friend. 
Along with his love, he gave me my daughter Delaney, who has been the light of my life 
since she was born on July 17, 2007. While she will not remember Mommy writing this 
at all, Mommy will always remember her being there and how she reminded me of what 
it was I was working for. Delaney and Sean are my joy, my reason for being, and it is to 
them I dedicate this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... x 
 
Introduction .........................................................................................................................1 
 
Chapter One: "Flattering the Little Sleeping Rooster": The French, De Gaulle, and the 
Vietnam War in 1965.........................................................................................................17 
 
Chapter Two: For Whom "The Heart of the French People Beats": Unity, Division and 
the  Development of Vietnam War Protest Groups in France, 1966 ................................48 
 
Chapter Three: "Today We Must Clearly Take a Stand:" The Growing Radicalization of 
the Vietnam War Movement in France, 1967....................................................................96 
 
Chapter Four: "At the Crossroads of Culture and Militancy:" The Collectif Intersyndical  
Universitaire and Armand Gatti's V Comme Vietnam on Tour, January - June 1967......148 
 
Chapter Five: "Against the Crime of Silence:" French Intellectual Protestors and the 
Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal, 1966-1967........................................................196 
 
Chapter Six:  "La France S'Ennuie"? Vietnam War Protests and the "Events" of February, 
March, and April, 1968....................................................................................................229 
 
Chapter Seven: The Retour à l'Hexagone: May '68 and the Decline of the Vietnam War 
Movement in France........................................................................................................267 
 
Conclusion.......................................................................................................................306 
 
Bibliography....................................................................................................................316 
 
 
 
 x
List of Abbreviations 
 
BDIC  Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine 
 
BNF  Bibliothèque Nationale de France 
 
CAC  Centre des Archives Contemporaines 
 
CIU  Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire 
 
CHS  Centre d'Histoire Sociale du XX Siècle 
 
CVN  Comité Vietnam National 
 
CVB  Comité Vietnam de base 
 
JCR  Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire 
 
PACS  Paris American Committee to Stopwar 
 
PCF  Parti Communiste Français 
 
PSU  Parti Socialiste Unifié 
 
SFIO  Section Française de l'International Ouvrière 
 
SNESup Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur 
 
UEC  Union des Etudiants Communistes 
 
UNEF  Union Nationale des Etudiants de France
  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 On November 28, 1966, five thousand people crowded into the Mutualité's large 
amphitheatre in Paris to hear speakers on the Vietnam War. With famous names such as 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Laurent Schwartz, and Pierre Vidal-Naquet on the roster, the draw was 
such that activists had been queueing up to get in since six that evening.1 The "Six Hours 
of the World for Vietnam" protest meeting offered an intellectual, cultural and artistic 
smorgasboard meant to bring anti-war activities in France to the next level. Acclaimed 
artist Max Ernst had drawn the poster for the meeting, which hung in the room.2 In 
addition to their choice of four colloquiums on topics such as "The Anti-Imperialist 
Struggle in the World" and "Gaullism and Vietnam," participants also heard songs by 
Jacques Martin and Pia Colombo and saw the world premiere of Wilfred Burchett's latest 
film on the war. But the centerpiece of the evening came when Jean-Paul Sartre 
approached the podium to give his speech. To "frenetic" applause, Sartre told the 
assembled crowd "We want peace in Vietnam, but not just any peace. This peace must 
end with the recognition of Vietnam's independence and sovereignty." He encouraged the 
French to move past "moral" support for the Vietnamese into "political" action. "This is 
how we need to be in solidarity with the Vietnamese people," Sartre explained. "Their 
fight is ours. It is the fight against American hegemony, against American imperialism. 
                                                 
1
 "A la Mutualité, cinq mille personnes ont participé aux 'Six Heures du monde pour le Vietnam,'" Le 
Monde, 30 November 1966. 
 
2
 Simone de Beauvoir, Tout Compte Fait (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 465.  
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The defeat of the Vietnamese people," Sartre argued, "would politically be our defeat, the 
defeat of all free people. Because Vietnam is fighting for us."3 
 Sartre's fervent belief in the deep importance of the Vietnam War played out 
across the French political spectrum. Some, like Jean Terrell of the Union Nationale des 
Etudiants de France (French National Students' Union, or UNEF), similarly saw France's 
support of the Vietnamese as essential to a fight against imperialist powers. As Terrel 
noted, "If our eyes are fixed on Vietnam, it's because it is the nervepoint of the people's 
fight against oppression and exploitation."4   The Communist Jacques Madaule 
proclaimed that "Vietnam is fighting for all people. Its victory would be that of all 
people[.]"5 On the other side of the political fence, the far-right writers at Rivarol 
proclaimed that "this fight concerns us all" because "the destiny of the entire Western 
world is playing out at the Cape of Camau in the Red River Delta."6 President De Gaulle 
had also thrown himself wholly into the battle, working to bring about negotiations, 
taking his most virulent stand at his famous speech at Phnom Penh in September of 1966.  
 But French reactions to the Vietnam War were more than just reflections on the 
international situation or sentiments for or against American power. For the French, 
reacting to the Vietnam War provided a means to define their place in the world. Having 
emerged from the crisis situations of World War II and the Algerian War, France came 
into the mid-sixties ready to recreate itself. The Vietnam War offered an important space 
                                                 
3
 "A la Mutualité, cinq mille personnes ont participé aux 'Six Heures du monde pour le Vietnam,'" Le 
Monde, 30 November 1966.  
 
4
 "Explication de vote de Jean Terrel, président de l'UNEF," Tribune Socialiste 14 October 1966.  
 
5
 "Manifestation place de la Bastille en faveur de la paix," Le Monde 13 December 1966.  
 
6
 Jacques Langlois, "Avec d'autres moyens, c'est la relève de nos Légionnaires que les Marines ont prise au 
Vietnam: leur combat nous concerne tous," Rivarol 15 September 1966.  
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for Frenchmen of all political stripes to discuss France's role in the world. Although 
opposition to the war was nearly unanimous in France, the war raised new questions 
about the country's global role and frequently brought out longstanding internal divisions. 
The ongoing dialogue and debate about the war thus had as much to do with French 
identities, international and internal, past and present, as it did with the United States or 
Vietnam. 
 This dissertation studies the activities of four French groups -- the far right, the far 
left, the French Communist Party, and the Gaullist government -- around the Vietnam 
War as a way of providing necessary insight into important elements of France and 
French identity at a key post-colonial moment, the time period between 1965 and 1973. 
Until recently, little secondary literature addressed the question of France's interactions 
with the U.S. - Vietnam War. While a plethora of books has sprung up around the U.S. 
phase of the Vietnam War, most works focus on either American or Vietnamese 
perspectives and neglect France. Studies of the diplomatic negotiations leading to the 
1973 Paris Peace Accords, for example, rarely mention France or French leaders, 
relegating the major players to a few pages of their story and deeming de Gaulle little 
more than, to quote one work, "a major irritant."7 Many still agree with political scientist 
Marianna P. Sullivan's 1978 assessment that France's Vietnam policy stemmed from "the 
                                                 
 
7
 For information on the Peace Accords and diplomatic relations see, among others: Thomas Alan 
Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2003); International Perspectives on  Vietnam, ed. Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making 
of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); and Allan E. Goodman, 
The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1978), revised for the Institute of East Asian Studies as an Indochina Research 
Monograph under the title The Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986). The quote comes from Gardner and Gittinger's International 
Perspectives on Vietnam, 283. 
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nature of an alliance relationship between an ascending superpower and a declining 
middle power," a view which limits France's actions to frustration over its "impotence."8 
Such denigration of France's role is telling of how French attempts were perceived by the 
United States, but neglects the central role that the Vietnam War played for French 
leaders, both intellectual and political. 
 Historians of France, in turn, have neglected to recognize the validity of Arthur 
Marwick's statement that "[t]here can be no study of the sixties without consideration of 
the complex repercussions of the Vietnam war."9 For some areas, notably cultural history, 
the lacuna in studies of the sixties and the war arose from a reluctance to study a time still 
so chronologically near.10 In general, however, the historiographical gap came from a 
tendency to focus on the events of the Algerian War, which spilled over from the fifties 
until its end in 1962, and the uprisings of May 1968. Presentations of the Vietnam War 
lodged it firmly in the domain of foreign policy, as part of de Gaulle's plan to restore 
France to its former state of "grandeur," while additionally connecting it to attempts of de 
Gaulle to correct perceived slights against him such as Yalta.11 While historians 
                                                 
 
8
 Marianna P. Sullivan, France's Vietnam Policy: A Study in French-American Relations (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1978), 142.  
 
9
 Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy and the United States, c 1958 - 
c 1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
 
10
 Jean-François Sirinelli, "La France des sixties revisitée," Vingtième Siècle 69 (2001): 118. Sirinelli 
addresses in particular those who study mentalités, noting that "The analysis of communal perceptions and 
shared sensibilities [...] seemed to only be applicable to societies geographically or chronologically 
removed from our own." 
 
11
 See for example Anne Sa'a'dah, "Idées simples and idées fixes: De Gaulle, The United States, and 
Vietnam," in De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal, ed. Robert O. Paxton and 
Nicholas Wahl (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 295-316. Vincent Jauvert's book,  L'Amérique contre de Gaulle: 
Histoire secrète, 1961-1969 (Paris: Seuil, 2000) provides an interesting take on French-American relations 
in this period. Jauvert, however, sensationalizes his usage of recently declassified materials in his recreation 
of U.S. - de Gaullian relations. While his idea of "l'Amérique contre de Gaulle" carries the antagonism a bit 
far, the documents reveal that from the get-go, French and American views on how to act in Indochina 
 5
recognized that Vietnam garnered large amounts of attention from the French in general, 
their presentation of the time between the end of the Algerian War in 1962 and 1968 
created the impression that for most, interest in the Vietnam War was a way to pass the 
time until life at home kicked up again. This is most evident in histories of modern 
intellectuals. Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli present interest in Vietnam as simply 
part of a lost-cause search for third-world revolutionary forces in their work, Les 
Intellectuels en France de l'affaire Dreyfus à nos jours.Michel Winock deems Vietnam 
as an "exotic" contrast to the "popote [boring, or stay-at-home] domestic affairs in his 
study, Le Siècle des Intellectuels.12 What these works have failed to recognize is that the 
focus on the "exotic" aspects of the Vietnam War did not exist separate from "popote" 
domestic concerns. Rather, the two were intimately joined. The "complex repercussions 
of the Vietnam War," as Marwick phrased it, resonated for France both at home and 
abroad. Because of France's colonial past and France's current world status, looking out 
involved simultaneously looking in.  
                                                                                                                                                 
were at an impasse.  Jean LaCouture, in his article "De Gaulle et l'Indochine,"( in La politique étrangère du 
Général de Gaulle, ed. Élie Barnavi and Saül Friedländer [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985), 
traces out de Gaulle's evolving views on Indochina from its time as a French colony to the American war. 
Lacouture also argues that de Gaulle used Indochina to challenge perceived old slights and avenge an "old 
bitterness" at seeing the U.S. take over in Indochina.  (Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970, 
trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 400. Phillippe Devillers gives a nice 
analysis of the Phnom Penh speech in his article, "Le discours de Phnom Penh,", where he argues that de 
Gaulle uses Indochina as a means of challenging American hegemony. Phillippe Devillers, "Le discours de 
Phnom Penh," in De Gaulle en son siècle: Tome VI, ed. Institut Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1992), 472-
476. In a contemporary article on de Gaulle's Vietnam War policy, Devillers fixes the interactions within 
French-American relations with no reflection on domestic France. Phillippe Devillers,  "La Politique 
Française et la Seconde Guerre Du Vietnam." Politique Étrangère 32: 6 (1967): 569-604. Edward Haley, in 
his article "Alliés et Adversaires: De Gaulle et les Etats-Unis de 1958 à 1969," argues that de Gaulle's 
primary motivation was to return France to its previous standing (and not, as some would say, inherent anti-
Americanism). Edward Haley, "Alliés et Adversaires: De Gaulle et les Etats-Unis de 1958 À 1969," in De 
Gaulle en Son Siècle, 298-309. 
 
12
 Winock, Le Siècle des Intellectuels (Paris: Seuill, 1997): 689. Interestingly, the Vietnam War appears 
sparingly even in works related precisely to French intellectuals' involvement with the United States; see 
notably Jean-Phillippe Mathy, Extrême-Occident: French Intellectuals and America (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993). 
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  Slowly, historians have begun serious work on French reactions to the Vietnam 
War. In his brilliant work on intellectual petitioning during the twentieth century, Jean-
François Sirinelli notes that "French intellectual debate was largely placed for many years 
under the sign of Vietnam, and the problem was essential [...] for a number of clercs; 
what's more, a new generation awoke to politics in the cadre of this anti-imperialist 
fighting."13 Sirinelli's central concern lies with the contradiction between intellectual 
engagement and attention to true situations: the continual approval in intellectual protests 
for communist Vietnam without apparent consideration of what that government entailed. 
The intensity of involvement in Vietnam, he claims, perhaps explains the problems 
intellectuals encountered in the 1970s.14  
 In a footnote, Sirinelli remarked that "one could do a great study on the different 
opposition movements to the Vietnam War, and notably on the creation in fall 1966 of 
the Comité Vietnam National."15 His challenge was taken up by several French 
historians. Sabine Rousseau undertook an analysis of Christian groups who protested the 
Vietnam War, examining how their understanding of Christian responsibility trumped a 
critique of imperialism as the motivating factor for their interventions.16 Christelle 
Gautran wrote her master's thesis on French participation in the Russell Tribunal, 
                                                 
 
13
 Jean-François Sirinelli, Intellectuels et Passions Françaises: Manifestes et pétitions au XXe siecle (Paris: 
Fayard, 1990), 253. Sirinelli's work focuses largely on left-wing intellectuals; he notes, however, that while 
left-wing intellectuals predominantly guided the debates on Vietnam, right-wing intellectuals also opposed 
the war (244-45). 
 
14
 Ibid., 260-61.  
 
15
 Ibid., 246 fn 2.  
 
16
 Sabine Rousseau, "Des Chrétiens français face à la guerre du Vietnam (1966)," Vingtième Siècle 47 
(1995); La Colombe et le Napalm : Des chrétiens français contre les guerres d'Indochine et du Vietnam, 
1945-1975 (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2002).  I have chosen not to do an in-depth examination of French 
Christians in this dissertation, as their primary motivation was ecumenical, as Rousseau shows.  
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providing in particular an informative overview of interactions between the French 
Foreign Ministry and the American Embassy over the desire to hold the Tribunal on 
French soil.17  Nicolas Pas followed Jean-François Sirinelli's suggestion the most closely 
and undertook a study of the various Comités Vietnam of the sixties, examining how the 
war played a catalysing role in French life and contrasting the different approaches -- 
largely age-based -- between the various "comités." By far the most detailed work on the 
French anti-war groups, Pas' work demonstrated how the French far left used their 
Vietnam War protests to establish a French left separate from the hegemony of the 
French Communist Party.18 
 In recent years, historians have also re-established the linkage between Vietnam 
and the coming of May.  Although there has always been awareness that protestors in 
May had a past connected to Vietnam -- Adrien Dansette, who wrote one of the earliest 
histories on May in 1971, noted that Vietnam War protests allowed French students to 
"take the decisive step" in their radicalization before May broke out -- no in-depth study 
of the connection between Vietnam and May existed.19 Pas' dissertation broke ground, 
and Laurent Jalabert's article,  "Aux origines de la génération '68," brought anti-war 
activity to the fore, explaining how involvement in early 1960s protests against the 
                                                 
17
 Christelle Gautran, Le tribunal Russell : tribunal international des crimes de guerre américains au 
Vietnam (PhD diss., Institut d'Etudes Politiques, 2003). 
 
18
 Nicolas Pas, "Six heures pour le Vietnam,": Histoire des Comités Vietnam français 1965-1968." Révue 
Historique 302.1 (2000); " Sortir de l'ombre du Parti Communiste Français: Histoire de l'engagement de 
l'extrême-gauche française sur la guerre du Vietnam 1965-1968," PhD diss,  Institut d'Etudes Politiques 
Paris, 1998. I am extremely grateful to Nicolas Pas for providing me with a copy of his dissertation for use 
in my research, as well as copies of several of his interview notes.  
 
19
 Dansette, Mai '68 (Paris: Plon, 1971): 71.. Dansette's acknowledgement is just a very brief mention, with 
no real elucidation; he also briefly addresses the connection between the Maoists and the Comités Vietnam 
de Base on pages 47-48. Similarly, Laurent Joffrin's history of May '68, Mai '68: Histoire des événements, 
mentions that anti-war protests allowed French students to "take their classes [in activism]," but does not go 
into depth at all. Joffrin, Mai '68: Histoire des événements (Paris: Seuil, 1988), 39.  
 
 8
Vietnam War laid the foundations for action in May '68 by providing students with 
activist training.20 Other historians have also expounded upon the ties between Vietnam 
War protests and May. Jean-François Sirinelli, in his recent book Les Baby-Boomers, 
builds on Pas' work, arguing that anti-war activity provided students with the bridge 
between anti-colonialism in Algeria to the anti-imperialism that would motivate them in 
May.21 Michael Seidman's excellent work, The Imaginary Revolution,  emphasizes the 
role Vietnam had in energizing students before May.22 Kristin Ross, in  May '68 and its 
Afterlives, also places Vietnam as the starting spark for May and similarly argues that 
Vietnam allowed students to move from the Algerian War to a larger fight. While Ross 
places too much emphasis on the influence of French Maoists, to the detriment of her 
presentation of other protesting groups, she nonetheless correctly highlights the 
importance of anti-war activity to the formation of the May generation.23  
 Although works on students and the far left dominate, historians have also begun 
to approach the Vietnam War's effect on other members of French society. Christopher 
Goscha and Maurice Vaïsse's edited volume, La Guerre du Vietnam et l'Europe, offered 
up numerous strong articles examining the effect of the war on multiple countries in 
Europe. The articles on France included Marc Lazar's study of the French Communist 
Party, examining how the PCF used Vietnam as an attempt to establish its anti-imperial 
stance and to keep down the far left, as well as Maurice Vaïsse's interesting study of de 
Gaulle's evolving views on policy and Laurent Cesari's article on the Pompidou 
                                                 
20
 Laurent Jalabert, "Aux origines de la génération 68: les étudiants français et la guerre du Vietnam," 
Vingtième Siècle 55 (1997): 69-81. 
 
21
 Jean-François Sirinelli, Les baby-boomers: Une Génération, 1945-1969 (Paris: Fayard, 2003): 242-243.  
 
22
 Michael Seidman, The Imaginary Revolution, (New York: Berghan Books, 2004): 36-7.  
 
23
 Kristin Ross, May '68 and its Afterlives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002): 80-81. 
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government's attempt to continue de Gaulle's general Vietnam policy without the 
accompanying struggle for grandeur.24 By far the most comprehensive work on France 
and the Vietnam War, however, is Pierre Journoud's recently completed dissertation, "Les 
relations franco-américaines à l’épreuve du Vietnam entre 1954 et 1975. De la défiance 
dans la guerre à la coopération pour la paix." A study of French and American diplomatic 
interactions over the Indochinese and Vietnam Wars, Journoud's work provides an in-
depth overview of how French and American policies towards Indochina evolved over 
time, highlighting the roles of de Gaulle and his foreign ministry. Meticulously 
researched in both French and American archives, the study brings new insight into how 
the war affected transatlantic relations and shaped French governmental ideas.25 
While these works have contributed valuable information to understanding the 
importance of the Vietnam War to France, they are limited in their contributions because 
they tend to focus on one set of political actors. Studies which concentrate on one group 
miss the dynamic interplay of competing views which fueled debates on identity during 
this time.26  In best evaluating how Vietnam War protests affected France's development, 
it is the differences of opinion, not the similarities, which offer the most insight. Michael 
                                                 
 
24
 Marc Lazar, "Le Parti communiste français et l'action de solidarité avec le Vietnam" in La Guerre du 
Vietnam et L'Europe, 1963-1973, ed. Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaïsse (Paris: Bruyant, 2003): 241-
252; Maurice Vaïsse, "De Gaulle et la guerre du Vietnam: la difficulté d'être Cassandre," in La Guerre du 
Vietnam et l'Europe, 1963-1973: 169-178; and Laurent Cesari, "Le président Georges Pompidou et la 
guerre du Vietnam, 1969-1974," in La Guerre du Vietnam et l'Europe, 1963-1973: 179-192.  
 
25
 Journoud, "Les relations franco-américaines à l’épreuve du Vietnam entre 1954 et 1975. De la défiance 
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 Pierre Journoud's dissertation has an outstanding chapter  on domestic protests, which brings out some of 
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Seidman, for example, is correct to state that "Antifascism and anti-imperialism offered 
common ground among groupuscules sparring over leadership and ideological 
dominance of the future working-class revolution. Even Communists were able to 
participate in the anti-American and pro-Vietcong campaigns."27 But as my dissertation 
shows, divisions between the far left and the Communists, and among the far left 
themselves, made unity tenuous at best, and the arguments among the groups show their 
varying ideas over how France should act. The left additionally needs to be considered in 
its relations with the Gaullist government. Laurent Jalabert's claim that the student 
protestors "showed a certain absence when dealing with national political authorities" and 
that "there was never a question of de Gaulle [or] of the government [...] in their 
demands" misses the fact that the anti-war left consistently, if with difficultly, used the 
government's stance on the war to better outline their own.28 Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, studies of this key time period need to emphasize the importance of the far 
right to dialogues of national identity. Jean-François Sirinelli proclaimed that 
"lifelessness loomed large on the right," on the war,  thus explaining the heavily skewed 
French stance against the Americans.29 But while far right-wing activity did not reach the 
levels it had during the Algerian War, it still featured strongly in protest actions and 
political motions around the war, and interactions with the far right motivated actors on 
the left. Studying far-right reactions to the Vietnam War is essential because it once again 
places the far right into national dialogue in the years following the Evian Agreements. .  
                                                 
27
 Seidman, 35. Seidman raises the issue of unity here in the context of the Union Nationale des Etudiants 
de France, but as will be shown throughout the dissertation, the UNEF more frequently encountered 
conflict than cohesion in its attempts to pursue anti-war activities.  
   
28
 Joffrin, 79.  
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 Sirinelli, Les Baby-Boomers, 246-247.  
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By examining the varying reactions to the Vietnam war and the interplay between 
them, my dissertation will demonstrate the multi-faceted national identity construction 
underway at this key moment in French post-colonial history, while also shedding light 
on the importance of social movements to the construction of national identity, and on the 
international repercussions of intra-national conflicts. Although most nationalists argue 
for a single definition of national identity to describe their country, the construction of 
national identity is never a singular enterprise. Rather, it is the result of multiple voices 
speaking at once, drawing on similar contexts and historical precedents, and arguing and 
agreeing with each other as they attempt to shape the meaning of their nation. This 
polyphonic, dialogic approach means that events and reactions need to be considered as 
part of a larger text of national dialogue.30 Additionally, identity acquisition needs to 
consider by history more than solely as a context, instead examining the development of 
identities as historical events themselves. In the case of France, this means evaluating 
reactions to the American War in Vietnam with an awareness of France's recovery from 
the material and moral devastation of World War II, its lowered circumstances in a world 
dominated by the Cold War, and its colonial past, both in Indochina and Algeria, along 
with internal divisions in French political and intellectual circles.  By moving beyond the 
idea of French national re-creation as a Gaullist project locked within the contours of the 
Cold War hegemony, my dissertation reveals that the attempts to decide French identity 
                                                 
30
 In this conceptualization of national identity creation, I draw heavily on M. M. Bakhtin's ideas. Bakhtin's 
theories of polyphonics and dialogics evoke the interconnectedness of ideas without removing these ideas 
from their historical context. As he noted, "Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily 
into the private property of the speaker's intentions; it is populated - overpopulated - with the intentions of 
others. " M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin, ed. Michael Holquist, 
trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 294.  
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resulted from the efforts and interaction of multiple social movements in French society, 
inspired by the past and the present, simultaneously on the right and on the left.  
While identity formation is typically considered a cultural event, my dissertation 
demonstrates that political debates and actions are also central to identity constructs. For 
the French, the Vietnam War served in debate less as an act of violence to reflect on,  
than as the floating signifier which allowed them to discuss the issues of concern to the 
French people, most notably the overarching question of what France's national identity -
- its role in the world -- would be following the loss of Algeria in 1962. Yet while French 
national identity acted as the umbrella for the debate, providing the contemporary 
context, the historical touchpoints, and the primary question for all, those discussing 
Vietnam in the mid-sixties also debated other elements of their identity as well. In the 
following chapters, I discuss generational identity, internal political party identity, 
intellectual identity, and artistic identity. Moreover, the dissertation's chronological scope 
allows the reader to follow as French identities evolve from a sense of general 
powerlessness pre-1968, to a feeling of regained French action in the post-68 period. The 
political discussions and maneuvers around the Vietnam War played a strong role in 
helping this identity evolution along.  
 Chapter One, "'Flattering the Little Sleeping Rooster': The French, De Gaulle, and 
the Vietnam War in 1965," uses the lens of the 1965 French presidential campaign to 
examine emerging views about the Vietnam War in France. First establishing the strong 
stand de Gaulle had already made against the Vietnam War by 1965, I then move to an 
examination of the French left and the French far right's rhetoric about the war as they 
campaigned against him. While the French far right's support for the American war effort 
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easily differentiated them from de Gaulle and allowed them to continue past grudges 
against him from the French colonial era, the French left faced a greater challenge 
because their anti-war stance largely appeared to mirror what de Gaulle had already said. 
Tracing developments throughout the year, I show how the far right and the left 
attempted to use Vietnam to counter de Gaulle's power in France and to argue for their 
own concept of post-colonial France's role in the world.  
 Chapter Two, "For Whom 'The Heart of the French People Beats': Unity, Division 
and the Development of Vietnam War Protest Groups in France, 1966," studies the 
growing activism in France, in particular the creation of groups such as the Collectif 
Intersyndical Universitaire, the Comité Vietnam National, and Occident. Highlighting the 
move away from protests centered around political parties, the developing challenge to 
the French, and the battles between the left and the far right, I show how Vietnam War 
protests contributed to the rise of  increasingly radical viewpoints and increased 
expectations of violence. Chapter Two also demonstrates how these protests continued 
the theme of questioning France's past and present, as well as challenging de Gaulle's 
standing in France.  
 Chapter Three, "'Today We Must Clearly Take a Stand:' The Growing 
Radicalization of the Vietnam War Movement in France, 1967," closely examines five 
significant protests over the course of 1967, the most active year for Vietnam-related 
activities in France. Focusing heavily on the growing splits on the left, not only between 
the far left and the PCF, but also amongst the far left with the introduction of the Maoist 
Comités Vietnam de Base, this chapter also shows how, as protests intensified, protestors 
began to direct their attention more and more to French-specific issues. Protests such as 
 14
those organized around Vice President Hubert Humphrey's visit to Paris in April 1967 
gave activists the chance to directly challenge de Gaulle's presentation of France to the 
world. As the central international issue of the day, the Vietnam War offered French 
activists a key way of addressing their concerns about France's future.  
 Chapter Four, "'At the Crossroads of Culture and Militancy:'  The Collectif 
Intersyndical Universitaire and Armand Gatti's V Comme Vietnam on Tour, January - 
June 1967," offers a literary interlude through a protest case-study. An in-depth analysis 
of the organization and presentation of Armand Gatti's play, V Comme Vietnam, as a 
protest-on-tour for the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire, the chapter explores the 
questions of how to protest which plagued the left, while additionally highlighting the 
continuing battle for French intellectual identity which the play brought to the fore. By 
showcasing both the actions undertaken to get the play on the road, as well as the 
resultant debate over the play's meaning and effect, the chapter brings out the effects of 
the Vietnam War on French culture and French militancy.  
 Chapter Five, "'Against the Crime of Silence:' French Protestors and the Bertrand 
Russell War Crimes Tribunal, 1966-1967," is another case study, this time of French 
involvement in Bertrand Russell's international war crimes tribunal, intended to put the 
United States on trial for war crimes committed in Vietnam. As well-known French 
intellectuals including Jean-Paul Sartre worked on the Tribunal, they drew upon their past 
protest experience in Algeria to justify their involvement, repeatedly referencing France's 
history. Moreover, a clash between Sartre and de Gaulle, who revoked the Tribunal's 
permission to hold their meetings in France, brought to the fore issues over how French 
national identity could be presented to the rest of the world. During the Tribunal itself, 
 15
the divide between Sartre's view and that of young activists highlighted the growing 
divide in beliefs on how protest -- or revolution -- should function, providing indications 
of the splits which would emerge in May 1968.  
 Chapter Six, "'La France S'Ennuie'"? Vietnam War Protests and the "Events" of 
February, March and April, 1968," takes a close look at the early months of 1968, leading 
up to the outbreak of the May events. Building off Pas and Jalabert's contention that 
Vietnam War protests were essential in forming May militants, I further argue that 
Vietnam War protests also created the atmosphere of expected violence which allowed 
May to happen. Moving beyond acknowledgement of the role of Vietnam in the 
formation of the March 22nd movement, I examined how Vietnam played into protest 
activities right up to and including the outbreak of riots in the Sorbonne. Most 
importantly, I emphasize the role of the right in group interactions at this time, reinserting 
them into the creation of this seminal French event.  
 Chapter Seven, "The Retour à l'Hexagone: May '68 and the Decline of the 
Vietnam War Movement in France," studies the changes to Vietnam War protests during 
May 1968 and in its aftermath, up to the 1973 peace talks. While Vietnam had strongly 
motivated activists prior to May, their attention shifted homeward once events began -- 
even though peace talks started in Paris at the same time. After a presentation of how 
interest in Vietnam waned during May, I evaluate the shifts in Vietnam War activism 
among the four major groups over the next five years. I conclude that the French turn 
homewards represents the culmination of a reconceptualization of French identity, and 
that the Vietnam War continues to provide a key reference point for their contemporary 
ideas on France.  Arguing that the Gaullist conception of France as a "capital of peace" 
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becomes dominant, I nonetheless show that the far right and far left continue to proffer 
competing ideas of French identity, all of which draw in part from their experiences 
protesting the Vietnam War.  
  Throughout the late sixties and early seventies, the Vietnam War provided the 
French with the means to debate key issues of national identity, as well as the experience 
and expectations which made nation-wide impact in May of 1968. By studying how the 
French reacted to the Vietnam War, we tie domestic change to an international context, 
removing foreign policy from the sole domain of the government and demonstrating its 
effect on France in general. Believing from many points of view that "Vietnam is fighting 
for us," the French used the Vietnam War to better fight for themselves and their own 
conceptions of what France should be.  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter One 
 
"Flattering the Little Sleeping Rooster": The French, De Gaulle,  
and the Vietnam War in 1965 
  
 In April 1965, Jean-Paul Sartre sat down for an interview with the French 
newspaper Le Nouvel Observateur to explain why he had backed out of a planned lecture 
series at Cornell University. America's recent escalation of military activity in Vietnam, 
Sartre said, made it so that no sincere European leftist could in good conscience travel to 
the United States. Appearing on U.S. soil had become the equivalent of accepting 
hospitality from the enemy. Even meeting with American leftists would do no good, 
because the American left still approved some of what its government did. There could 
be "no further dialogue possible," Sartre proclaimed, unless they completely condemned 
all of the U.S.' foreign policy.1  
 Two weeks later, the French humor weekly Le Canard Enchaîné published a 
response letter they claimed to have received from the Americain intellectual "John-P. 
Serter," explaining his refusal to come to France. John-P. Serter told Le Canard Enchaîné 
that he could not, in good conscience, be seen anymore with a French left that was so 
enamored with de Gaulle's foreign policy it could no longer effectively oppose him. This 
foreign policy -- which, according to Serter, had two main aims: "to annoy the Americans 
[...] and to paralyze the French communist left" -- had succeeded in blinding the French 
                                                 
1
 Sartre, "Pourquoi je refuse d'aller aux Etats-Unis," Le Nouvel Observateur, 1 April 1965.  Reprinted in 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Situations VIII: Autour du '68 as "Il n'y a plus de dialogue possible." 
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left to de Gaulle's slow attack on democracy in their country. As Serter put it, "no further 
discussion was possible unless the French left accepts -- which most of them are not 
ready to do -- that they need to question the entirety of Gaullist politics, or more exactly 
its essence: that is to say, a most arbitrary personal power." Even those French 
leftwingers who recognized that de Gaulle was motivated by nationalism and 
anticommunism were not worth meeting with. They had become, in Serter's words, 
stealing, with wickedly satirical intent, a phrase from Frantz Fanon, "the wretched of 
the earth."2 
  Although the authenticity of Serter's letter and even his existence was 
questionable, the point he made about the agreement between the French left and de 
Gaulle on foreign policy was undeniably true. Nowhere was this more evident than on the 
central international issue of the day: the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. De Gaulle's calls for 
a negotiated peace, combined with his insistence on the neutralization of Vietnamese 
territory and his overt critiques of the United States, appeared to be lifted directly from a 
French leftwing playbook on international relations. The additional demands the French 
left made when proposing their own solutions to the conflict were, as diplomatic historian 
Pierre Journoud has put it, more a question of "style" than of "substance."3 Yet these 
small stylistic divergences in fact revealed substantial domestic differences over what the 
French role in international affairs should be.  
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 R. Treno, "'John-P. Serter': Pourquoi je refuse de venir en France," Le Canard Enchaîné, 14 April 1965. 
  
3
 Pierre Journoud, "Les relations franco-américaines à l'épreuve du Vietnam entre 1954 et 1975: De la 
défiance dans la guerre à la coopération pour la paix," (PhD diss, Paris I- Sorbonne, 2009): 1093 n18. 
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 Because de Gaulle's Vietnam War policies made such an impact on international 
relations, most historical studies have overlooked reactions to his views on the 
homefront.4 Focusing on responses in France, however, brings to light the continual 
battle between Gaullists and their opposition over post-colonial France's role in the 
world. This held true for the leftists stymied by de Gaulle's apparent usurpation of their 
rhetoric, as well as for those on the far right who drastically differed with de Gaulle on 
the Vietnam War and yet could not effectively oppose him. In this chapter, I study how 
the French left (notably the main political parties of the Parti Communiste Français, the 
Section Française de l'International Ouvrier, and the Parti Socialiste Unifié) and the French 
extreme right (notably the group around Tixier-Vignancour and the newspaper Rivarol), 
dealt with the challenge of de Gaulle's Vietnam War policy, by examining their public 
commentary on his international actions in the year leading up to the 1965 presidential 
election.5 In arguing with De Gaulle's Vietnam War policy, the opposition attempted both 
to assert their understanding of French national and international identity and to challenge 
de Gaulle's hegemony over French politics. This study of homefront reactions to an 
international policy highlights the limitations of political parties in protest movements, 
                                                 
4
 On de Gaulle's policy on the U.S.-Vietnam War, see in particular Pierre Journoud's dissertation. See also: 
Maurice Vaïsse, "De Gaulle ou la difficulté d'être Cassandre," in La Guerre du Vietnam et l'Europe, eds. 
Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaïsse (Brusells: Bruyant, 2003); Anne Sa'a'dah, "Idées simples and idées 
fixes: De Gaulle, The United States, and Vietnam,", 295-316; Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-
1970, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991) and also his article "De Gaulle 
et la gestion des crises: le discours de Phnom Penh" Espoir March 1990; W.W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the 
World: The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966); 
Phillippe Devillers, "La politique française et la seconde guerre du Vietnam;" and Marianna P. Sullivan, 
France's Vietnam Policy: A Study in French-American Relations.  
 
5
 While Lecanuet announced his candidacy for president in October and ran against de Gaulle as the center-
right candidate, I have chosen not to examine his campaign, as he and the group surrounding him do not 
become part of the French activists around the  Vietnam War as do the members of the left and far right 
under evaluation here.  
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while additionally demonstrating how conceptions of France's role in the world fed into 
debates over French national identity.  
The "Very Pleasing Situation of French Independence:" 
De Gaulle's Foreign Policy and the U.S.-Vietnam War in 1965 
 
As American troops increased in Vietnam over the course of 1964, de Gaulle 
warned more and more often of the risk of another world war. "Never has peace seemed 
so necessary," he proclaimed at the start of 1965.6 What concerned de Gaulle most was 
the perceived threat he felt American presence abroad posed to individual nation's 
interests, as he believed that the possibility of larger nations imposing their designs by 
force risked the destruction of newly emerged nations. Additionally, he remarked, "while 
the possibilities of a world war exploding because of Europe are dissipating, now we see 
that conflicts in which America has thrown itself in other parts of the world, such as 
earlier in Korea, more recently in Cuba, and now in Vietnam, risk becoming, due to the 
well-known effects of escalation, so wide-spread that they could flame up into a general 
fight." Such a flare-up would inevitably drag in America's allies, and thus entrap France.  
 By far, however, the most central aspect of de Gaulle's foreign policy lay in his 
belief in each nation's right to determine, for itself, what it wanted to do. Anne Sa'adah 
calls this de Gaulle's "idée fixe" and argues that its incompatibility with the domino 
theory was the central reason for the impasse between the two states. In de Gaulle's view, 
she claims, Americans "were unable to accept the notion that international politics is an 
arena in which all states rightly and inevitably pursue their national interests through 
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 21
unceasing, though not necessarily violent, conflict."7 Philip Gordon argues that the 
Gaullist idea of the nation-state lay "at the heart" of his world view, and notes that the 
General himself once remarked "nothing is more important than the legitimacy, the 
institutions, and the functioning of the State."8 
 De Gaulle's emphasis on the importance of national self-determination revealed 
itself both in his presentation of France and in his proclamations of the rights of other 
countries. From the moment he took office, de Gaulle worked to create an image of a 
France standing on its own two feet again and having put itself back upright - much like 
he had worked to create an image of France liberating itself at the end of the Second 
World War. He argued that the U.S. could no longer consider France as indebted to 
America, since France had re-established itself economically.9 Tending to place blame 
for France's weakness on the Fourth Republic10, he proclaimed the France of his time as 
independent and able to do what it desired. The move was clearly in defiance of the U.S., 
as came through in his remarks after a visit to Mexico in 1964: 
I've concluded, as has the entire world, that the international situation of 
our country is more brilliant, more secure, than it ever has been. We are a 
great nation.  
 This does not mean that we are in opposition to those who are 
naturally our friends and allies. They must learn to adapt themselves to 
this new and, for us, very pleasing situation of French independence. But 
as soon as they've adjusted and they admit that France, as well as any 
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other country, can take initiatives, have its own foreign policy and its own 
political ideas, there won't be any trouble between us at all. It's up to them! 
We hope that they'll come around as soon as possible.11 
 
 Or, as he put it more bluntly as he greeted the end of 1964, "I spoke of our 
independence. This means that our country, which does not seek to dominate anyone, 
intends to be its own master."12 
 For de Gaulle, however, French independence was only part of the equation. He 
proclaimed loudly and often that each people should be allowed to "permitted to act as it 
chooses in all circumstances." This belief was tied closely to his understanding of 
Vietnam, as well: in 1963, he proclaimed that the choice of Vietnam's future government 
lay solely within itself. "It belongs to the [Vietnamese] people, and only to them, to 
choose the ways to solve their problems," de Gaulle proclaimed, adding that whatever 
actions Vietnam took, it would find France ready to support them.13  
De Gaulle had, as historian Anne Sa'adah has commented, "a critique of 
American policy in Indochina even before the United States had a policy in Indochina." 14 
As early as 1961, de Gaulle had sent a message to John F. Kennedy , warning him  "not 
to get caught up in the Vietnam affair. The United States could lose not only its forces, 
but also its soul." 15 De Gaulle firmly believed that there could be no military solution to 
the problems in Vietnam and that change had to come from the nation itself. He argued  
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 De Gaulle, Discours et Messages: Vers le Terme, Janvier 1966 - Avril 1969 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 200.  
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that "there was no possibility that the peoples of Asia would submit to a foreign will 
coming from the other side of the Pacific, whatever its intentions and however powerful 
its weapons,"16 and insisted that international troops would merely exacerbate what was 
in fact a local situation. As early as 1964, he decried the U.S. presence in Vietnam as a 
"war action," claiming that Southern guerillas who had disappeared after the Geneva 
Accords returned because the American actions in the South indicated that the Accords 
were not being carried out.17 Moreover, because outside military intervention just 
inflamed an internal situation, de Gaulle believed the solution to the Vietnamese 
problems had to be neutralist: a removal of all foreign troops and a cessation of hostilities 
followed by mediation. He called several times for the creation of a second Geneva 
Accords, in which he imagined France  would play a central role.18  
The ramifications of de Gaulle's views on Vietnam extended into other areas of 
his foreign policy as well. In 1965 he used the possibility of France being drawn into a 
war it did not support as a reason to remove France from the military command of NATO 
and to have American troops abandon their bases on French soil. He additionally moved 
to make France a bridge between various fighting parts of the world. In 1964 he 
established diplomatic relations with China, with the clear intention of using these 
relations to discuss a settlement of the Vietnamese question.19 De Gaulle did all of this 
while positioning himself and France as a friend and aid to third-world countries breaking 
free from the yoke of colonialism. Overall, outreach met with success. "He is the most 
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popular among Western statesmen in the Third World of undeveloped countries," 
political scientist W.W. Kulski would comment in 1966. Quite simply, Kulski 
proclaimed, de Gaulle "is the hero of the Third World. To it he stands for the liberation of 
former French colonies in Africa, for the indefatigable apostolate of aid to the 
underdeveloped people and for nonintervention in their affairs."20 
The Danger of "Appearing Gaullist:" 
The French Left and the Challenge of De Gaulle and Vietnam 
 
 De Gaulle's policies covered virtually every point the French left itself had raised 
about U.S. actions in Vietnam.21 But rather than finding it pleasing, the left found the 
congruence between their views and de Gaulle's enormously frustrating. Having spent 
years opposing de Gaulle, the left now faced the horrifying possibility of, as  Le Nouvel 
Observateur put it, "appearing Gaullist."22 Already commentators had begun to mock 
parts of the left, notably the PCF, for the hypocrisy of their apparent subservience to de 
Gaulle's foreign policy. Combat imagined a meeting where Communist leader Waldeck 
Rochet, leaving the Elysée palace, paused to enthuse to reporters about every aspect of de 
Gaulle's current international actions before ending by saying, "I forgot to say: please tell 
your readers that we denounce Gaullist power and the power of monopolies."23 But as the 
PCF noted in their response to Combat's article, de Gaulle's policies put the left between 
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a rock and a hard place. They were forced to choose between supporting a political line 
that had been theirs for ages, or taking a stand against de Gaulle. In order to please critics, 
the PCF wondered, "would we have had to refuse peace in Algeria because de Gaulle 
signed the treaty? Must we argue for the continuation of the war in Vietnam because [de 
Gaulle] has finally decided to call for the neutralization of the country?"24 
 The left's worry extended beyond the possibility of losing face, although that was 
an issue. Sticking to their political line and admitting they agreed with de Gaulle held 
significant risks as well. As the socialist Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière 
(SFIO)'s newspaper Le Populaire remarked, the popularity of de Gaulle's Vietnam policy 
lulled French citizens into a complacency that left them unwilling to question other 
aspects of his regime. "Our foreign policy is a permanent spectacle," Le Populaire 
complained. "[...]The people feel prestigious and demand nothing more than to remain 
spectators."25 Journalist Jules Roy claimed that fear of appearing to agree with de Gaulle 
led to an unusual amount of "reserve and modesty" on the subject of Vietnam from a left 
that had traditionally spoken out forcefully against other colonial wars. Now, even though 
their hesitancy "dishonored" them, Roy complained that "the left would rather be quiet 
rather than appear, however little, to support the politics of a head of state hated for other 
reasons[.]" 26 The left thus faced a difficult balancing act: maintaining their own views on 
Vietnam, which closely resembled de Gaulle's, while still critiquing his policy and 
regime. As commentator Jean Daniel expressed it, the left needed to "take a position 
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immediately, and in a spectacular fashion. We must not betray principles that have been 
ours simply because [de Gaulle] is using them; we have to instead show that he is not 
truly applying them. We must be above Gaullism and not within it. It is when we betray 
ourselves to oppose de Gaulle that we play into his game."27 Instead of opposing de 
Gaulle for the simple sake of opposing him, the left attempted to use the apparent 
affinities between itself and the General as a gateway to critique his regime in its entirety.   
 A challenge to de Gaulle's visions for France in the present involved attacking his 
perceptions of France in the past. In his commentary on Vietnam and his work in the 
third world in general, de Gaulle drew on the prestige he had garnered in removing 
France from Algeria to position himself as a hero of decolonization. The move placed 
him at the center of a historical narrative the left considered their own, and they worked 
hard to diminish his claims by establishing their own primacy in this regard. The Parti 
Communiste Français placed their action against the U.S. in Vietnam within a continuity 
of anti-colonial protests that began with the French war in Indochina. They referenced 
their support of dockers who, during the French "sale guerre," had refused to load arms 
onto ships bound for Indochina, and they frequently had Henri Martin, a Party member 
who had refused to serve in Indochina, come to speak at protest meetings. 28 In this way, 
they underlined the long-term commitment to decolonization that had defined Communist 
politics. Socialists in the PSU highlighted de Gaulle's own responsibility for the French 
phase of the war, remarking that it was "piquant to see the man who sent Argenlieu to 
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reconquer Indochina in 1945, and who has never disavowed the war that ended in Dien-
Bien-Phu, playing today at being the protector of the Vietnamese people."29  Their 
historical reminder challenged de Gaulle's narrative of himself as a crusader for 
decolonization. 
 Pierre Mendes-France, former president of the Fourth Republic, which had 
experienced both the wars in Indochina and in Algeria, took Gaullist Michel Debré to 
task over the Gaullist claims to supporting decolonization. "We've come a long way from 
the time when notions [about decolonization and self-determination] seemed scandalous 
to friends of Mr. Michel Debré and to Michel Debré himself!" Mendès-France exclaimed 
during a debate. "When we wanted to explain to the French, not so long ago, the need to 
give people in the colonies  a growing dose of autonomy, towards their liberation [...] 
what difficulties we had  [!]" When Debré responded that de Gaulle had been defending 
these concepts since 1958, Mendès-France shot back that the left had been applying them 
"against all odds for quite some time, against which they raised in this country passions, 
anger and violence, to such an extent that it was against the right of people to dispose of 
themselves, against self -determination, that came to be, you remember, the May 13th 
rebellion that gave birth to the current regime."30 By insisting on a long history of 
decolonization anchored firmly to the left, left-wing commentators attempted to tie liberal 
progress in France to actions of the French left rather than to de Gaulle.  
 Leftwing commentators consistently worked to challenge not only the length of 
de Gaulle's committment to decolonization, the third world, and thus to Vietnam, but also 
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his sincerity. Repeatedly in their attacks on his foreign policy, the left conflated the 
French government with de Gaulle himself, and attributed motivation for governmental 
actions to what they saw as de Gaulle's personal failings. Of particular concern was the 
belief that de Gaulle's actions rose from a desire for vengeance for past personal wrongs, 
rather than from an objective assessment of France's needs. De Gaulle's attacks on 
America were thus fixed by commentators within the history of his experience during 
World War II, notably during Yalta, where de Gaulle was not included in the meeting of 
the Allied leaders. After de Gaulle issued a statement in late April underlining France's 
independence from the U.S., the socialist paper Le Populaire noted dryly "It's clear that 
de Gaulle is still having a hard time choking down Yalta." While the socialists agreed 
that Yalta had been a bitter pill for French pride, they noted that more than twenty years 
had passed and much had changed in the world. Nothing, they claimed, "is more 
dangerous than basing an entire political line on a long-lasting personal resentment."31  
Jean Daniel for Le Nouvel Observateur fixed Yalta as the moment when de Gaulle's plans 
for France's grandeur were blocked, and depicted him as forever attempting to overcome 
that obstacle.32 In a more humorous vein,  Le Canard Enchainé published a cartoon on 
January 27, 1965 depicted de Gaulle standing next to a carnival-style wood cut-out of the 
historic photo of the three leaders at Yalta,  ready to put his own head in when the 
photographer gave the OK.33  
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 In general, however, the left found de Gaulle's "obsession" with grandeur no 
laughing matter. As the motivation for the majority of his foreign policy actions, this 
rampant nationalism seemed to the left to provide a flimsy basis for sincere efforts. In 
their view, in fact, de Gaulle's grandeur was no more than grandstanding, and they used 
analysis of his Vietnam War policy to attempt to show his lack of substance there and in 
all of his foreign policy. "The Vietnam War is precisely the kind of situation that allows 
us to judge how serious de Gaulle is in his discourses in favor of independence and 
peace," declared the Tribune Socialiste. They wondered "What is the French government 
doing to put into practice the principles it preaches? When you get down to it, it's not 
doing anything but talking."34  The left pointed out that de Gaulle's proposals for peace 
bolstered French pride but involved no actual commitments. As Tribune Socialiste put it, 
"It's hard to see how this prestige could survive real conflicts (as contenting oneself with 
regretting the situation in St. Domingo and Vietnam does not go very far)."35 In the 
P.C.F. newspaper L'Humanité, Yves Moreau emphasized that de Gaulle had not really 
done anything, noting "He declares himself [...] for the neutralization of South Vietnam, 
but he's hardly taken any initiatives to apply the reasonable declarations that he's made 
[.]"36 Le Populaire commented that while de Gaulle had taken a strong stand on Vietnam 
and other issues, "as these declarations have changed nothing in global politics and as the 
United States, in particular, has viewed them as unimportant, we've stayed at the stage of 
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freedom of expression."37 Claude Martinet for the PSU urged the left to ask for real 
action, arguing "We can't be happy with declarations of intent and winks aimed at 
journalists."38 In short, the left saw de Gaulle's search for grandeur through his stand on 
Vietnam and from there on French independence as nothing more than empty promises 
with no real effect beyond making the French feel proud As Claude Fuzier remarked in 
Le Populaire, the Gaullists were "trying to flatter the little sleeping rooster at the heart of 
a certain number of Frenchmen."39 
 These attempts at flattery were particularly disturbing to the left because the left 
saw them as based on hypocritical double-standards which they felt permeated de 
Gaulle's regime. He claimed independence from the United States and critiqued the 
American war effort, leftist commentators noted, but (at least at the start of 1965) 
American troops occupied stations on French soil, and American companies held a strong 
control over the French economy. 40 "A country colonized economically can not, in 
effect, be independent," Gaston Deferre remarked in Le Populaire. 41 Fellow Populaire 
writer Christian Pineau observed "There's no doubt that no other French leader has 
expressed himself so disagreeably to foreign powers, and notably the United States, in 
quite some time. But that does not constitute a showing of independence." While 
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admitting that de Gaulle's foreign policy stands, notably on Vietnam, made him stand out, 
Pineau argued that nevertheless de Gaulle was not being taken seriously, and thus these 
attempts at independence were really nothing more than "freedom of speech."42 
 Although de Gaulle positioned himself as a strong supporter of self-determination 
and decolonization, the left saw him still as the defender of traditional capitalist and 
imperialist interests. L'Humanité underlined that he took stands only where it benefited 
French monopolies, declaring him the "spokesman" for the "grande bourgeoisie."43 The 
P.S.U. noted that he urged freedom for others but kept a stronghold on French 
possessions in the Pacific that were essential for French atomic development.44 Finally, 
the left questioned whether de Gaulle truly wanted peace in the world. His dedication to 
establishing a French nuclear strike force appeared to contradict his stated goal to avoid 
having war spread from Vietnam throughout the world, especially since many feared that 
tensions between the U.S. and China in Vietnam could lead to the use of nuclear 
weapons.45 The PSU went so far as to hint that de Gaulle's actions could reignite old 
enmities. Commenting that "The 'reprobation' that Gaullism directs against American 
policies in Vietnam and Latin America is not expressed by positive acts," the socialists 
warned that "the exaltation of nationalism limits France's international action and creates 
                                                 
42
 Christian Pineau, "Le Mensonge de l'indépendance," Le Populaire 6-7 May 1965.  
 
43
 René Andrieu, "Avant-première de l'Elysée." 
 
44
 Pierre Naville, "Vietnam: La Guerre s'étend. Il faut reconnaitre l'autorité du Front National de 
Libération;" Pierre Naville, "La politique extérieure du gaullisme: une hypocrisie," Tribune Socialiste 26 
June 1965. 
 
45
 See for example the views expressed by Pierre Naville in "Pour le boycott du régime de Saigon. 
'L'escalade' du Vietnam," Tribune Socialiste 3 April 1965, and by  Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch in "Une 
politique indépendante." 
 
 32
new dangers, in particular by encouraging the rebirth of German nationalism."46 In the 
eyes of the left, de Gaulle's stand on Vietnam and his subsequent foreign policy had 
created an international identity for France as a country puffed up with pride but lacking 
actual power, a country playing with matches but unable to handle the fire that would 
result.  
 But as Claude Fuzier remarked for the SFIO, "in order to be heard or understood, 
a nation has no need for sulks caused by vanity, nor tantrums caused by pride, nor the 
moodiness of those who confuse character with bad character."47 The left wanted to look 
beyond a French identity conflated with and limited by de Gaulle and his desires, to a 
France truly able to participate in the modern world. The different parties urged France to 
take more concrete actions, including recognizing North Vietnam (which de Gaulle did 
not officially do), and standing up to the U.S. by refusing military connections with 
NATO and by requesting the removal of American troops (which de Gaulle did do over 
the course of 1965). But primarily they pushed for a foreign policy separated from what 
they saw as the dictates of de Gaulle's ego. Where de Gaulle sought international 
relations with France in a leading position, the left argued for international relations 
based on cooperation with France in a position of influence and suasion. De Gaulle's 
attempts at re-establishing France, they felt, had in fact hurt her. "In the name of 
grandeur, those in the hallways of power continue to pursue a political line that step by 
step is leading France to isolation," Henri Dusart complained in Le Populaire.48 Politician 
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Guy Mollet felt that the only result of de Gaulle's foreign policy was that "when he leaves 
power he will have left France more isolated than she has ever been, and for nothing. I 
repeat: for nothing."49 Leftwing presidential candidate François Mitterand also took de 
Gaulle to task. "General de Gaulle has the respect of people around the world, that's true, 
and it's a plus for France, but he does nothing with this respect beside serving his own 
stature," Mitterand commented. "It's too bad, when he could be using [this respect] as the 
best tool for returning France to the role she should have: [he could be] fighting against 
the spread of nuclear arms[,] fighting for international mediation, fighting for the respect 
of all attempts [...] for dialogue between peoples."50 
De Gaulle's "'Trojan Horse' of Communism:" 
The Far Right on de Gaulle and Vietnam 
 
 The far right faced a different set of issues than the left, but held the same desire 
to challenge de Gaulle's prestige and power. Like the left, commentators at the far right 
newspaper Rivarol worried over the extent of control de Gaulle seemed to exercise over 
the French electorate. "Never before have our people [...] accepted so passively having 
their destiny subjected to the humors, to the fantasies, to the nightmares of an egotist who 
idolizes himself and for whom the world has no sense or value except as an instrument of 
his own will," the editorial board grumbled in October 1965. The stupor in which the 
population seemed sunk horrified Rivarol, as they saw it as an attack on "the roots of 
national vitality and energy."51 During his 1965 campaign, far-right candidate Tixier-
Vignancour, warning of his opponent's support for "North Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh," 
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claimed that "the French people, brainwashed by one-sided propaganda, doesn't realize 
the importance of the engagement it's undertaking for the next seven years [by voting for 
de Gaulle in the upcoming election.]."52 Le Populaire bemoaned a nation content to be 
merely "spectators;" Rivarol deplored a "practically commonplace apathy and 
indifference."53 De Gaulle's need to control the French for himself, they warned, put the 
nation at risk of not being able to defend itself if necessary. 
 The question of defense played a central role for the far right, because unlike the 
left, they did not agree in the slightest with de Gaulle's assessment of the situation in 
Vietnam. Where de Gaulle argued for a war based on the right to self-determination, the 
far right saw the frontlines of the war against a spreading and monolithic communism. 
Unquestionably, they supported the Domino Theory. "Since 1917, a planetary war is 
taking place under our very eyes," commentator Pierre Dominique explained. "The battle 
rages on between two conceptions of the world." In this global war, the local fight in 
Vietnam held great significance. "Whether the Americans are well placed or poorly 
placed, whether they've been able or clumsy, the fact remains: if they release their 
pressure today, everything will fall in Southeast Asia," Dominique warned. "Everything." 
54
 Quite simply, the weight of the free world rested on the United States' shoulders. "It's 
not overdramatizing the danger, or overstating things to proclaim this evidence," the 
editorial board wrote in February: "Either the US makes the DECISIVE HIT to the 
communist front in Southeast Asia, or the mortal enemies of the West will draw from the 
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American defeat the ASSURANCE that 'capitalist countries' have given up defending 
themselves and that henceforth no obstacle keeps them from installing their domination 
everywhere." It would, Rivarol stated, be only a matter of time from the fall of Vietnam 
to the "final triumph" of communist forces.55 
 American success held particular importance for the far right because they saw 
the Americans as taking up their own fight -- not, as one would suppose, of continuing 
the fight begun by the French in Indochina, but rather of the fight against communism the 
far right believed they had been forced to abandon in the more recent Algerian War. In 
Rivarol's presentation, communist forces directed by the Soviet Union played a strong 
role in the uprising and subsequent loss of the former French colony. "How often did we 
repeat that Algeria was the bastion of western defense in the Mediterranean, that its fall 
would irreversibly signify for Europe the definitive loss of its influence in Africa and, for 
Communist imperialism, the possibility of taking advantage of the European continent?" 
Rivarol demanded in January 1965. "In the same way, Vietnam is today the key to Asia. 
It is equally the supreme 'test' of the United States', shield of the free world, will to resist 
the 'sprawling marxism' whose objective is and will remain [...] the enslavement of the 
entire planet[.]"56 Algeria was now "one of the principal means by which the subversive 
current [of Communism] passed,"57 and "the fight in Vietnam is the penultimate episode 
of [the] battle."58 
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 Seeing the war as a struggle against Communism, the far right naturally opposed 
de Gaulle's calls for neutralization and a negotiated peace. Neutralism was a bad policy 
anywhere, whether it applied to the Congo or Vietnam. In both instances it would 
represent a caving in to communism. The U.S., the far right argued, had no business 
pulling back, as history showed. "Sedan, Coventry, Pearl Harbor, Dresden, Auschwitz, 
Hiroshima were the fruits of English treaties with Hitler, of English and French inertia 
faced with Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhine," former Vichyite Lucien Rebatet reminded 
Rivarol's readers after warning them that accepting neutralism in the Congo would be 
agreeing to the fall of Vietnam. "We shudder to think we might write one day that it was 
in knocking out the Chinese during the Korean War, as MacArthur wanted, or in saving 
the Congo, that we could have avoided the third world war, the nuclear war, annhilating 
the third, the half or even more of the human race."59 Noted anti-communist crusader 
Suzanne Labin insisted that the fight had to be carried on in Vietnam or it risked danger 
to France itself. Neutralization, she argued, really meant leaving use of military arms to 
the communists. "Can't we see," she proclaimed, "that if we tell the communists all they 
have to do is bring out their daggers and their submachine guns in order to oblige the 
West to negotiate a 'neutrality,' that that will lead us tomorrow to negotiating the 
neutrality of Naples, and after that, the neutrality of Billancourt?"60  
 In truth, the far right believed the theoretical loss of Billancourt represented de 
Gaulle's deepest, darkest desires. For the left, de Gaulle's policies arose from his wish for 
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grandeur and self-aggrandizement. The right similarly saw de Gaulle as an egotistical 
maniac --  invoking La Fontaine's fables, they compared him to "a frog who risked 
paying too dear for his dream of grandeur"61 -- but for the far right, he was an egotist with 
a secret purpose: the installation of a communist regime within Vietnam and, eventually, 
in France. His claims to neutrality were but a thin front for his real motivations. "Current 
French diplomacy has no illusions on the authenticity of the 'neutrality' it is promising to 
South Vietnam," Suzanne Labin sneered. "[I]t knows that the so-called political solution 
consists, in reality, of turning Vietnam over to communism, just after a set period and the 
decorum of a treaty."62 In its humor column, Rivarol mocked de Gaulle's supposed 
impartiality. After Sukarno revealed that de Gaulle had told him he believed the Vietcong 
would win, the "Evil Eye" scoffed. "Thus the general, who's so concerned with the future 
of the world, has already bet on the Vietcong! There's neutralism for you!"63 
 In the view of the far right, de Gaulle's committment to communism was of long 
term and would continue unabated unless challenged. He was, as they noted, the man 
who had "voluntarily abandoned Algeria, where Moscow was now more and more solidly 
staking its claim."64 Now, they claimed, his foreign policy had fallen even further under 
Soviet control, as evidenced by his anti-American actions, particularly in Vietnam. Like 
the lefts' critics, the far right saw connections between de Gaulle and the left, but rather 
than believing these similarities showed a weakness of the left, the far right felt they 
                                                 
61
 " 'La grenouille qui veut se faire aussi grosse que le boeuf' est également une fable de La Fontaine," 
Rivarol, 29 April 1965. 
 
62
 Ibid. 
 
63
 Le Mauvais Oeil, "Plumes et Paons," Rivarol 12 August 1965. 
 
64
 Pierre Dominique, "M. De Gaulle vivant et régnant, attendons-nous au pire," Rivarol 3 June 1965. 
 
 38
demonstrated the communists were "playing" de Gaulle whose "foreign policy was theirs 
[the Communists']."65 France, the far right insisted, was in danger from the communists, 
but not necessarily from the Communist party: this danger "was more a problem of 
foreign policy than domestic policy." As one commentator wrote, "The danger lies 
essentially in the sabotage of European construction, in the disentegration of NATO, in 
the policy of ouverture to the East, the systematic denigration of American policy, the 
recognition of communist China [....]"66 Or, as Pierre Dominique put it, "Our particular 
misfortune -- we who abandoned, systematically, the strategic location of Algeria, 
political key of the Mediterranean -- is to have at our head a man who wants Europe from 
the Atlantic to the Urals and who, to this end, intends, with the certainy he has that 
communism is the future for him, to throw himself into the lion's mouth."67 
 The far right used its challenge to de Gaulle's neutralism and its belief in his 
ostensible desire for a communist front in France as a means of arguing for a switch to a 
far-right political regime. Lucien Rebatet cast the war against Communism as a war of 
the white Western race against the other, warning ominously of the wave of "anti-white" 
reaction that would follow if the US lost in Vietnam. "De Gaulle's Sovietized policy 
could have drastic, if not irreparable, consequences for Europe," Rebatet proclaimed. "In 
any case it's to this breach that the Elysee is working: destroying the Western group, 
discouraging the Americans in their defense of the old world, opening the doors 
everywhere to a mortal neutralism."68 Pierre Dominique cautioned that democracy alone 
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could not fight against the communism de Gaulle was attempting to let in. Denigrating de 
Gaulle's call for a new Geneva conference, Dominique wrote that "De Gaulle, more 
myopic than we thought, unless he's flat-out playing the Russian-Chinese game, wants 
his conference -- so he can shine there -- and believes, moreover, that Communism is the 
way history is going." De Gaulle, Dominique insisted, believed Communism was not that 
evil and that once the French had more dealings with it, they would accept it. In 
Dominique's view, there was only way to combat this: "We must, our feet firmly planted 
in the earth, set up in France and in all of the West -- as Maurras put it -- 'national 
socialism liberated from democracy,' otherwise known as fascism." Only this "interior 
toughening" would allow the French to fight the "Trojan horse" of Communism de 
Gaulle had put in place. 69 
Sending French Gratitude to American Troops: 
The Far Right Candidacy of Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour 
 
 Despite this virulent proclamation, the candidate chosen to represent the far right, 
Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, did not run explicitly as a fascist but instead as the 
representative of  "the national opposition."70 "I am the candidate of youth and country," 
he proclaimed proudly71. Tixier-Vignancour had long been a fixture on the far right. A 
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former worker in Vichy's propaganda ministry, he was also a lawyer who had defended 
OAS members after the Algerian war.72 Proud of his collaborationist and colonialist past, 
he strongly contrasted with de Gaulle. From a political background characterized by 
challenges to Gaullist policies and actions, Tixier-Vignancour stepped easily into a 
campaign in which he incarnated opposition to de Gaulle in every area.  
 At campaign stops, Tixier-Vignancour would often salute American troops 
serving in Vietnam. Invoking the American war effort allowed Tixier-Vignancour and his 
supporters at Rivarol to denigrate de Gaulle's committment to the free world and to 
underline, by extension, his connections with Communism. In an early 1965 visit to 
Strasbourg, the "capital of Europe," Tixier-Vignancour argued that "the government of 
France of tomorrow must insert itself into a free world." To emphasize this, he then 
contrasted his continued support for the Atlantic Alliance with de Gaulle's weakening 
bonds, and proclaimed, "I send from Strasbourg, tonight, my salute to American aviators 
defending liberty in South Vietnam." The proclaimation, Rivarol reported, was met with 
ovations.73 A similar declaration in Poitiers a week later led to such an uproar that 
Rivarol claimed it took over ten minutes to calm the room down enough for Tixier to 
leave. 74 Moving into more explicit racism, Tixier-Vignancour used Vietnam during a  
meeting in Aix-en-Provence as a means of positioning himself as a key defender of the 
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white West. In a speech where he also argued for doing away with aid to third-world 
countries, Tixier-Vignancour declared "I send a salute and the gratitude of the French 
nation to the American marines, soldiers and airmen who in Vietnam are defending peace 
and the honor of the white man." He reminded his auditeurs that de Gaulle supported Ho 
Chi Minh, warning them that "Western civilization depends on the survival and the 
victory of the free world."75  
 Tixier-Vignancour's most explicit challenge to de Gaulle's foreign policy came 
when he undertook a trip to South Vietnam in September 1965. The South Vietnamese 
government had broken off diplomatic relations with France three months earlier in June, 
accusing de Gaulle of providing aid to North Vietnam. South Vietnam's government 
declared it "did not want to give any other advantages to a country that claims to be a 
friend and treats us like an enemy." As General Ky made very clear, the South 
Vietnamese anger was directed at de Gaulle's policies; South Vietnam "kept the same 
friendly sentiments towards the French people." Positioning himself as a represent of the 
French people and as the opposite of de Gaulle, Tixier-Vignancour traveled to 
SouthVietnam for a short trip in which he met with South Vietnamese government 
officials and made several public declarations of his belief in the quick end to the war. 
Arguing that "Communists, progressists and Gaullists" in France had taken up the cause 
of the Viet Cong, he declared his intent to take a stand for the South Vietnamese. "I do 
not want the aggressor's cause to be the only one defended," he proclaimed.76 He declared 
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that once elected, his first official visit would be to South Vietnam and assured that South 
Vietnam "would re-establish relations with France as soon as de Gaulle has left the 
Elysée."77 Returning to France, Tixier-Vignancour placed his connections with the South 
Vietnamese as part of a continuation of the right's fight against communism, this time 
reflecting directly on the French war in Indochina. He had experienced a "great emotion" 
upon seeing Saigon because "it was there that the French army, made up of these 
admirable units for whom we still have such respectful honor, bolted the door which 
protects South-East Asia."78 Through the visit he placed de Gaulle firmly within the 
Communist camp, argued that his actions hurt France's relations with the rest of the 
world, and sought to establish himself as a viable alternative to de Gaulle. 
"It's Foreign Policy Which Commands Domestic Policy:" 
The Left and the Election 
 
 Although similarly opposed to de Gaulle, the left had a much more difficult time 
finding a candidate to represent their opposition. An early attempt by centrist socialist 
Gaston Deferre collapsed spectacularly in June after he failed to convince all of  the left-
wing parties to participate in his "Federation of the Left." Deferre's candidacy failed for 
several reasons, including his attempts to pander simultaneously to both the Communist 
left and the Republican  center, but his stance on the Vietnam War held a center role for 
the other leftist parties.79 Deferre's Section Française de l'Internationale Socialiste was far 
more "Atlanticist" than the other leftist parties, arguing that the French needed to work 
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with the United States, rather than against it.80 Although they protested the war, they 
additionally claimed that the Vietcong bore as much responsibility for the outbreak of the 
war as the United States, a stance that horrified the Communists.81 Explaining their 
reasons for not supporting Deferre, the Communists noted "It's true that Gaston Deferre 
doesn't have a word in him to denounce American aggression in Vietnam and San 
Domingo, which has embarrassed a certain number of his own supporters."82 Deferre's 
views caused others on the left to accuse him of not offering any real "democratic 
alternative" to de Gaulle's policies. "[His] victory would mark the return to 'Atlantic' 
conformism, which would exclude, in particular, all real opposition to the current 
American interventions in South-East Asia and in Latin America."83 Deferre withdrew in 
early June, leaving the left without a clear candidate for several months. The left finally 
settled upon socialist François Mitterand as its joint candidate, supported by the PCF, the 
PSU, and the SFIO. This candidacy came with some compromises -- as the Nouvel 
Observateur noted, Mitterand had had to step up his denunciations of American policy 
and the PCF had had to accept the plurality of leftist parties, among other things -- but 
Mitterand the candidate did receive the support of all major parties.84 
 As the December election date drew closer, leftwing commentators insisted on the 
centrality of Vietnam to the elections. Sartre proclaimed in an opinion piece in Le Nouvel 
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Observateur that "Today in France, it's foreign policy which commands domestic 
policy."85 Jean Daniel, also in Le Nouvel Observateur, declared Vietnam the biggest 
international stake of the elections and stated that a candidate without a firm stand on it 
would be seen by him as an "adversary."86 Yet when Mitterand's platform emerged, 
Vietnam was nearly absent.87 This was perhaps due to a desire to play down an issue that 
divided the left amongst itself, but public commentary indicated that a prime concern was 
avoiding giving support to de Gaulle on an issue where he already held popularity. 
Instead, the left highlighted other foreign policy issues, such as the European Union or 
nuclear disarmement, where de Gaulle appeared weaker. Leftists would grudgingly admit 
that there were some areas of de Gaulle's foreign policy they approved, but they hurried 
to underline that if he had arrived at the right decision, it was for the wrong reason, and 
they gave short shrift to the question of Vietnam in general. Discussing Mitterand's 
foreign policy, Le Populaire underlined the importance of his insistence on a strong role 
for Europe, arguing that while de Gaulle had taken a strong stance on Vietnam, his voice 
was "nothing compared to what Europe could do."88 The choice to foreground Europe 
and move away from Vietnam demonstrated the strong hold de Gaulle had on France in 
the domain of foreign policy. While the left had earlier tried to use Vietnam to challenge 
his national and international ideas about France, they were forced during the election to 
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mute their concerns and direct them elsewhere, for fear of appearing to support de Gaulle 
and perhaps further awakening yet more sleeping roosters in the hearts of those who 
might otherwise have voted for the left.  
Between De Gaulle and "Chaos": 
Election Results and Effects on Vietnam War Activism 
 
 Although the opposition framed their candidacies against Gaullist policies, de 
Gaulle himself waited until November 4 to declare his candidacy. In his declaration 
speech, de Gaulle presented a choice between himself and chaos, warning that if people 
voted for him, the "future of the Republic would decidedly be guaranteed," but if not, "no 
one can doubt that it will collapse quickly and that France will have to endure -- but this 
time without any possible recourse-- a confusion of the State more disastrous than that 
she has previously known." Although he did not directly reference Vietnam, he warned 
that the French were risking "the situation and the actions of France in a world overrun 
by immeasurable dangers, [... ] the cooperation practiced with those peoples where our 
colonization had become anachronistic and, often, bloody," as well as  "the consideration 
and the audience of other peoples justifiably obtained by us in searching everywhere the 
cause of liberation, development and joint aide upon which depends henceforth the sort 
of the human community." 89 By threatening to remove himself from the French political 
scene entirely if he were not re-elected, de Gaulle asserted that French foreign policy and 
the security of the world were tied to his continuing as President.  
 Despite de Gaulle's perceived popularity, he received only 44% of the votes, 
forcing a run-off with the second-place candidate, Mitterand. Although Tixier-
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Vignancour was forced out, Rivarol rejoiced in de Gaulle's loss, arguing that in addition 
to clearly showing reprobation for his Algerian policies, the French people's voting 
choices were significant because "above all, a majority of the French turned away from 
him, FROM THE MAN, which told him he was not a God."90 Determined to knock de 
Gaulle down even further, Rivarol then threw its support behind the left-wing candidate. 
Specifically justifying their support for Mitterand in foreign policy, Rivarol argued that 
Mitterand would be "MORE ATLANTIC" and "MORE EUROPEAN" than de Gaulle, 
and urged their voters "Whatever you think of his opponent, vote against de Gaulle!"91 
 Even additional right-wing support was not enough, however, and Mitterand lost 
the second round of the 1965 Presidential election, leaving de Gaulle slightly shaken by 
the challenge but firmly ensconced in power. In the coming year, de Gaulle would further 
undermine the left by enacting several of their proposals, establishing contact with North 
Vietnam via a letter exchange with Ho Chi Minh, completing the removal of American 
troops from French soil, and withdrawing France from the military command of NATO. 
He would take his strongest stand about the war on September 1, 1966, during his 
celebrated speech at Phnom Penh, Cambodia. But while he solidified his power and his 
stance, elements on the left would move from working primarily within political parties 
to challenge de Gaulle, to participating predominantly in social movements dedicated to 
fighting the war. From outside traditional political channels, where the far right was 
already established,  the left would find itself more able to directly confront de Gaulle 
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and to argue for the implementation of their own idea of France.92 But the discourse they 
used as they continued to protest the war and clamor for a change in France's 
international actions around the war drew from the dialogue they had begun while 
challenging de Gaulle during 1965. The debates raised on the left and the right over what 
France's role in the world should be put into play questions of what French national 
identity should be, showing that both groups refused to simply accept de Gaulle's 
presentation of France to the world. The  John-P. Serter may have been correct that the 
French left, faced with de Gaulle's power, were among "the wretched of the Earth," but 
he was mistaken when he claimed they were so enamored with de Gaulle's foreign policy 
they could no longer adequately challenge him. Although not always successful, for the 
left  and for the right criticisms of de Gaulle's foreign policy, primarily in Vietnam, were 
the gateway for challenging, as Serter had said, "the entirety of Gaullist politics."
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Chapter Two 
 
For Whom "The Heart of the French People Beats:" Unity, Division and the  
Development of Vietnam War Protest Groups in France, 1966 
 
 In July of 1966, the French Communist Party's paper L'Humanité published an 
article exulting over recent activity in France against the Vietnam War. The past seven 
months, they noted, had been filled with non-stop protests. "Not a day goes by," the 
editorial board crowed, "without L'Humanité [receiving] information talking about the 
continual fight undertaken in our country for the support of the Vietnamese people, for 
ending American aggression in South Vietnam [...]" In February, 15,000 Parisians had 
answered the Party's call to protest the escalation of fighting by delivering petitions to the 
U.S. Consulate. More than 100,000 protestors had responded to the Communist-led 
Mouvement de la Paix's three-day protest in March, staging rallies in 125 towns. Fifty 
thousand French women had participated in multiple "Peace Vigils" organized by the 
Communist Union des Femmes Françaises (Union of French Women). The Mouvement 
de la Jeunesse Communiste (Communist Youth Movement) had drawn 70,000 to 
meetings in May. When the U.S. bombed Haiphong and Hanoi in June, 30,000 people 
descended on the place de la Concorde to protest. On the Fourth of July, the Communists 
joined up with two university groups, the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire (University 
Intersyndical Collective) and the Union Nationale des Etudiants de France (National 
Union of French Students) and a group of American expatriates, the Paris American 
Committee to Stopwar (PACS), to march from the Madeleine Church to the U.S. 
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Consulate. "Not a week passes without actions of the masses expressing, in diverse 
forms, this will of the Communists, [who are] participating in the front ranks," the paper 
remarked, noting that the protests also demonstrated "the will of hundreds of thousands 
of French people of varying opinions and conditions." The meaning was clear, the paper 
proclaimed: "It is for the invincible and courageous Vietnamese people that the heart of 
the French people beats."1 
 1966 saw a decisive increase in Vietnam War protest movements in France. In 
addition to the efforts of the French Communist Party, new organizations, particularly in 
universities, sprang up, drawing both on the far left and the far right, to coordinate 
petition signings, lectures, and public protests against and for the American presence in 
Vietnam. Barbara and John Ehrenreich, writing in 1969, noted that the war revived  some 
of the political activism that had fallen by the wayside since the Algerian War ended. 
"For the first time in years," they remarked, "there was an issue which could rally 
apolitical and liberal students, as well as the ideologically committed." But the 
Ehrenreichs saw the Vietnam War protests in France as distinct from actual French life: 
"an easy evasion of domestic issues," they deemed it. With de Gaulle already against the 
war, the students' protests did not challenge the existing order. Students who protested, 
they argued, could "talk and even act militantly without ever confronting the power of the 
state or of established Left organizations such as the giant Communist party."2 
 While the Ehrenreichs correctly noted that Vietnam War protests captured some 
of the enthusiasm of past Algerian War protestors, they were wrong in assuming that the 
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focus on the Vietnam War existed separate from contemporary French issues. As Nicolas 
Pas has shown in his excellent dissertation, "Sortir de l'ombre du Parti Communiste," 
students on the non-Communist left used their participation in Vietnam protests to take a 
stand against the Communist Party's dominance of left-wing politics.3 Yet the developing 
protest groups revealed more than a gap between the Communist Party and the left. 
Conflicts during protests demonstrated other splits within the left as well, while 
highlighting the growing acrimony and violence between those on the far right and those 
on the left and the dynamic of expected violence this was creating. Protest actions also 
reacted to and acted upon de Gaulle's stand on Vietnam and his standing in France, 
offering a forum for criticism that moved beyond the debates of political parties.4 
Moreover, groups on both the left and the right used their protests to argue over 
interpretations of French history and of France's current role in the world. Through an 
examination of the development of large left-wing groups such as the Collectif 
Intersyndical Universitaire and the Comité Vietnam National, as well as right-wing 
groups such as the student group Occident, this chapter shows that Vietnam War-based 
demonstrations were not simply a response to developments in South-East Asia or an 
escapist measure that allowed protestors to play at social change without addressing the 
situation in their own country. Rather, the surge of Vietnam War protest groups in 1966 
played an essential role in establishing cleavages in French political life, highlighting the 
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growing radicalization of fringe groups and the on-going battle over French national 
identity.  
The "Sentiments of the Majority of Paris:" The PCF and Early Protests 
 The Communist Party exercised, as Marc Lazar put it, a "quasi-hegemony" over 
early protest activities.5 Throughout 1965, in conjunction with their electoral struggle, 
they organized a series of public demonstrations, petition signings, peace vigils, and 
marches to the American Embassy off the Place de la Concorde. Calls to participate 
placed these actions within the challenge to de Gaulle's foreign policy. A 1965 resolution 
of the Union des étudiants communistes (Communist Student Union, henceforth UEC) 
calling for increased Communist protests claimed that "diverse imperialist 
contradictions" motivated de Gaulle to condemn the American effort, but his 
"declarations did not become acts."6 Through their protests, they encouraged participants 
to push de Gaulle to take serious actions such as the diplomatic recognition of North 
Vietnam. At a protest organized by the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Communiste 
(Communist Youth Movement) in February 1965, Roland Leroy of the Central 
Committee denounced the French government for shirking its responsibility as a 
signatory of the Geneva Accords, and arguing that the government should go farther and 
do more -- for example, offering formal protests to the American government, as the 
Communists were doing by presenting a motion condemning U.S. action in Vietnam to 
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the American Consulate.7 The protests tied in with editorial commentary and other 
denunciations of Gaullist foreign policy in an attempt to establish the Communist left as 
an alternative to the Gaullist vision of the world.  
 These early protest activities also worked to tie Vietnam War protests into an 
ongoing narrative of French leftist history.  A January 1965 front-page photo of a 
Vietnamese woman working in the fields appeared under the title "Amie, si tu tombes, un 
ami sort de l'ombre..." ("Friend, if you fall, another friend comes out of the shadows...") -
- a famous line from "Les Partisans," a song written in London during World War II that 
became the anthem of the maquis of the French resistance.8 Its use with the photo of a 
Vietnamese woman connected the maquis of the Vietcong to the French maquis -- which 
had had large numbers of Communist members -- while simultaneously indicating the 
strength of the Vietcong (if one went down, another was waiting) and implying that the 
French Communists stood ready to support them (if the Vietcong went down, the French 
Communist "ami" would step in). The PCF also invoked memories of the Algerian War. 
When members of a Communist led union of dockers decided to donate one day of pay to 
helping the Vietnamese, L'Humanité  noted proudly that they had "solid traditions of 
anticolonial fights" and reminded its readers these dockers had refused to load material 
"intended for use in the sale guerre (dirty war)" when the Algerian War raged in 1953.9 
Communists even drew a connection between the failed 1871 attempt to establish a 
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Commune in France and contemporary activities for Vietnam. Describing a 
commemorative march past the Communards' Wall in Paris' Père Lachaise cemetery, 
where in 1871 leaders of the Commune had been brutally lined up and shot, Jacques 
Kahn waxed lyrical for L'Humanité about the juxtaposition of past and present 
revolutions. The last group of marchers -- which, he noted, was from the working-class 
20th arrondissement of Paris -- stopped before passing the wall, grouping themselves 
together "shoulder to shoulder, a living wall of cohesion and warm force." Continuing 
their walk, they sang out the end of the International: "Workers, peasants, we are/ The 
great party of the workers" as the crowd behind them yelled out "Peace in Vietnam!" 
Combining the historic song of Communist revolution, the location of a past Communist 
uprising, and the support for a contemporary Communist action in a different country led 
Kahn to sigh that the whole event signified an "undying fraternity."10 
 For the Communists, 1966 dawned optimistically, imbued with the same sense of 
brotherhood and dedication to those fighting against the United States inVietnam. As he 
closed one of the first large PCF meetings of the year, Party chairman Waldeck Rochet 
reminded his fellow Communists that "the people of France have, in fact, particular 
reasons to bring their active support to this grand fight for Vietnamese independence and 
for peace." These "particular reasons" included both France's status as a signatory of the 
Geneva Accords and France's international ties to socialist countries. Given French 
obligations, Waldeck Rochet explained, the French Communist Party, "along with its 
central organ L'Humanité and by all means" intended to increase its efforts to "unmask 
the aggressive policies of American imperialism and to develop popular mass protest in 
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all its forms."11 Working with a number of umbrella groups, including the Mouvement de 
la Paix (Peace Movement), the Union des Etudiants Communistes (Communist Student 
Union, hereafter UEC), the Union des Femmes Françaises (French Women's Union), and 
the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Communiste, the Communists quickly set about 
organizing more activities.  
 In presentations of their protests, the Communists portrayed their actions as 
representative of French sentiments as a whole. When groups massed in front of the 
American Embassy on February 3rd to protest an increase in bombing, L'Humanité 
described the resulting "choir of 15,000 voices" as a sort of tout-Paris -- but the "real" 
tout-Paris of working and everyday folks, not a distant elite. "For an hour [...] Paris 
demonstrated its solidarity with the people of Vietnam," L'Humanité wrote, "cried out, to 
the point of losing their voice, their indignation against American aggression [...] beat 
their hands in rhythm for the victory of these heroic people." The group that came out 
represented "the Paris of the factories, of offices, of universities, of schools [...] with the 
young people, so many young people, among the most ardent, the most fervent [.]" 
Delivering a prepared statement condemning the bombings, Party member Raymond 
Guyot insisted his view "express[ed] the sentiments of the immense majority of the 
population of Paris and the suburbs[.]"12 Claiming a popular mandate was key: for the 
Communists, it was essential to position themselves at the center of French Vietnam 
War-related action.   
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"A Particular Obligation to Speak Up and Act": 
Academics, Students and Protest Movements 
 
 In spite of their claims to pre-eminence in protests, the Communists were far from 
alone in opposing the U.S. war effort. In addition to protests run by rival political groups 
such as the Parti Socialiste Unifié, a strong movement also developped in the universities, 
where, as the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire noted, "faced with war, the academics 
and the students of our country have never been indifferent."13 Formed in 1965, the 
Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire [University Intersyndical Collective, henceforth 
CIU] operated as an umbrella organization, coordinating the anti-Vietnam War activities 
of three of the major academic unions in France: the Syndicat National des Chercheurs 
[National Researchers' Syndicate], the Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur 
[National Higher Education Syndicate, henceforth "SNESup"] and the Union National 
des Etudiants de France [the National Student Union of France, henceforth "UNEF."].14 
Its members consisted of professors, researchers, and students, coming from a variety of 
prestigious institutions in France.15 They included some names well-known both in 
academia and in activism, such as the professor Laurent Schwartz, who was a Fields 
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medal recipient for his work in Mathematics and who had at one point lost his university 
job due to his protest activities against the French war in Algeria.16 Although all leftist in 
political orientation, members belonged to a multitude of political parties.  
 Early protests organized by the Collective centered on attempts to educate others 
on the war and on Vietnamese history. Drawing on its academic strengths, these meetings 
featured lectures by academic experts such as Jean Chesneaux, who had extensively 
studied and written on French Indochina.17 The Collective found particular inspiration in 
the activities of American academics, whose efforts "held their attention and demanded 
their sympathy."18 Attempting to demonstrate French "support" and "solidarity," the 
group organized protest efforts in France, including an "International University Week 
Against the Vietnam War" from November 18-25, 1965. 19  Intended as a "week of 
information and discussion," the CIU hoped to involve both academics and the "general 
public" and to encourage a "confrontation of opinions" that would lead to "new forms of 
action" against the war.20 In the CIU's view, academics were uniquely situated as 
protesters. As scientific researchers, they "less than anyone else could tolerate the 
perversion of science" that the American uses of gas and alleged torture in Vietnam 
                                                 
16
 Schwartz gave an excellent overview of his protest activities and his mathematical work in his 
autobiography, A Mathematician Grappling with His Century, trans. S. Schepner (Boston: Birkhauser-
Verlag Basel, 2001).  
 
17
 "Meeting universitaire contre la guerre au Vietnam," Le Monde 22 May 1965. 
 
18
 Union National des etudiants de France: "AFGES: Table Ronde," no date, BDIC F delta 1081/17; the 
same announcement was also sent to newspapers. "Semaine universitaire en France contre la guerre du 
Vietnam," Le Monde 6 November 1965, 7. 
 
19
 Flyer, "L'Université contre la guerre au Vietnam," no date, CAC 20000529 art 2. 
 
20
 J.M. Legay, D. Lahalle, and J.F. Nallet, "Editorial,"; "Semaine universitaire en France contre la guerre du 
Vietnam," Le Monde ; Alfred Kastler, "Les Universitaires devant l'escalade," Le Monde 20 November 
1965.  
 
 57
produced.21 Moreover, they explained, "university faculty members, because of the 
objectivity they owe to the scientific character of their research and because of the 
responsibility they hold in shaping the young," faced a "moral obligation" to work for 
peace in Vietnam.22  
 Similar to the Communists, the CIU inscribed itself within a French leftist history 
of protest against colonial wars. In particular, the Collective emphasized the importance 
of academics' actions in affecting wars' outcomes. An early recruiting letter sent out to 
universities in France and abroad reminded readers that little time had passed since 
France itself possessed colonies, and that numerous academics "took part in the initiatives 
which helped to end [the first war in Indochina], as they did later on with the war in 
Algeria."23 Not everyone agreed their actions had been beneficial. A "Professor Dr. 
CGCJ" returned their letter with the note "In reply to your printed circular of June 1st, 
1965, regarding Vietnam Day, I may remind you that France would still be Vichy-France, 
and Europe under the heel of Hitler if it had not been for the Americans. Never forget 
that!"24 Another wrote to specify he would not join their protest, claiming they supported 
dangerous subversion.25 One recipient returned the letter with the section mentioning 
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Algeria circled in red and "Bunch of fucking assholes!!" written on the margin. 26 Yet this 
did not hinder the Collective. The rapid spread of Vietnam protests through the 
University community could be seen in an August 4, 1965 Nouvel Observateur cartoon, 
where a professor's disembodied head mused to himself "I've been teaching at University 
for five years. My students like me. My colleagues appreciate me. Journals speak well of 
my work. My position seems unassailable." And yet, the head complained, "no one has 
asked me to sign a petition for peace in Vietnam. Where could I have gone wrong?"27 
 Left-wing students at the universities displayed similar interest in organizing 
protests. In addition to its participation in the CIU, the UNEF continued to work on its 
own, aiming its actions at drawing in the youth. As part of their vision of "giving more 
publicity to our protest movement and spreading it to all youth, and not just to students," 
the UNEF sent out feelers in February 1966 about the possibility of organizing a concert 
tour by the "well-known" singer, "model for an entire category of artists right now": "Bob 
Bylan." Their aim, they said, was to get "Bob Bylan" to France not for a "traditional gala" 
but for a "protest meeting."28 Unable to contact him (perhaps due to spelling errors), the 
effort came to nothing, but it indicated the desire of the UNEF to expand the audience of 
their protests and their realization -- similar to the Communists -- of the importance of 
youth backing. This awareness was not limited to the students' union. In mid-February, 
members of various youth-centered groups banded together to form an "action committee 
against the Vietnam War." They intended to centralize their activities to give them more 
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force. As did the Communists, the Committee considered their actions as a challenge to 
the dominance of Gaullist former policy, noting in a release that "We can in no way be 
content with just approving Gaullist policy; its objectives are not ours and the apparent 
coincidences between his positions and those of the left can only be ephemeral."29 
Although their announcement did not directly reference the Communist Party, the 
Committee's constitution nonetheless challenged PCF power over the left by presenting 
an alternative to Gaullist foreign policy originating from outside of the Communist 
Party's own groups.  
 A more serious threat to the PCF arose from the party's own former members, 
however. In 1965, the Communist Student Union (UEC) had undergone a severe purging. 
In two waves, it singled out members harboring sympathies for the Italian Communist 
Party philosophies -- the so-called "Italians" -- and members who had been drawn to 
Trotskysm.30 The exclusion created, in the words of Nicolas Pas, "a diaspora of active 
young militants" looking for a new cause right as the Vietnam War caught more 
attention.31 The Trotskyst members, grouped around Alain Krivine, quickly formed 
themselves into a new group called the "Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire" 
(Revolutionary Communist Youth, henceforth JCR). In one of their introductory texts, 
they placed the Vietnam War at the center of their interests, proclaiming that "the 
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struggle against the war in Vietnam will be, in the months to come, one of the essential 
axes of our combat[.]" Challenging the Communists' control over the anti-war movement, 
the group stated that "the JCR should take the lead on all initiatives aiming to explain and 
denounce American aggression and to popularize the character of the Vietnamese 
revolution."32 As various committees grew, it was becoming clear that while the PCF 
might have seen itself as the center of anti-war activities, other groups on the left did not 
agree.  
"All Partisans of Peace Are Invited to Work Together:" 
Early Divisions and the March 25, 1966 Protests 
 
 Although the left-wing groups supported the same cause, the presence of so many 
protesting at once quickly made the old adage of "too many cooks" seem true. This was 
not to say that the left was incapable of working together. The Tribune Socialiste 
described an April 24, 1966, demonstration resulting from joint efforts of the Saint-Denis 
section of the PCF, the PSU, the SFIO, and the Parti Radical, which after some 
negotiation over a mutually agreeable date ran smoothly. Supported by the original 
groups joined by the Mouvement Contre l'Armement Atomique (the Movement Against 
Atomic Arms, or MCAA), the groups sent out "forty cars, decorated with posters calling 
for peace in Vietnam," which drove around the central parts of town in a pouring 
rainstorm. Reflecting proudly on the successful outing which "took place in the most 
perfect order," the Tribune hoped that "this action, like all the others undertaken in 
France, will be an encouragement for the Vietnamese in their just fight for independence 
and for the American pacifists." Working together, the groups felt they had been able to 
make a stand that helped publicly express their desire "to finally see the end of the 
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massacre of an entire country."33 (This did not, however, mean that their message 
actually got through: a joint protest by the Mouvement de la Paix, the PCF, the UNEF, 
and the CIU on June 30th found their delegation to the American Embassy met by 
staffers who would only repeat over and over again "We don't speak French."34) 
 Despite these instances of unity, multi-group protests often ran into difficulties 
which highlighted the PCF's intransigence, the growing radicalization of parts of the left, 
and the differing views on how France should participate in international calls for peace. 
As early as December 1965, complaints emerged about the Communist Party's insistence 
on portraying itself as in control. Multiple student groups had organized a protest in Paris 
on November 26th, intended to coincide with the CIU's "Action Week" for Vietnam.35 
From their gathering place in the Sorbonne, they headed out towards Châtelet. Marching 
along, they yelled out slogans such as "US go home!" and "Johnson Assassin!," cheered 
as they went by former presidential candidate François Mitterand, whose headquarters 
they passed. The group then listened to a speech by UNEF head Michel Rostain before 
splitting up and heading for home.36  In Tribune Socialiste, the Socialist Students' Union 
praised the joint effort as a demonstration of the "growing awareness among students of 
the primordial importance of the problem of imperialism." They argued, however, that 
the article in L'Humanité, which presented the protest as the brainchild of the Communist 
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Students' Union, was a step backwards for the antiwar movement. "It's certainly not by 
acting like that," the paper remarked, "that we can best move towards unity."37  
 Unity appeared on the agenda again when the Communist-led Mouvement de la 
Paix issued calls for protests in France to coincide with American protests on March 25, 
26, and 27 of 1966.  For this "International Solidarity Week," the Mouvement de la Paix 
encouraged participants to plan "local actions, meetings, delegations to the US embassy 
and consulate, film showings," and to sign a French-written petition to be delivered to 
President Johnson. Significantly, they phrased their call as open to all interested in 
opposing the war. "All peaceful forces in each town or département," the press release 
noted, "all partisans of peace are invited to work together for the preparation and success 
of these days."38 Interest quickly spread. By March 4, L'Humanité announced that 
nineteen groups had joined the planning; by March 11, there were twenty-four.39 
Numerous "personalities" (French members of the cultural elite), including philosopher 
Vladimir Jankélevitch and writer Marguerite Duras, voiced their support, and the protest 
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spread to multiple areas across France.40 By the time the end of March arrived, 
L'Humanité could proudly proclaim that protests were taking place in 110 towns and in 
35 départements.41 Yves Moreau presented the action as France standing up for its own 
defense, noting "The Pentagon [....] has not hidden that it considers the Vietnam War as a 
'testing ground.' The continuing escalation can only lead to the expansion of hostilities. In 
shouting out our disapproval of American aggression, " he therefore concluded,"we are 
defending the security of our home."42  
 In Paris, the main demonstration occurred on March 25th, consisting of a 
gathering in front of the American Embassy, delivery of petitions to the ambassador, and 
a march through the neighboring streets. Student groups gathered first at the Sorbonne 
before moving to join the larger group at the Place de la Concorde. As a delegation 
entered the Amercan Embassy to present "a letter demanding the end of the war," 
protestors numbering somewhere between 20,000 (L'Humanité) and 3,000 (the New York 
Times) chanted slogans outside, crying out "Peace in Vietnam!" "U.S. Go Home!" and 
"U.S. Assassins!"43 After speeches by group leaders, the mass marched down to the 
Opéra, brandishing posters emblazoned with slogans such as "Immediate End to 
American Aggression," "Immediate End to Attacks Against the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam," and "FNL, Only True Representative of South Vietnam." L'Humanité 
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described "innumerable" Mouvement de la Paix posters held high by hands, calling for 
"Peace in Vietnam!"44 The protest, which the New York Times deemed "rather orderly," 
offered to the Communists proof of their ability to connect organizations and tie in to the 
international movement against the war. "Thanks to the initiative originating from the 
Mouvement de la Paix," L'Humanité exulted, "during these three days [...] our country's 
people proclaims with force the demand that today in the United States numerous 
Americans are demanding in their turn."45 The protest appeared an unqualified success. 
 Yet descriptions of the protest from the new student group the Jeunesse 
Communiste Révolutionnaire demonstrated serious divisions within the anti-war 
movement, both in how protest should be handled and in the ideological aims of the 
protestors. "The way this rally unrolled, as well as the lack of preparation in the [protest 
group] sections, shows that the directors of the PCF don't want [...]to organize the 
struggle against U.S. imperialism," the JCR complained. They accused the PCF of 
"colluding" with police forces to keep protestors well-behaved and orderly. One protestor 
claimed to have overheard a Communist leader telling an officer "We have to keep this 
meeting from degenerating into the protest desired by the gauchistes."  But the JCR 
gloated that the Communists had been unable to silence the students, who had brought an 
NLF flag with them and began a chant of "Arms to Vietnam!," a direct challenge to the 
calmer official call by the Mouvement de la Paix, "Peace in Vietnam." Contrary to 
L'Humanité's description of the "crowd vibrating [as the] flag of the NLF glided gently to 
the rue St. Florentin," the JCR told of student groups refusing Communist orders to 
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disperse at the Tuileries and breaking off themselves to head towards the rue St. 
Florentin, forcing protest organizers to have to run frantically after them in order to get to 
the head of the group and appear as though they were leading the movement. The JCR 
claimed the rebel protestors largely ignored the organizers' instructions, deliberately 
letting the leaders -- once they'd caught up -- "walk about ten or twelve meters in front of 
the real head of the group, as if they were people in no way connected to the [protest.]" 
When the prestigious Communist reporter Madeleine Riffaud, recently returned from two 
months spent with the Vietcong, attempted to call for an end to the protest at the Opéra, 
the JCR claimed the protestors whistled at her before singing the "International" over her 
speech. It was, they claimed, the police who finally convinced the protestors to leave. The 
day opened the eyes of the JCR members, who now realized that the organizers "had no 
intention of doing whatever it takes to put an end to the war in Vietnam." Their very 
organization and insistence on unity, calmness and cooperation had damned them in the 
eyes of the more militant leftists, who were looking for a more active denouncement of 
American activities. "Bad day for bureaucrats," the JCR noted.46 
"A Particular Obligation to Speak and Act:" 
New Forms of Protest and Unity and the First "Six Hours for Vietnam,"  
26 May 1966 
 
 A desire for more dynamic protests permeated the non-Communist left beyond 
the gauchistes of the JCR as well. In the spring, its most vibrant manifestation came in 
the May 26th protest "Six Hours for Vietnam," organized by the Collectif Intersyndical 
Universitaire and featuring a roster of well-known French names, including Jean-Paul 
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Sartre. "We can not remain silent," the twenty-one "personalities" at the center of the 
initiative proclaimed in their initial call for the Six Hours meeting. Arguing that the 
American war effort had become more and more "inhuman," they called for "the union of 
all forces who, in France and in the world, notably in the United States, fight against the 
Vietnam War and support the fight of the South Vietnamese people for their 
independence, under the direction of the National Liberation Front."47 Declaring that 
"[a]cademics, students, and French intellectuals remember the traditions of the times of 
the first war in Vietnam and the Algerian War," they stated they "could not rest 
indifferent" and encouraged participation in their teach-in style, six-hour long meeting at 
the Mutualité in Paris.48 The set-up of the protest showed the expanding interest in 
protesting the war, the need to move beyond delegations and petitions, along with a 
continued sense of French historical connections and contemporary obligations to 
fighting against the war.  
 "This will be the longest protest ever organized, in France, against the Vietnam 
War: from 6PM to midnight, Thursday May 26th, at the Mutualité," Olivier Todd 
enthused in Le Nouvel Observateur. "This will not simply be a night of speeches."49 In 
fact, the organizers intended for the meeting to help "renew our traditional styles of 
action." The six hours were symbolic, expressing "our anguished sense of the length of 
the conflict -- and of the continuity of the action we want to lead."50 To inspire new styles 
of protest, the CIU put together a combination workshop and cultural spectacle. Four 
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colloquiums on different topics ("American Imperialism in South-East Asia," "French 
Policy Towards the Vietnamese Problem," "The Situation in Vietnam," and "The 
Struggle Against the Vietnam War in the World,") were bookended by a documentary on 
Vietnam, the premiere of a Joris Ivens film on the war, "Le Ciel et la terre," and 
performances by French singers including Hugues Aufray, famous for singing French 
versions of Bob Dylan songs. Paintings on the war by American, Vietnamese and French 
artists hung from the walls of the Mutualité for participants to admire, and well-known 
members of the Parisian theater world such as Armand Gatti and Roger Blin had 
announced their attendance. International figures from both Vietnam and the United 
States spoke.51 The event, intended to draw attention and force reflection, worked to push 
French protest to the next level. As the organizers put it, "This association of political 
reflection and cultural expression, which makes up the originality of this protest, is very 
significant: our protest against the war is total."52  
 Several thousand people, in majority "students and young people," showed up to 
participate in the six hour teach-in.53 L'Humanité described participants grouped outside 
waiting to get in, blocking the sidewalk outside the Mutualité and causing the procedings 
to get off to a late start.54 Throughout the evening, organizers emphasized the importance 
of French activism to ending the war in Vietnam. Professor Steven Smale of U.C. 
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Berkeley, invited to speak, exhorted the French to believe their participation mattered. "In 
France, people have asked me if a meeting like this can have any influence," he said. "I 
say with force: Yes! What happens in Vietnam concerns the entire world. There is a 
question we must ask ourselves: can the American war machine succeed in keeping a 
country from deciding its own destiny? We must have a unified action respond: No!"55 
Roger Blin, reading a declaration agreed upon by the twenty-one personailties who had 
called the protest, further underlined the importance of French participation and of new 
styles of protest. He declared first that the protest was not simply an emotional call, 
stating "the organizations and the 'personalities' who have joined their efforts here to ask 
the French people to reflect for six hours on the reasons and consequences of the Vietnam 
War and to then mobilize themselves to fight for peace over there do not want to limit 
themselves to an appeal to your pity, to your imagination, to your heart." Rather, he 
argued, the French needed to act from a rational, fact-centered base, and part of that base 
included admitting that France was responsible in part for the war's outbreak. France's 
colonization had provoked the Vietnamese people's resistance, and France had brought 
"the most atrocious forms of war, introduced in France by the nazis," to Vietnam. This 
gave the French, Blin argued, "a particular obligation to speak and act."56 
 The declaration of the twenty-one then went on to place French protest within a 
leftist tradition of action and to argue that unity on the left and new, more decisive 
actions were needed to make an impact. Vietnam, they argued, held the same 
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ramifications for peace in the world as had the civil war in Spain previously. "In France," 
the declaration stated, "it is indispensable that the ensemble of forces on the left feel 
concerned by the bombs falling in Vietnam, as, thirty years ago, the bombs which fell on 
Guernica concerned western democracies." The organizers asked the left to come 
together and particularly to "put pressure on the French government so that it assumes the 
obligations it took in signing the Geneva Accords, and to make it recognize the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam." They ended by insisting on the need to use the new 
knowledge received for good. "We are gathered here not only to proclaim our solidarity, 
but to live it," the twenty-one declared. "What is at stake is pulling the Vietnamese 
people from their torturers, is defending everywhere the right of men to take their destiny 
in hand." They closed with an encouragement for further action. "Our obligation here, 
and beyond these walls, in this moment and tomorrow, is to engage ourselves with all of 
the solemnity of a well-thought out decision, but also with passion, to make sure that the 
Vietnamese people can finally retake their rights, all their rights, in the arena of the 
world's people."57 As Blin finished reading the declaration, Le Monde reported, the 
audience burst spontaneously into "L'Internationale," singing together with their fists 
raised in the air.58 
 The Six Hours protest set the bar for new protest activities, and inspired some of 
its members to insure joint action would continue. A group of 'personalities,' including a 
number of organizers Six Hours for Vietnam, issued a call to create "support committees 
                                                 
57
 Ibid. 
 
58
 "Jeudi soir à la Mutualité, la manifestation 'Six heures pour le Vietnam' a réuni plusieurs milliers de 
participants." 
  
 70
for Vietnam" with plans for a "coordination center against the Vietnam War." 59 But 
while the protest had managed to bring in international participants and unify groups, 
reactions still demonstrated that divisions on the left indicated difficulties over how to 
fight the war and over control issues. The JCR called the 5,000 person meeting "a success 
as far as participation goes," arguing that "the presence of such a crowd, its enthusiasm, 
the content of numerous interventions in the colloquiums lets one see the degree of 
discontent" about the war. They also noted with pleasure the side-by-side presence of the 
representatives of numerous organizations at the tribune. They complained, however, that 
the "spectrum of organizations supporting this meeting does not allow for a great increase 
in understanding the political problems posed by the Vietnamese revolution and the help 
that the international workers' movement should bring it."60 Their comments indicated 
that radicalizing views on the youth of the far left was driving a wedge between them and 
other protest movements. For the Communists, the issue remained one of discipline. Le 
Monde noted that while the PCF had sent members to attend, it had been "from the 
beginning hostile to this protest," and none of the twenty-one 'personalities' who had 
originated the call had ties to the Party. Although it participated, the Party expressed its 
discontent with the meeting shortly after it ended, when it expelled Jean Schalit, one of 
the principal organizers and a former editor of the UEC's newspaper, from the French 
Communist Party.61 The action showed that despite the organizers' plan to "renew" 
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protests and gather unity, splits within French left  politics domestically still affected the 
French left's ability to protest internationally together. 
"Defending the West Wherever It Fights:" 
Right-Wing Protests and the Rise of Occident 
 
 In-fighting on the left butted up against actual physical fights between left and 
right. With the removal of Tixier-Vignancour from the presidential race, another far-right 
group stepped into the national spotlight: Occident. Young, violent, and rabidly 
nationalist, they set their sights on the French left and particularly on their anti-war 
protests. Throughout 1966, their meetings with the left increased in frequency and in 
levels of violence. While their insistence on violent acts made some see them, as one of 
their own put it, "an organization of violent thugs with no brains," Occident's rash actions 
stemmed from a rationalized conceptualization of French national identity, based in pride 
in France, sorrow for her lost empire, belief in white racial hegemony, and virulent anti-
Communism. Small in number, Occident nevertheless contributed in a large way to the 
development of the Vietnam War protest dynamic in France in 1966 by challenging left-
wing dominance in the universities, disputing left-wing and Gaullist presentations of 
French history, and creating an atmosphere of violence which pushed left-wing 
movements towards radicalization.  
 Occident emerged from a split in an earlier far-right student group, Europe-
Action, in 1964.62 Originally led by Pierre Sidos, they began establishing themselves on 
the scene over the course of 1965. Before Sidos fell out with Tixier-Vignancour, 
Occident comprised the majority of the intimidating "Comités T-V" which provided 
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"security" at campaign events. They quickly became the main youth group on the far-
right. Although small in number (total members stood at 300 to 400, but they could only 
"count on" about 40 regulars), Occident used the forces at its disposal extremely 
effectively.63 Taking as their symbol the Celtic Cross, they set out to conquer the Latin 
Quarter. Aware of their smaller numbers, Occident from the beginning employed 
"commando" tactics, operating in small bands, frequently changing locales, and arranging 
for quick approaches and retreats from planned attacks.64 
 From its inception, Occident concentrated its attention on combatting anti-
Vietnam War protests in France. In their view, support by the left -- and by de Gaulle -- 
for the North Vietnamese and for neutrality violated France's national obligations and 
France's historical role as a power of Western civilization, and demonstrated the real 
danger of communism in France.  In an early article in their newspaper, Occident 
Université, the group declared their obligations to support the U.S. in Vietnam, stating 
"Wherever it fights, the West must be defended."65 Support for the American war effort, 
they claimed, tied directly into France's "national interests." For France, defending the 
West meant standing up to de Gaulle's neutralist policy, because "the final victory of 
Communism, in which Monsieur de Gaulle believes, would mean the annhilation of 
France." Arguing that nationalism was the "essential sentimental motor" of the West, 
Occident asserted that "Defending the West involves fighting Communism by insisting 
on putting its partisans outside of the law. Defending the west means stating that France 
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can not be neutral in this conflict which threatens our civilization." Most significantly, 
they argued that by fighting against those who opposed the United States, they would 
keep France true to its past and push it in the direction it was meant to go: "Defending the 
West means wanting to make France a country worthy of its past, turned towards the 
future while faithful to its traditions incarnated in Joan of Arc, Saint-Louis, Napoleon, 
Charles du Foucauld, Liautey, and also Jean-Marie Bastien Thiry."66 In standing up 
against anti-war protestors, Occident intended to shape France in the image it felt best 
represented its history and traditions: those of the white, Christian, nationalist, 
expansionist exponents of Western Civilization, and -- as the inclusion of Jean-Marie 
Bastien Thiry, attempted assassin of Charles de Gaulle, showed -- hostilely opposed to de 
Gaulle and his anti-colonial legacy.  
 Occident began converting these rhetorical attacks into physical assaults in late 
1965. Continual fights between right-wing and left-wing students broke out in the Latin 
Quarter near the end of the year. On November 19th, Le Monde reported, left-wing 
students soliciting donations for the FNL and handing out leaflets in front of the 
university dining hall were set upon by right-wing students armed with sticks and 
pickaxes. One student needed to be hospitalized.67 Shortly thereafter, Rivarol published a 
call to protest by Occident. Portraying themselves as the injured party, Occident called 
for like-minded individuals to join them in disrupting the CIU's planned International 
Protest Week  -- or as they put it, "the communist protest in favor of the Vietcong" -- as a 
way of "countering the Marxist agitators, in order to defend the West wherever it 
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fights."68 That time, Occident was not able to directly confront the left-wing protestors, 
but they were not discouraged.69  
 As1966 progressed, Occident's actions became more organized, more violent, and 
more recognized by others on the far right as a defense of nationalist interests. On March 
25, Occident called for a nationalist student protest to counter the planned Communist 
protest. "At the moment where countries in the 'third world' are ridding themselves of 
Communists, our duty is to do the same thing in France," Occident declared. "The 
generals Suharto and Nguyen Cao Ky have shown us the road to follow. We'll begin by 
transporting into France the methods that have guaranteed their success." During the 
protest, about a hundred militants clashed with the police and split up before regrouping 
and ripping the iron grills off the windows of a Communist Party office.70 Over that 
week, "violent brawls" in the Latin Quarter led Rivarol to laud the union of nationalist 
student groups in the battle against Gaullism and communism. In these fights, Occident 
joined up with the nationalist groups Jeune Alliance (Young Alliance) and the Fédération 
des Etudiants Nationalistes (Nationalist Student Federation) in fighting leftist students.71 
Informing readers of Occident's program of "fighting against communist domination in 
the universities, for the victory of the West wherever it fights, and for the complete and 
immediate amnesty of all patriots imprisoned by the government,"  Rivarol applauded 
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Occident's "ardor and courage." The UNEF, Rivarol gloated, would "from now on be 
able to find someone to 'talk' to, if that's what they're looking for."72  
 In late May, Occident, "determined to smash communist action in the Latin 
Quarter," called for nationalist students to join them in "breaking" a planned JCR protest 
on the twentieth in support of the Vietcong.73 The resulting clash gave the far-right writer 
Robert Anders of Rivarol "hope for the future."74 Storming the Latin Quarter to chants of 
"Vietcong Assassin!" and "Nationalism!," the right-wingers at first found themselves 
blocked from the JCR by the police. Pushed back, Occident moved into the neighboring 
streets, smashing the windows of La Joie de Lire, a Maoist bookstore, throwing a smoke 
bomb into the cafe Le Campollion, a gathering spot for leftists, and causing several 
injuries.75 Encountering some JCR militants venturing out of the Sorbonne, Occident 
began fighting with them. The far-right students' strength was so overwhelming, Rivarol 
claimed, that the JCR was forced to flee to the Right Bank to hold the rest of its protest. 
Occident, now "masters of the Latin Quarter," marched back towards the Sorbonne 
chanting slogans "favorable to President Johnson's politics." They clashed with the police 
again, causing some injuries and a few arrests, none of which were maintained. By 8PM, 
the Latin Quarter was calm, although some nationalist students remained to keep an eye 
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out. "Wasted effort," Rivarol noted; "the lesson was a good one and the communists were 
not coming back." 76 
 "It's comforting to see that the French youth has stayed, in its immense majority, 
hostile to the anti-American policies of the government," Rivarol reflected after the 
clashes. The protests, Anders asserted, had demonstrated that the nationalist students 
were a force to be reckoned with and "would not tolerate any Gaullist-communist 
provocation." The fights were "encouraging" because they showed that without bringing 
in the workers -- who, Anders claimed, were more interested in "defending their dinner 
steaks than their 'Vietcong brothers'"-- the leftist students were unable to stand up to 
Occident and could do nothing beyond "shouting out slogans and insults." Most of all, 
Anders remarked, the battles let him have "hope in the future, because they cement the 
union [...] between nationalist party militants at the base, who are too often divided at the 
summit."77 As Occident rose to prominence, its violent methods drew more attraction and 
approval, and began unifying the right-wing student groups into one viciously armed 
force. 
Trying to "Start from Zero:" 
Leftwing Unity and The Formation of the Comité Vietnam National 
 
 While the far right closed ranks, the left entered the fall of 1966 more determined 
to act against the war but just as divided. Protests had continued throughout the summer 
months, but differences between the Communist Party and other activists and 
disagreements among the major leftwing political parties kept the left from presenting a 
unified front. In September of 1966, the left received another blow when de Gaulle spoke 
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out against the war at Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 1966 had already been a watershed year 
for de Gaulle as far as Indochina was concerned. In January, he had exchanged letters 
with Ho Chi Minh, and over the course of the spring he took the necessary steps to 
extract France from NATO's military command. But his most striking contribution came 
at Phnom Penh, where, in a speech in front of thousands that was immediately relayed 
around the world, he placed the blame for the war on American shoulders, acknowledged 
the validity of the NLF as partners in any mediation, and offered up his own success in 
Algeria as a model for how the U.S. could leave Vietnam. His condemnation of U.S. 
actions -- the most direct he had offered to date -- and his presentation of France's past in 
Algeria, as resolved by his actions as president, as a way of ending war in Vietnam, 
raised yet more obstacles to a left still struggling to come out of the shadow of his foreign 
policy.78  
 In their reactions to the speech, the left questioned de Gaulle's sincerity but also 
underlined how his comments forced them to act more decisively. Christian Pineau of Le 
Populaire decried de Gaulle as a spokesman for peace in Vietnam, noting that he had, at 
the end of World War II, been responsible for  the start of the first Indochina War (which 
he then abandoned to the Fourth Republic), and aruging that he clearly did not support 
peace, as he had followed his Phnom Penh declarations with further nuclear tests.79 
Slightly more generous, L'Humanité admitted that "[they] appreciat[ed] this speech as an 
element that could help lead to a political solution," but hastened to note that "it in fact 
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takes up positions that we've been holding since the start of the conflict, more than ten 
years ago." They also reminded their readers that even if he was right on Vietnam, de 
Gaulle was not to be trusted, warning "We do not forget at all that he who gave this 
speech does not obey the same motives that we do."80 Laurent Schwartz admitted that de 
Gaulle had a "left-wing policy" internationally, recognized by the Third World. But he 
refused to let this hold back the left, arguing "We can surpass Gaullism. De Gaulle," he 
remarked, "does not have the domestic policy of his international policy."81 In other 
words, despite their agreement with de Gaulle on international matters the left could still 
be a valid player on the homefront and make a significant impact worldwide. 
 Convinced that a left working together would be more effective, a handful of 
well-known intellectuals and academics launched a call in October 1966 to create one 
over-arching committee for all Vietnam protest groups. Their organization, the Comité 
Vietnam National (National Vietnam Committee, or CVN), would go on to become "the 
most active and the most prestigious" protest group.82 Yet reactions to the Comités 
creation demonstrated the depth of divisions on the left, showing how they extended 
beyond a simple Communist/others split and highlighting the desire for more radical 
actions against the war.  
 The idea for the Comité Vietnam National had its roots in the May 14th call for 
"support committees for Vietnam" with a planned " 'coordination center against the 
Vietnam war,' grouping the totality of interested French organizations," which Laurent 
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Schwartz had the charge of creating.83 Although the committee did not put together 
anything large during the summer, in September 1966 they began working to create 
another meeting which they hoped would be "if possible, even more massive."84 Dealings 
with the PCF for the first meeting had been "long and difficult," and preliminary 
discussions for the second meeting proved no different.85 At a reunion to discuss the 
possibility of a new "Six Hours," Schwartz described running into "considerable 
reticence" from those in the Communist camp. "Lively" discussions dragged on until 
midnight, at which point a frustrated Schwartz broke in. "There's no point in looking for 
an agreement," he said, "we're not going to find it. So, [eh bien] we'll organize the protest 
ourselves." His faction broke off to work on their own. In his memoirs, Schwartz 
described it as "leaving for a new adventure. I had the feeling I was taking a sacred risk 
for Vietnam."86 
 In his venture, Schwartz was joined by four other intellectuals: Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Alfred Kastler, and Henri Bartoli. The group brought a mix of 
tradition and cachet to the anti-war movement. All were known in France, with 
philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre as the unquestionable "star."87 Schwartz and Vidal-Naquet 
had, along with Sartre, been heavily involved in protesting the Algerian War. Vidal-
Naquet, a historian, had made a name for himself with his role in the Comité Audin, a 
group which protested French use of torture in Algeria. Kastler, a physicist, had recently 
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won the Nobel Prize for his work. As an activist, he had joined Sartre and Schwartz in 
protesting against the Algerian War in 1958. Beginning in 1965, he had worked with the 
CIU, writing a piece in Le Monde supporting their November 1965 meeting which 
established historical parallels between the actions of contemporary American academics 
and of French academics during the Algerian war.88 Bartoli, less well-known, had been a 
member of the French group "Association d'Amitié Franco-Vietnamienne" (French-
Vietnamese Friendship Group) and was active on the Christian left. 89 
 The first call for a Comité Vietnam National went out in October and focused 
upon France's intimate connection with Vietnam's fight: "Thousands of miles from 
Europe, a people whom nothing can bring down is fighting for their liberty. They are also 
fighting for ours." Claiming that the U.S. used Vietnam as a way of determining just how 
far it could go towards global domination, the organizers argued that the time had come 
for the French to make a stronger stand. "Meeting up to proclaim our admiration or our 
solidarity with the North Vietnamese and NLF fighters is no longer sufficient," they 
proclaimed. "All those who in this country support their fight must engage themselves 
without reserve so that the Vietnamese people can finally win peace and independence." 
To this end they were creating the Comité Vietnam National. They planned for the 
formation of multiple "base committees" who would report up to the "national 
committee" and asked existing groups to join up with them. Many, they claimed, had 
already agreed. They finished by emphasizing the importance of working together. 
"Today," they said, "dispersion hurts our efficiency and, faced with the seriousness of 
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events, we feel the need, in our fight by the side of the Vietnamese people, to call 
immediately for unity."90 To this end, they invited all protestors to join them at a new 
"Six Hours" meeting, this one bearing a title that demonstrated its larger aims: "Six Hours 
of the World for Vietnam." 
 Laurent Schwartz offered more details of their vision of how the Comité Vietnam 
National would run in an interview in Le Nouvel Observateur in November. "We'd like, 
in some way, to start from zero," he explained. Since the existing anti-war groups were 
too "scattered," they believed that a national organization would "regroup all the 
energies." Not planning on direct control over the local committees, they hoped that these 
base committees would instead allow coordination by the national group, which would let 
those that wished "keep a certain autonomy." The group planned to support several extant 
movements, including the "Milliard pour le Vietnam," which aimed to collect a billion 
old francs to send to North Vietnam, and the Russell Tribunal, which aimed to put the 
U.S. on trial for war crimes in Vietnam.91 But the committee planned to shake up the 
protest movement by "going farther." Their "Six Hours of the World" protest would 
move beyond Paris, with "Six Hours" meetings taking place in multiple cities 
simultaneously. Schwartz said the organized had considered other issues as well. "We 
could effectively boycott American products in France," Schwartz remarked, suggesting 
taking aim at companies such as Ford and Coca-Cola. "We have to think carefully about 
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this." In particular, Schwartz noted, the committee wanted to break intellectuals out of 
their ghetto and take their issues about Vietnam to the workers as well.. Deploring the 
current "screen" splitting the people from intellectuals, he argued the group should be 
able to go "do a 'teach-in' at the Renault factories."92 
 Most of all, however, Schwartz argued that the CVN wanted to "shake up public 
opinion" by reminding protestors of their historical power and by overcoming divisions 
within the left. He told Le Nouvel Observateur that "Lots of people are discouraged. They 
tell us 'You get involved for nothing and nothing comes out it...'" Schwartz particularly 
felt that intellectuals had given up after the Algerian war, feeling that their actions there 
had accomplished nothing. "This is false," Schwartz said. "[W]e made public opinion 
aware of the problems with the Algerian war." The awareness had created pressure on the 
government which caused de Gaulle to act and led to the end of the war. For Vietnam, 
Schwartz argued, intellectuals could have the same impact. However, he admitted that 
"the current formations of the left [....] are not very effective." He specifically singled out 
the difficulty of working with the Communists, saying "We asked for communist 
signatures. We're always ready to receive them. A unified movement can not happen 
without the communists. But for the moment, they don't want to s'engager in this 
direction." The CVN hoped, Schwartz said, that the Communists would change their 
minds and come to the Six Hours of the World protest.  
 Continued difficulties with the Communists did exist, demonstrating the ongoing 
struggle for control on the left. On October 28th, Jean-Pierre Kahane, a Communist and 
member of the original Six Hours committee, wrote a letter to Le Monde complaining 
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about the CVN's decision to call their inaugural meeting "Six Hours of the World for 
Vietnam." He claimed that the original organizers had recently met to figure out how to 
follow up the Six Hours protest, but at no point did anyone invoke the possibility of "Six 
Hours of the World."93 He declared slyly that he hoped Le Monde's source was mistaken, 
for he believed the CVN founders would be "incapable" of "trying to annex the succes of 
May 26th for their own ends." Kahane noted nevertheless that "if [Le Monde's] 
information is confirmed, it will be sad to see that, by a maladroite initiative, the 
organizers of 'Six Hours of the World' are adding a ferment of division to the current 
dispersion of efforts." Schwartz responded in Le Monde with a brief but biting letter, 
accusing Kahane of not taking a strong enough stand for what he knew was right. The 
choice of the title "Six Hours of the World," Schwartz admitted, was an error on the part 
of the organizers who "hadn't thought long" about its problems. But the organizers, he 
pointed out, were not the only ones who should be admitting guilt. The first Six Hours 
had been marked by an "atmopshere that was frequently stifling, and certain people had 
inexcusable attitudes[.]" The current group's actions were intended to move on from that 
dysfunctional atmosphere "in the interest of communal action for Vietnam." This, 
Schwartz claimed, had been threatened by Kahane's anger at "an erreur de forme" on the 
part of the CVN; anger Schwartz found to be part of a "shocking dissymmetry" of action 
given his silence when faced with the "scandalous behavior of some of his fellow Party 
members." Schwartz said that he hoped with his letter, the conflict would go away and 
that activists "could come to a positive agreement for unitary action."94 
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 But the Communists were not the only ones unhappy with the large-scale aims of 
the CVN. Although the group claimed in their original call to have already drawn in 
numerous established local groups, comments by other groups showed an unwillingness 
to abandon ideological control to one group in the name of left-wing unity. The Milliard 
Campaign put out a press release stating they would be at the Six Hours of the World for 
Vietnam protest, but specifying that "this presence in no way implies [the Milliard's] 
adhesion to the Comité Vietnam National, which would exceed the limits of its 
mandate[.]"95 Announcing the creation of their Vietnam Committee, the students at the 
Institute for Labor Studies emphasized that they intended to maintain their independence. 
A flyer for their group announced that: 
THE COMMITTEE commits: 
1) to creating and supporting all initiatives which fall into its defined 
perspectives [on how to support Vietnam] 
2) to undertake a full examination of study and propaganda on the 
conditions, the significance and the actual consequences of this war.  
THE COMMITTEE, currently AUTONOMOUS, reserves for itself the 
possibility of participating in campaigns and organizations which appear 
to it to be working in the same sense [as the committee].  
 
At the moment, the flyer noted, the committee members "are in agreement about 
participating very efficiently for the success of the 'Six Hours of the World for Vietnam' 
protest," created by the CVN. They then quickly added, however, "Not to say that we're 
joining up organically, at this point, with this committee [the CVN], but rather that we are 
in agreement with the type of support that the promoters of this protest want to offer to 
the Vietnamese fighters." Willingness to participate in the meeting, as these groups 
showed, did not mean willingness to conform to the CVN's wishes.  
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 Along similar lines, the UNEF spoke out against the CVN's plans. In a letter to 
Laurent Schwartz, Jean Terrell, the UNEF's president,  expressed the student group's 
discontent with how the creation of the CVN had been handled. Specifically, he wrote, 
the UNEF opposed "the very unfortunate title that lends itself to confusion witht the 
protest of last May 26th" and the "precipitous and not very courteous character of the five 
personalities' call towards the UNEF, which was an active partner for each of the 21 
[organizers of the original Six Hours]." More than this general discourtesy, Terrell noted, 
the UNEF had concerns about the level of control the national committee would offer, or 
the necessity of even having any control from a national committee. "[The UNEF] 
supports developing, among students, base committees [...] which will organize 
information and agitation against the war," Terrell wrote, "at the same time as they work 
to cause an anti-imperialist awakening of conscience among the students. [The UNEF] 
does not believe, however, that a national coordination of base committees actually 
existing is desirable." National coordination, they noted, would only exist if the national 
group could prove itself to be truly unitary and if the base committees were truly active. 
"We think," Terrell told Schwartz, "that if the base committees should one day come 
under a national coordinating structure, this must come truly from the committees and not 
be 'astutely' imposed upon them."96 
 Yet despite these reservations, the UNEF noted that "the November 28th protest 
and the eventual constitution of a Comité Vietnam National are -- of course -- two 
distinct things." The UNEF agreed to support "Six Hours of the World for Vietnam," 
stating that "it is vital that students' and workers' opposition to American imperialism and 
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the Johnson administration be shown this rentrée. And we are, in this way, favorable to 
all protests which aim to increase this opposition." To that end, the UNEF had called 
upon its militants to support the protest and were distributing at the universities 50,000 
copies of a tract about the protest's aims.97 But even their publicity about the event 
retained a cautionary note: in a press release about the UNEF's Vietnam-based activities 
which included a statement of their support for the Six Hours of the World Protest, the 
group declared that "the UNEF calls to create base committees of support for the 
Vietnamese people in study groups and facultés [...] The UNEF believes that this task 
takes priority and comes before any national coordination of these committees[.]"98 Like 
the other groups, the UNEF's declarations showed a willingness to work together but a 
continued current of independence among groups which interfered with complete unity 
on the left.  
 Despite resistance from the Communists, and unwillingness of other groups to 
submit to the CVN, the "Six Hours of the World for Vietnam" protests drew large 
numbers of participants. The meeting in Rouen highlighted the movements' ability to 
draw in multiple groups and big names, even outside of Paris, and to overcome the PCF's 
opposition. Militant Gérard Filoche recalled that the Rouen organizers managed to get Le 
Dinh Nan, a North Vietnamese official, to come to the protest. "The PCF was furious," he 
remembered, "but all the democratic organizations opposed to the war in Rouen brought 
their support to our initiative." To hold the protest, the group rented out the Cirque de 
Rouen, a large building with a capacity of 3000. They offered up "films by Roger Pic and 
Wilfred Burchett, images and books by Madeleine Riffaud," as well as talks by Jean-
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Pierre Vigier, recently back from Vietnam,  Mary Alice Waters, head of the American 
Socialist Workers' Party, and an American deserter who received a standing ovation. The 
Vietnamese also showed up, despite being warned by the PCF that "they were coming to 
support 'a band of gauchistes.'" Filoche reminisced over the success, stating "This was a 
triumph: we, a small group of adolescent activists [...] we had managed to do what none 
of the old parties on the left had wanted or been able to do: a paying meeting of a 1,500 
enthusiastic participants working for peace by an NLF victory."99 It was clear the left 
could come together for a good meeting even without the support of the PCF.     
 The central protest, "Six Hours of the World for Vietnam" on November 28th in 
Paris, showed the new levels the CVN organizers were hoping to reach. The meeting 
incorporated many of the cultural and political elements that had characterized the 
uniqueness of the original "Six Hours" presentation, but on a grander scale. Five 
thousand people crowded into the Mutualité for a night that offered speeches, teach-in 
style colloquiums, and performances, as the first "Six Hours" had, but with more options 
(five colloquiums instead of four), a more global focus (appearances by several "eminent 
foreign personalities" from Brazil, Morocco, Cuba, the United States and the 
Netherlands), and more star power (opening speeches by Schwartz and Kastler and a 
central speech by Sartre). Participants had the possibility of learning about "Methods of 
Fighting Against Aggression," "Gaullism and the Vietnam War," "The United States 
Faced with the War," "Vietnam's Social and National Liberation," and "The Anti-
Imperialist Fight in the World." As part of the cultural section organized by playwright 
Armand Gatti and actor/writer Claude Roy, they could then watch the world premiere of 
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Wilfred Burchett, an Australian filmmaker's, new documentary "L'Enlisement, l'impasse" 
as well has hearing readings from actress Loleh Bellon. In addition to performances by 
Pierre Asso, Jacques Martin, and Pia Colombo, those attending got to hear the French 
premiere of Italian singer Luigi Nono's song dedicated to the FNL, "The forest is so 
young and full of life." The announcement in Le Monde specified that the event's poster 
had been painted by Max Ernst, the German painter and well-known surrealist.100 
Through the additional celebrity and spectacle, the meeting outpaced any previous French 
offering. The Tribune Socialiste cheered that the protest showed that "it was thus possible 
to bring action in France against the Vietnam War, and to affirm our solidarity with the 
Vietnamese people, at a much higher level."101   
 During the night, speakers underlined the need for French involvement and the 
need for new protest methods. Opening the meeting, Laurent Schwartz said that the 
protest was meant to show "the solidarity of French public opinion with the North 
Vietnamese people, as they fight against American imperialism."102 Sartre, whose 
comments Simone de Beauvoir said "caused unbridled enthusiasm" to break out, stood in 
front of the auditors and declared "We want peace in Vietnam, but not just any peace."103 
Taking a stand against the tone of recent protests, Sartre continued, "But we do not want 
this peace for simple moral reasons. Morality is not a sufficient motive. Our motive, the 
motive of our combat, must be political." Sartre placed support for the North Vietnamese 
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as part of a larger fight against "American hegemony, against American imperialism." 
Tying the French future tightly to the outcome of the Vietnam War, he concluded, "The 
defeat of the Vietnamese people would be politically our defeat, the defeat of all free 
people. Because Vietnam is fighting for us."104  
 "The Likes of Which Have Not Been Seen for Years:" 
Increasing Protests and Radicalization at the End of 1966 
 
 Reflecting on the "Six Hours of the World for Vietnam" meeting, the CVN 
exulted in 1967 that "the success of this meeting immediately let the CVN gain a solid 
base." Starting in December and continuing on, the CVN noted, militants had formed 
base committees throughout Paris and its suburbs. Multiple protests showed the force of 
these groups, including one on December 16th featuring the CVN, the UNEF, the PCF, 
the Mouvement de la Paix and the CIU, which also highlighted its ability to create 
unity.105 Others also applauded the growing protest movement. In an article in the 
Tribune Socialiste entitled "The Escalation of Refusal," the writers described an early 
December protest and cheered the strength of feeling against the war in France. "The 
success of this protest, put together in a very short time period, after the success of the 
two 'Six Hours for the Vietnam' evenings organized by the Comité Vietnam National," 
the Tribune wrote, conflating the early non-CVN protest with the more recent gathering, 
"shows very well how much French workers and intellectuals are determined to assert 
their solidarity with the just struggle for national liberation led by the Vietnamese people 
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and the NLF fighters."106 Looking back on 1966 for the Christian left newspaper Esprit, 
Jean-Marie Domenach spoke of a year full of "meetings so virulent, so exuberant, the 
likes of which have not been seen for years."107 In the number of protests and the 
attempts at left-wing unity, 1966 marked a new beginning of political activism for the left 
in France, raising them from the stupor into which they had fallen since the end of the 
Algerian War.  
 But as noted, the renewed activity did not come without strife. Even the "Six 
Hours of the World for Vietnam" meeting, which had drawn in groups even if they were 
unwilling to acquiesce to all of the CVN's demands, found controversy. Le Monde's 
summary of the protest noted continuing divisions among the left, with splits primarily 
along the Soviet/Chinese lines. More damningly, it dismissed a left "expressing itself in 
terms which too often reflect less a real knowledge of the facts, than poorly rationalized 
preferences."108 Conflict had also emerged during the meeting, where Alfred Kastler's 
contribution was roundly booed and led to perceptions of a "duel" between him and 
Sartre. Where Sartre had argued for an NLF victory and more committed protests at 
home to support the Vietnamese who were "fighting for us," Kastler had spoke out for a 
peace based on compromise. Attempting to explain himself later to Le Nouvel 
Observateur, Kastler remarked "If the Vietnamiens' war is really our war, then it's up to 
us to participate in it as well: we can't, we don't have the right, to say to the Vietnamese 
'Fight until the end to defend our cause.'" He explained "I'm just worried that we'll end up 
asking too much from the Vietnamese people and that if we get comfortable with the idea 
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that they're fighting for us, we'll finish by letting them fight along against American 
imperialism[.]"109 There were, he felt, other fights the French could join in, and fighting 
for his idea of a compromise peace could be one of them. While Kastler insisted that 
despite this divergence, he and Sartre remained in agreement on the "essentials" of the 
war, their fight and Le Monde's observations demonstrated that splits in opinion hindered 
joint action for the left.  
 Perhaps more to the point was a comment Pierre Vidal-Naquet made during the 
"Six Hours of the World for Vietnam" rendez-vous, when he reminded participants that 
"A meeting is not a revolution, and the Mutualité is not France."110 An IFOP poll from 
1966 showed that while 41% of the French disapproved American actions in Vietnam, 
49% had no opinion, an attitude which commentator Jean Lacouture described as 
"expressing more scepticism, it seems, than indignation."111 While a good number of the 
French opposed the war, helped on, as Lacouture noted, by de Gaulle's condemnation and 
a general "nurtured" anti-Americanism, the "'large batallions' of the campaign against the 
war are still found on the left and far-left." And these groups, Lacouture reminded his 
readers, were continually split by in-fighting. The protest groups were marked by "the 
conjunction of the most official conformism and the most vehement anti-conformism," 
Lacouture remarked. But even these differences were balanced out by a uniting goal: "a 
common refusal to accept the law of the strongest."112  
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 If not involving the majority of the French, the protest movement in 1966 had 
nevertheless spread rapidly, increasing in size and notoriety while moving from 
traditional protests to more radical, and often more violent, actions. During the December 
16th protest referenced by the CVN, protestors clashed violently with the police, causing 
multiple injuries among both police and protestors and leading to numerous arrests.113 
During the fights, protestors chanted "Charonne, Charonne!," invoking the police-
protestor clash during the Algerian war which had resulted in the death of 9 protestors. 
For the left, the increased police repression indicated the repressive nature of the French 
state and challenged the apparent progressivism of de Gaulle's views on Vietnam. 
Describing a police beating during a different early December protest, the Tribune 
Socialiste told of a young protestor walking by with long hair, a typical sign of a left-
wing youth, similar to hippie styles in the States. "You're going to get the hell out of here, 
gonzesse," a police officer cried out, using an insult that mixed the word for Vietnamese 
monks (bonze) and the left (gauche) but included a feminine ending. As the Tribune 
Socialiste recounted, the protestor stopped and asked "Does it bother you that I'm yelling 
'Peace in Vietnam?," at which point multiple officers began beating him. An "elegant and 
polite" older woman watching from a nearby café as the police loaded protestors up into 
paddy wagons asked "But why is De Gaulle letting them do this is?" A nearby protestor 
responded, "No. Why is he making them do this?" The change from trying to work 
against agreement with de Gaulle, to directly challenging de Gaulle as repressive, would 
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find more echo in the protests emerging in 1967 and was defined by the protestor's cries 
that day as they yelled "US Assassins! De Gaulle complicit!"114 
 The emerging aggression of left-wing protests was amplified by ever-growing 
attacks by the far-right, which contributed to creating a general atmosphere of violence. 
Testifying to the importance of the CVN, Occident attacked their headquarters twice over 
a week. According to one of the CVN witnesses, seven militants had been sitting in their 
office "when a dozen students burst into the interior, armed with billyclubs and chambres 
à air filled with sand. They fell upon us," he recalled, "overturning all the furniture as 
they came. Before leaving, they broke all the windows." Four of the CVN members 
attacked suffered serious bruising.115 Occident also disturbed a Vietnam War peace 
meeting held by left-wing Christians, at which, Rivarol pointed out, the left's "services 
d'ordre" gave as good as they got.116 In Toulouse, the Fédération des étudiants 
nationalistes attacked students protesting the war, "beating them with boards ripped off a 
construction site, billy clubs, and belt buckles." One student had to be hospitalized. They 
followed this with an attack on the Association générale des étudiants at Toulouse, where 
several UNEF members were injured.117 Shortly thereafter, student groups demanded that 
Occident be dissolved, arguing that "it would be inadmissible to confuse such aggression 
with the legitimate exercise of political and syndical student activity in the universities, 
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and with the right of propaganda, which is also tied to a democratic society."118 Lodging 
a complaint after his son was so badly beaten in a Latin Quarter confrontration that he 
needed his skull trepanned, novelist David Rousset said he had decided to pursue legal 
avenues "not for personal vengeance, but to alert public opinion. The seriousness of this 
incident comes from the fact that it is not unique," he noted. "In Paris and in the 
provinces, a movement of violence is developing."119 The violence played into the 
growing desire of groups on both sides to push beyond traditional protest methods, to 
challenge each other for hegemony and the right to speak. Frédéric Charpier's description 
of the end of the year summed up nicely the situation: "Pipe wrenches, iron bars, fists 
American style: the escalation was there. The year 1966 ended in a crescendo of 
violence."120 While he was referring to Occident, the general radicalization held 
throughout the youth. As L'Express noted, "More and more, kicks and punches are taking 
the place of dialogue. The brutality has no faith nor political horizon."121 
Conclusion 
 The emerging violence, the growing strength and presence of Occident, and the 
establishment of large groups which challenged the Communist Party's hegemony meant 
that 1966 changed the face of Vietnam War protests in France. Action for and against the 
war had moved from party politics in 1965 to street actions in 1966. Many of these 
actions continued some of the debates that had been raised during the '65 presidential 
season, notably over how to represent French history, particularly the legacy of the 
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Algerian war, and over how France should take a stand in the world. But the growing 
radicalization allowed protestors to take a firmer stand against de Gaulle, challenging his 
policies more vocally and, by changing the forum to one outside of the foreign policy 
arena he controlled, bringing the issues to the domestic front. The continued dissonance 
within the left-wing both hindered and helped the protest movements. In particular, the 
creation of new groups created a power force for the left outside of the Communist Party, 
raising a challenge of the Party being passed on its left which would continue to plague 
the PCF until the far left exploded in 1968. Finally, the increase in violent clashes 
between protestors and police, and between left and right, laid the foundation for an 
increasing radicalization of militants over the next year. These experiences would be, as 
Laurent Jalabert has shown, "at the origin of the '68 generation." The Communist Party 
was pleased in July with what it had seen, and Domenach in January 1967 saw 1966 as 
the most exuberant protests he'd seen in years. But these protests were nothing compared 
with what was to follow.  Overall, 1966 set in place the groups and atmosphere which 
would push Vietnam War protests in France forward on a higher level, questioning as 
they did the policies of de Gaulle, of the left, of the far right, and of the identity of France 
itself.  
  
 
Chapter Three: 
"Today We Must Clearly Take a Stand:" 
The Growing Radicalization of the Vietnam War Movement in France, 1967 
 
 On January 12, 1967, a deep fog lay over the university campus at Rouen. As the 
lunch hour started, a group of Parisian right-wing students belonging to the militant 
organization Occident emerged from their cars and headed towards the dining hall. Their 
target: a group of about sixty left-wing students who, according to the far-right paper 
Rivarol put it, were "dressed in dark leather jackets, wearing hammer-and-sickle style fur 
caps, [and] holding a meeting at Rouen in honor of the Vietcong."1 The students, 
Rouennais members of the Comité Vietnam National, had gathered on either side of the 
line into the dining hall to ask students for money and support for a CVN activities.2 As 
they pressed for more donations, the Occident group suddenly burst forth from the fog, 
shouting "Occident vaincra, Occident passera, de Gaulle au poteau!" ["Occident will 
win, Occident will pass, lynch de Gaulle!"]3 The left-wing students never had a chance. 
In the blink of an eye, Occident was upon them, beating them with iron bars, billy clubs, 
and other improvised weapons. Before the students in the dining hall had even had the 
chance to pour out into the courtyard in response to the cries of "Fight!" that had broken 
out, Occident finished their work, smashing the front windows of the dining hall before 
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disappearing into the fog again. In the chaos left behind them, amidst pools of blood and 
broken glass, several students lay seriously injured, one in a coma with a fractured skull.4 
"Communism aggression has suffered a new setback," cheered Rivarol. "Next, the Latin 
Quarter, Nanterre, Montpellier, and the University of Rouen plan on liberating 
themselves from their 'bolcho' students."5  
 The attack made national news, and police quickly launched an investigation to 
find the perpetrators. As the authorities searched, far-right students struck again 
repeatedly: breaking up a meeting in Bordeaux, attacking a group seeking donations for 
the Vietnamese in Lyon, and at one point, jumping two men hanging theater 
advertisements in Paris whom they mistook for left-wing militants posting pro-Vietcong 
propaganda.6 In March, five students came under arrest for the Rouen attacks. Newspaper 
coverage showed them unrepentant: in a photo in Paris-Normandie, Occident member 
(and future French government Minister) Alain Madelin held up his cuffed hands and 
smiled as police led him away.7 Despite earning fines and jail time for several of its 
members, Occident did not stop counter-protesting and attacking anti-war movements in 
France.  And despite Rivarol's boasts, Occident's acts only spurred more leftist protest 
activity. CVN militant Gérard Filoche recalled that the Rouen Comité Vietnam received a 
bump in membership after the attacks and even formed a temporary "anti-fascist and pro-
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democracy" front with the French Communist Party.8 Throughout 1967, their group, and 
others like it, would grow.  
 In 1967, the Vietnam War permeated France. Richard Perrin, an American 
deserter then resident in Paris,  recalled seeing "a mannequin dressed in a U.S. pilot's 
uniform" and "sandals made from the tires of downed American warplanes and rings 
fashioned from similar wreckage" for sale at the Vietnamese section of the Villejuif fair.9 
On the news every evening, the war often spilled over into the streets, with numerous 
major protests occuring throughout the year. The protest movements also continued to 
expand. As the Comité Vietnam National became more firmly entrenched, it found itself 
challenged not only by a recalcitrant French Communist Party but also by the newly 
emerged Maoists Comités Vietnam de base (Local Vietnam Committees, or CVBs). 
Occident strengthened its ranks, stepped up its violent tactics, and found support from 
more established members of the far right by providing "security" for the former French 
paratrooper, Algerian War veteran, and far-right politician Roger Holeindre and his 
newly formed group, the Front Uni pour Vietnam de Sud (United Front for South 
Vietnam). While those involved in active protest represented, as activist René Dumont 
noted in early January, only a small proportion of the total French population, they were 
nevertheless strongly committed to their cause and convinced that their actions in France 
had ramifications for the outcome of the war abroad and, by extension, for France itself.  
In his own call for participation, Dumont wrote "History is not made by the passive, and 
our action can quickly become truly effective. If we don't manage to stop the formidable 
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'escalation' we risk soon suffering from it directly and personally."10 For far-right 
activists, the fight held similar significance; as Francine Dessaigne wrote in Rivarol early 
February, "Vietnam is most likely the last stand in the free world."11  
 As the central focus of French protestors in 1967, the Vietnam War offered a 
prime means of articulating their conceptions of the world and their desires for France. 
While some interactions between groups rehashed debates established the previous year, 
1967 holds significance because the emergence of new players and new dialogues forced 
a reconceptualization of French protest methods, created deeper rifts between activists, 
and led to more radicalized understandings of French roles on both the right and the left. 
Nicolas Pas has shown in his dissertation, "Sortir de l'Ombre du Parti Communiste," that 
anti-war protest groups at this time served as a means for left-wing groups to free 
themselves from the tutelage of the French Communist Party. Yet as this chapter will 
show, divisions extended beyond the Communist/non-communist dichotomy. Through an 
examination of five key protests, this chapter will trace the developments in French 
Vietnam-War based activity throughout the year to demonstrate how French protests 
brought to light not only questions of how to be on the left, but also questions of France's 
role. Increasingly, as the year advanced, Vietnam War protests focused more and more on 
what protestors wanted for France.   
Problems for "Ho Chi Minh's Allies:" 
The Left and Occident at the 21 February Protests 
 
 With the first major protest of the year, on February 21st, activists' attempts to 
change up French protest methods, as well as the problems caused by continued in-
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fighting, became clearly visible. Originated by the newly formed Maoist Comités 
Vietnam de base, the Februrary 21st protest called for an "anti-imperialist day of action" 
in celebration of the Vietnamese people, "today at the front lines of the battles of workers 
and the people of the world."12 Through their chosen date, the CVBs hoped to revive an 
anti-colonialist protest tradition that had been popular during the Algerian War. They 
linked their support to the war tightly to the Vietnamese by making their program the 
"Four and Five Points" of the NLF and the North Vietnamese, specifically insisting upon 
the NLF's role as "the only authentic representative of the people." Among their French 
counterparts, the CVBs encouraged protest "from the base," encouraging everyday people 
and workers to act out in a variety of forms. "Peace can't be begged for, peace is won by 
the resolute fight of the masses against their oppressors," the CVBs announced. Calling 
upon "French workers, immigrant workers, students, high school students" to work 
together to make the day a success, they encouraged people to focus on activity in 
everyday areas to spread the word. "Let's mobilize in workshops, in offices, in lecture 
halls, in high schools, in apprentice shops, so that the most diverse preparation styles and 
actions can make February 21st the culmination of an intensive militant work," they 
wrote. "Reinforce the base committees that exist, form new committees, multiply 
initiatives."13 
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The protest on February 21st marked their first large-scale action.  
  The CVB envisioned February 21st as the culmination of a month of action 
dedicated to the Vietnamese, a month which would allow them to reach greater numbers 
of people and hone their protest skills. Although not part of an umbrella organization like 
the CVN, the CVBs were networked and shared information to keep up with each other's 
works. They discussed their preparations for February 21st in a simply produced 
brochure entitled "February 21st Bulletin." As they noted, the bulletin's aim was not to 
"create a forum for agitation," but rather to make sure everyone knew what was going on. 
"Letting all known and unknown comrades working for February 21st know what 
initiatives have been taken, what new forms of action have been put in place: so that this 
exchange experience may help each one to lead the struggle at their workplace, in their 
neighborhood, in their lecture hall, that is our only goal," the editors wrote.15 The various 
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intiatives showcased the CVBs' Maoist interests, notably in their continual striving to 
involve workers and in their focus on a grassroots, low-key campaign. 
 At factories around France, the CVBs worked in small groups to directly spread 
"the struggle of the Vietnamese people" to the French. One committee put together a 
special edition of their newspaper, "Youth Special," which they "sold door to door in the 
housing projects, in the markets, at the doors of factories, in university dining halls, in 
high schools, in workshops, [and] in offices." The newspaper, which "Bulletin" editors 
felt "showed the solidarity of young French workers with their Vietnamese comrades," 
was also distributed by CVBs at factories such as Vitry and Nord Aviation, where, the 
editors noted, "missiles sold to the Americans are built." In addition to these efforts, CVB 
activists had managed to put together groups at Bezons and Montreuil as well as a 
Comité Vietnam at the large factory of Renault, which had managed to raise 3000 francs. 
Creating groups in these factories meant that the activists were working directly with the 
proletariat, the source of all potential revolution.16 
 In addition to the working class, the CVBs attempted to reach future intellectuals 
via students, striving particularly hard to spread what they saw as the correct, Vietnamese 
version of events. The "Bulletin" told of one group, the Comité Vietnam of the Marais 
district in Paris, which consisted of both workers and students, who went out of their way 
to attract attention to the Vietnamese message. Starting at Christmas, they began 
decorating large signs with the Courrier du Vietnam, a journal created in North Vietnam 
consisting of news dispatches from the North Vietnamese view about the war. (They 
contrasted this paper with newspapers wwith dispatches written by the French or others 
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which interpreted, rather than presented, the Vietnamese view.) They stuck these signs, 
which stood out because of their red borders, all over the Marais. They then began a 
"militant sale" of the Courrier du Vietnam and other Vietnamese propaganda, succeeding 
in selling up to a dozen copies of the paper -- which, they noted, had been "totally 
unknown up until that point." The combined attack of guerilla advertising and person to 
person sale spread, so that "each week new information panels are created and stuck up 
while the militant sale in the marketplace has become the rally point of the friends of the 
Vietnamese people." In Parisian high schools, notably Louis-le-Grand and Lakanal, 
students formed committees despite administrative resistance and took repeated 
opportunities to speak up about the war as well as distributing literature around school 
exits as their peers came and went.  
 Right-wing students sometimes attacked the CVB activists as they worked, but 
the committee members strived to turn right-wing harassment into a positive. Repeated 
harassment of students distributing literature at Lakanal led to an "improvised protest of 
200 people," which drew attention to the cause.17 When the information panels activists 
had created "at the cost of long nights" were "ripped or covered up," the members of the 
Contrescarpe committee took the setback as a chance to "put themselves in the school of 
the Vietnamese people." By this, they meant learning the discipline and continued desire 
to fight which they believed motivated the Vietnamese, despite apparent superior force 
on the opposing side. To this end, the Contrescarpe group "did not hesitate, despite the 
presence of fascist organizations in their quarter, to put up panels each week, most of 
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which were rapidly destroyed."18 Although comparing pasting up propaganda to fighting 
in an actual war might have seemed a bit of a stretch, the CVBs felt that their actions 
showed they were learning the revolutionary lessons the Vietnamese had to offer.   
 Most of all, the CVB activists strove to keep their activities at the grassroots, and 
base them on what they saw as Vietnamese desires, refusing the calls for peace by the 
PCF and spurning the celebrity endorsements that appeared to drive the CVN. They 
expected all militants at the protest on the 21st to yell out "FNL will win," which marked 
a strong distance from the PCF's preferred call of "Peace in Vietnam."19 The "Bulletin" 
described a meeting at the Sorbonne on February 9th, which drew between 500 and 800 
students. Large "information panels" drew visitors to stands selling Vietnamese 
propaganda. Students had hung the North Vietnamese and the NLF flags in the courtyard, 
and they had "militants stationed at the exits selling the Courrier du Vietnam." But 
despite the carnival atmosphere, the "Bulletin" stressed that they had "systematically 
refus[ed] to make the protest into a spectacle" and that to that end "speeches were made 
not by celebrities but by militants: a comrade of the Vietnam Comittees, Roger Pic from 
the Russell Tribunal investigation groups, and comrades from the Vietnamese Student 
Unions."20 To the CVBs, the key purpose was spreading the Vietnamese message, as told 
by the Vietnamese, person to person. The move clearly indicated a belief that the French 
should hold a background, supporting role in the anticipated revolution.  
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 Yet despite their distaste for CVN methods, the CVBs agreed when delegates 
from the Comité Vietnam National suggested working together to prepare the February 
21st protest. To insure the protest went as they desired, the CVBs insisted that the joint 
work be run by an "organization committee" whose members would be chosen directly 
from the grassroots committees. This condition was necessary, they explained, because 
"it authorized a mass style, [and] because it privileged grassroots work for Committees 
and teams [working in] lecture halls, neighborhoods, and enterprises." The CVN, 
however, moved on with its own planning, and after complaining, the two groups came to 
a compromise: the "Preparation Organization Committee for February 21st" would be 
made up of CVB members, UNEF leaders, and "a few celebrities." The inclusion of 
celebrities went against the grain, especially as it detracted from the grassroots work the 
CVBs considered essential. Yet they decided in the end that the CVN's actions, including 
their plan for a meeting on February 20th at the Mutualité, constituted "an important 
contribution, in which we rejoice, for the success of the anti-imperialist day of February 
21st."21 
 The actual protest produced mixed results. While it received little notice in the 
press -- Le Monde devoted only a small blurb to it which noted the location, some of the 
slogans shouted, and an estimated several hundred participants -- both the CVNs and the 
CVBs drew positive lessons from the experience.22 Although deploring how the protest 
had been "minimized to the extreme or deformed," the CVB newspaper Victoire pour le 
Vietnam remained proud of succeeding in getting "2500 resolute anti-imperialists 
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grouped in a powerful street protest for an hour chanting slogans mastered by all of the 
committees: 'U.S. Assassins!' 'NLF will win!'"23 They patted themselves on the back for 
holding together despite multiple police charges, and argued that their protest had marked 
a new era in the French anti-war movement, stating "The formes d'acheminement along 
with the February 21st protest's content -- radically different from the bellowing and 
unorganized marches done up until then -- indicate that the necessary grassroots work 
ahead of time had been done, that each Committee had organized its militants and 
sympathizers through grassroots work."24 Moreover, they hoped the protest would have 
strong long-term effects. The Comité Vietnam de base of the Saint-Louis lycée said the 
protest had increased interest in their group, noting "We never had more than 15 people 
at meetings [before the protest], we never had less than 20 afterwards."25 The CVN, 
which claimed the protest had drawn "around 4000 people," listed it among their 
accomplishments for the start of the year and cheered that the group had "held the 
boulevards for over an hour."26  For the CVN, the meeting showed the strength of their 
movement and of the anti-war sentiment in France.  
 In the media, the most enthusiastic presentation of the protest came, seemingly 
strangely enough, from the far-right paper Rivarol, which concentrated not on what the 
left had accomplished but rather on Occident's violent interventions. Beginning in early 
February, Occident had called for counter-protests for the 21st, inviting "all students, 
citizens and nationalists, to join its action against the Vietcong servants and for the 
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victory of the West."27 Early in the morning on the 21st, Occident members distributing 
counter-protest pamphlets were attacked by "around sixty communists from the lycée 
Louis-le-Grand [...] armed with iron bars." They fought back, leaving two Occident 
members and five CVB members wounded. The real clash, however, came that evening. 
At 6PM, the Occident counter-protest began, starting in front of a French-Chinese 
exposition in the Rue de Rennes.28 Moving then towards the Sorbonne while chanting 
"Vietcong assassins!," Occident then clashed with leftist protestors at the intersection of 
Boulevard Saint-Germain and Saint-Michel. Their violence, Rivarol noted, had the 
desired effect: "As this was going on, Ho Chi Minh's allies ... ran away: five hundred 
communists installed in the courtyard of the Sorbonne decided to evacuate the Latin 
Quarter, as the 'fascists'' pressure was too strong. The flocks of the UNEF, the JCR, etc, 
split in disorder."29 That evening, Radio Luxembourg interviewed an Occident member, 
leading Rivarol to proclaim, "In short, a day meant to be anti-imperialist became a day of 
struggle and victory for the West." The title of the article summed up their feelings 
nicely: "In the Latin Quarter, the friends of the Vietcong no longer lay down the law."30 
While the left had been able to rise above its differences for the protest, they still faced 
considerable opposition on the right and some indifference from the mainstream. 
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Occident's violence and the limited press coverage made it clear the left would have to 
take more radical measures in order to make an impact.  
"Those Rotten French:" 
Confronting de Gaulle during the Humphrey Protests, April 1967 
 
 The left succeeded in making a large impact in its next major undertaking, a series 
of protests against American Vice-President Humphrey's visit to France in early April. In 
these protests, the left faced off against not the far-right of Occident, but the center-right 
of Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle's policies on Vietnam, so similar to those of the left, 
often stymied the French left's attempts to extend protest to a larger segment of the 
population. Through their actions during Humphrey's visit, the French left sought to 
diminish de Gaulle's power over France's international image and establish a new, more 
revolutionary identity for France. The Humphrey protests additionally demonstrated how 
the rising prevalence of protest groups and the more dramatic direct action they inspired, 
outside the realm of political parties, allowed the French left to break free of the 
traditional governmental political arenas controlled by de Gaulle and make diplomatic 
statements outside of traditional diplomatic channels.  
 Humphrey's visit to France at the start of April offered the perfect opportunity to 
take a strong and visible stand. In his trip around Europe, the Vice President aimed to 
inform countries about the U.S.' current actions in the world. But no such information 
session was planned for France. De Gaulle had already made his views on American 
foreign policy very clear, especially with his recent decision to remove France from 
NATO's military command and to evacuate American military bases in France. Yet de 
Gaulle intended more to assert French independence than to reject America entirely, and 
he still sought to maintain ties with the United States. For both sides, Humphrey's Paris 
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sojourn served as a symbolic interaction meant to underline the two countries' strong ties. 
As French newspaper Le Monde put it, "Obviously no one expects concrete results from 
[this visit], but both sides place great importance on maintaining the dialogue between 
these two countries."31  (The Boston Globe took a more cynical view, claiming the only 
reason for coming was that "it would have been diplomatically impossible to skip the 
French capital" and that if Humphrey had decided to bypass Paris, "he would not have 
missed a thing except a good lunch at the Elysée Palace."32) In addition to the planned 
meetings with de Gaulle, the itinerary called for Humphrey to salute the history of 
French-American bonds by laying wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and at 
the statue of George Washington on the Place d'Iéna while giving speeches 
commemorating the fifty-year anniversary of American entry into World War I.   
 The parts of the day dedicated to formal meetings with French officials passed 
very cordially. Humphrey met behind closed doors with French Prime Minister 
Pompidou and Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville. While the content of these 
discussions was not released publicly, sources indicated that the group avoided discussing 
Vietnam and instead stuck to "topics on which they agreed and the inalienable friendship 
between France and America."33 Toasts over lunch continued the theme of friendship, 
with de Gaulle raising his glass "in honor of the United States, in whom France has found 
a friend for over two hundred years, and who, just fifty years ago, became once again 
France's most glorious ally." Humphrey responded in kind, stating "the links between my 
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nation and Europe, and my nation and your nation, are deep and real. They can not and 
they will not be suppressed."34 Toasting to "the honor of the friendship that has linked our 
country through so many years and so many trials," Humphrey praised de Gaulle as  "a 
man of courage who will go down in history as a great leader."35 (American observers 
claimed that this unscripted moment brought tears to the General's eyes. French 
commentators, however, doubted that a compliment from an American could cause de 
Gaulle to cry.)36 De Gaulle managed to sneak in one comment on Vietnam, working in a 
reference to "the difference in our prospective actions in the midst of a troubled and, alas, 
bloodied world."37 The visit was a success for de Gaulle's conception of an independent, 
neutralist France with a strong role in the world. By refusing to be challenged on his 
views on Vietnam, and yet insisting that France could still work with the US, de Gaulle 
made the Humphrey visit into a friendly meeting which confirmed his foreign policy to 
the Americans while still marking himself as a valuable and appreciative ally. 
 The French left, however, was unwilling to allow this friendly exchange to 
represent their country. A mix of leftist groups, including the Socialist Party, the French 
Communist Party, the Comité Vietnam National, and the Comités Vietnam de Base 
called for protests during the Humphrey visit.38 L'Humanité, the French Communist 
newspaper, urged its readers to come out and denounce the "travelling salesman of 
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American aggression."39 The Mouvement de la Paix encouraged Parisians to give 
Humphrey "a welcome that will leave him with no doubt about how much French 
opinion condemns the American attitude in Vietnam."40 Groups responded 
enthusiastically to the call, and from the moment of Humphrey's arrival on French soil 
protestors challenged the official state declaration that France was glad to have the 
American Vice-President visit. As Humphrey got off his plane at Orly, he was greeted 
not only by the French foreign minister but also by a crowd of protestors chanting "US, 
Assassins!" 41 In a move that showed how much planning had gone into the protests, 
other activists were waiting on overpasses on the highway that led to Paris. As the 
motorcade passed, they chucked rotten eggs and dumped paint on to the cars.42 The 
drivers were forced to change their route to Paris at the last minute to avoid a crowd 
waiting at their planned entrance to the city. 43 Although the protestors at this point were 
not numerous, their presence and actions offered an alternative view of how the French 
people truly welcomed the Vice President's visit.  
 Protestors had also prepared for Humphrey's trip around the city. Overnight, they 
had papered the walls in areas he was expected to visit with posters, some of which said 
"Humphrey Go Home!" in black and yellow and others of which declared "The NLF will 
win!" in red on black. The base of the George Washington statue at the Place d'Iéna had 
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been painted bright red, and a clean-up crew was barely able to remove the paint before 
the ceremony.44 In addition to sending a clear signal to Humphrey that not all of France 
appreciated his visit, the decorations changed the symbolism of important French spaces. 
Areas that traditionally marked either heroic French exploits -- the Arc de Triomphe -- or 
celebrated the bond between the United States and France -- the George Washington 
statue -- now wore revolutionary colors and proclaimed the superiority of the Vietnamese 
National Liberation Front. For a moment, they became visual expressions of the socialist 
revolutions the French left supported around the world. 
 The challenge to de Gaulle's efforts to present a welcoming, proud France 
continued during the afternoon protests. At the Arc de Triomphe, in addition to jeering at 
Humphrey, a group of protestors insulted French nationalism by booing as the 
Marseillaise was played.45  More serious protests broke out at the next stop, where by 
laying a wreath on the statue of George Washington in the Place d'Iéna in Paris, 
Humphrey had intended to underline the strong and long-standing ties of friendship 
which bound France and the United States together. Yet as the Vice President approached 
the square, he was met not by friendly faces, but by a wave of hostile chants. Drowning 
out the bands playing the French and American national anthems, over a thousand 
protestors shouted repeatedly "Humphrey, Assassin!" and "Get the hell out of 
Vietnam!"46 When they attempted to push past the barricades on the street, the police 
attacked, and the area descended into chaos. As the cops tried to round up the protestors, 
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a group of youths broke away and headed to the nearby American Cathedral in Paris. 
Before anyone could react, they yanked down the large American flag hanging from its 
front and set it on fire. Two American Marines who happened to be in the area were 
jumped and beaten. Other youths who had been pushed away from the Place d'Iéna 
protest by the police threw rocks through the windows of the American Express office 
and, apparently not aware of or not caring about the paper's liberal reputation, attacked 
the Paris location of the New York Times. When the protests finally ended, forty-six 
police had been injured, over one hundred fifty protestors were arrested, and, several 
newspapers noted, Vice President Humphrey did not look pleased.47 More than simple 
anti-Americanism, the disruptions and targeted destructions demonstrated the 
intransigence of the left's Vietnam policy. Their actions made it clear that whereas de 
Gaulle could put aside disagreements for decorum's sake, it was not so for all the French. 
 Perhaps even more interesting than the afternoon protests were the events at night, 
for which Vice President Humphrey was not even present. (He had decided, based on his 
earlier public reception, to forego a planned dinner out with his wife on the Champs-
Elysée in exchange for eating at his hotel.) At around 6:30, a crowd of several thousand 
workers and students attempted to take over the Place de la Concorde near the American 
Embassy, shouting out "Peace in Vietnam! US Assassin! Humphrey Go Home!" They 
came armed with red paint and rotten eggs, which they aimed at the large police force 
stationed there. Violent clashes ensued, with the police brutally beating protestors. 48 As 
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that area was cleared, fighting shifted to the streets around the Opéra.  Police actions 
became so vicious that protestors changed their cry, no longer calling out for peace in 
Vietnam but instead shouting out "Charonne!"49 This was a reference to an infamous 
protest event during the French war against Algeria. Although the evocation of Charonne 
clearly came about as a heat-of-the-moment response to police actions, its use revealed 
additional aspects of the protestors' opposition to de Gaulle. First, the use of Charonne 
linked these protestors to previous leftist actions,  inserting the Vietnam War protests into 
a history of anti-colonial activities. Second, the choice of Charonne implicated de Gaulle 
within the colonialist, repressive legacy. The Charonne protests had occured in 1962, 
several years after de Gaulle had taken power, and the police who had acted then were 
instruments of the state under de Gaulle's control. The police chief in charge at the time, 
Maurice Papon, had de Gaulle's support despite his penchant for brutally crushing his 
opponents.  By bringing up the Charonne massacre, still a passionate moment that the 
French commemmorated yearly, the protestors implied that de Gaulle, and the 
governmental forces which worked for him, now as then stood for repression. That this 
view was not simply limited to a momentary angry recall of a six-year old event became 
clear through tracts produced by the Comité Vietnam National and distributed at the 
movement, which, American officials noted, for the first time denounced not only 
American imperialism in Vietnam but accused the French government of complicity. 50 
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 The news of the Paris protests angered Americans at home. The French stop was 
just part of a multi-leg goodwill tour of Europe, and Humphrey had been booed and 
attacked at every stop along the way. But it was the Paris unrest which caused the 
greatest reaction. The American government lodged a formal protest against the flag-
burning.51 Outside diplomatic channels, a group of youths in Boston lodged their own 
protest by igniting a French tricolor in front of the French Consulate.52 Pennsylvanian 
American Legion secretary Thomas Camarotta called for a boycott of all things French. 
"Real" Americans, he noted, had been horrified to see "those rotten French" burn the 
American flag, when, after all, these French were only free to do so because "under this 
same flag Americans shed their blood while the French capitulated and collaborated with 
the Nazis." Denouncing De Gaulle as "that senile man" who hadn't bothered to stop the 
protests, Camarotta suggested that the next time the French wanted to burn something, 
they burn themselves. He was pretty sure there was enough gas left at the military bases 
the French had recently forced the U.S. to evacuate. 53 
 After a tit-for-tat demand for apologies for flag-burning by both countries, the 
French government and its sympathizers attempted to play down the incidents. The 
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American Cathedral's rector dismissed the protestors as "Communists and beatniks,"  
while the pro-Gaullist newspaper Paris-Presse declared "American public opinion is 
sophisticated enough not to lump together the attitude of General de Gaulle and the debris 
of the burned flag."54 French Information Minister George Gorce declared the whole 
event no big deal. "There is no ground for overdramatizing the incidents," he proclaimed.  
"A stupid performance by youngsters in Paris was followed by another stupidity in 
Boston. This is how the French government looks at it."55 
 But if the government attempted to downplay the protest, it still held significance 
to the French left. In the months after the visit, groups would still refer to what they 
simply called the "Humphrey Welcome" as a way of indicating the strength and power of 
protest they wanted to see happen.56 In organizing and carrying out the protests against 
Humphrey, the leftist groups had effectively challenged the official image of France the 
Gaullist government wished to present to the world. Their actions forcefully 
demonstrated their condemnation of American actions in Vietnam, sending a message to 
the US about French views of American foreign policy but doing so outside of traditional 
diplomatic channels. The juxtaposition of the protests' hostility with de Gaulle's warm 
welcome highlighted the division between the government and the left, making it clear 
that while both had the same reaction to American involvement in Vietnam, significant 
differences lay between them. The day's events additionally demonstrated the power 
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potential of the left. As the French Socialist Party noted contentedly after Humphrey's 
departure, the protests showed "that we can effectively develop a larger, more effective, 
and more political movement." Finally, the protests helped the French insert themselves 
into a revolutionary tradition, both their own through the invocation of the Charonne 
massacre, and the Vietnamese Communists' through the French protestors' support of the 
NLF and their re-decorating of Paris. Refusing de Gaulle's push for neutralism and his 
willingness to work with the Americans, the French left used Hubert Humphrey's visit to 
trace out for the world the limitations of de Gaulle's Vietnam policy and his ability to 
speak for all French.  
"All Frenchmen Concerned with Justice and Peace:" 
Attempts at Unity at the National Assizes and the Estates General, April-May 
 
 Fresh off the Humphrey action, the left moved on to two protests intended to 
strengthen unity among their groups: the National Assizes of the Comité Vietnam 
National in late April, and the "États-Généraux de la Paix" (Estates General for Peace) 
organized by the Mouvement de la Paix in May. Both actions aimed to bring together 
those involved in anti-war activity in order to better share information and work towards 
their common goal of ending the Vietnam War. Yet while both protests drew large 
numbers of participants, they revealed more dissent than unity on the left.  
 The Comité Vietnam National planned their Assizes as the culmination of their 
efforts to organize French protestors, by providing militants with a forum where they 
would choose a national board to oversee CVN activities. By the time the Assizes took 
place, the CVN had reached an impressive size, with approximately 200 local committees 
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signed on.57 It had followed the success of the Six Hours of the World for Vietnam 
protest with several smaller but well-attended protests, and French journalist Jean 
Lacouture had deemed the group as the "most active and the most prestigious" member of 
the anti-war movement in France.58 Coming into late April, it had, as Tribune Socialiste 
writer Marc Heurgeron showed, a lot on its agenda: "material solidiarity with the 
Vietnamese, particularly through following up on the action undertaken by the 
Mouvement du Milliard; support for the Russell Tribunal Against War Crimes; 
denunciation of French tolerance in regard to war products destined for Vietnam; 
boycotts against American products; support of American deserters and resisters; 
welcoming representatives from Vietnam in France."59 It had additionally decided, 
similarly to the CVBs, to make the "4 and 5 points" of the NLF and the North 
Vietnamese its program for peace. The move made the group distinctly more radical than 
the PCF. Through their works, the CVN envisioned a group which could function 
internationally in a manner that challenged perceived American imperialist hegemony, 
Gaullist complicity, and French leftist complacency.   
 The Assizes offered the opportunity to finalize the organizational aspects of the 
CVN -- Laurent Schwartz referred to the meeting as their "veritable constitutive 
conference" -- while also staking out an aggressive political stance.60 While the CVN had 
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a provisional directory in place, it felt the time had come for more structure. "At the 
present time, the urgency of a political direction democratically elected is being felt more 
and more," reported the CVN's newspaper Pour le Vietnam. "It is in fact necessary for all 
militants, from Paris and from the provinces, to be able to meet up in order to elaborate 
the line to follow in the months to come, and to give themselves an organization up to 
carrying out the tasks that need to be accomplished[.]"61 They also hoped to direct some 
of the attention and resposibility back to regular militants; as Marc Heurgeron noted, one 
of the goals of the Assizes was to " get past the habitual framework of a committee of 
celebrities."62 The "urgency" driving the meeting came from the homefront rather than 
abroad.  The call to attend the Assizes placed the action not simply in the face of 
escalating American military activity but specifically as a direct opposition to Gaullist 
foreign policy. "The American government is inexorably moving up the steps of its 
military escalation. Tomorrow, perhaps the invasion of North Vietnam or direct 
aggression against China," the CVN noted in announcing the meeting. "The movement 
for passive neutrality has long since passed. Today, we must clearly take a stand for the 
aggressed against the aggressor."63 Where de Gaulle called for neutrality, the CVN staked 
a claim for a North Vietnamese victory.  
 The organization of the CVN operated on the principle that "a national protest 
movement [mouvement de lutte] has no sense unless it is emanates on its own, 
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autonomously, from committees which have as their main if not exclusive goal the 
struggle against imperialist aggression."64 In envisioning their group's struggle against 
American hegemony, the CVN planned for a two-part structure. On the first level, the 
local committees would agitate in their workplaces, providing "truthful information" 
(which would attack the French state by "critiqu[ing] State or capitalist information 
providers"), "perspective" (which would gather together all "concerned by American 
aggression and wishing to demonstrate their solidarity with the Vietnamese people,") and 
"means of action," (which included "selling Vietnamese literature, [...] conferences, film 
showings, [...] proposing unity to other organizations, going door to door in working-
class neighborhoods.")65 This grassroots activity, which closely resembled that of the 
CVBs, could not suffice on its own, however, and this was where the national directive 
came in. This national group would provide "a minimum of political coordination and a 
minimum of centralization of action, so that it reaches a greater extent and has more 
resonance and can deal with each new conjuncture (increasing escalation, diplomatic 
situation, etc)." The national direction would have its own specific tasks: 
• coordination of committee action by diffusing information on the 
diverse experiences 
• undertaking intiatives on a national level (protests, relations with other 
organizations, relations with the press, etc...) 
• creating material for national propaganda (brochures, tracts) and the 
regular appearance of the newspaper Pour le Vietnam 
• preparation and implementation of systematic campaigns, along with 
the committees 
• international coordination66 
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The CVN planned for a representative national managing committee, which would hold 
national meetings once every four months. In addition to this group, the local committees 
would also choose representatives to participate in sub-groups on specific topics, which 
would report back to the national group. Although setting up a rigid hierarchy, the CVN 
believed that this structure would allow for a greater flow of information and inspire 
more activity. As they put it, "Envisaged in this manner, the national direction will not be 
a yoke, but a true aide for the committees who will thus be in a position to let them 
reinforce their autonomy."67 
 The organization was put in place, but not without controversy Despite the 
original plans for the national committee to consist of proportional representatives from 
each committee, the "celebrities" involved in the creation of the CVN also needed to be 
included.68 In discussion before the meeting, attendees also argued over whether the "4 
and 5 points" provided enough motivation to possible militants, an apparent indication of 
fear of losing potential protestors due to being too radical. In their statement, the CVN 
dismissed this concern, noting that while it would require effort to get people to 
understand why the 4 and 5 points were important, the CVN could not simply call for 
peace (as, at the moment, the PCF and de Gaulle were). "Since when," they asked, "is it 
obligatory for one to fall in with confused notions of a purely sentimental pacificism[?]" 
The CVN also rejected challenges that their focus on imperialism detracted from possible 
action for world peace, proclaiming that "going easy on imperialism is a false solution, 
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because this can only encourage it to increase its pressure."69 Most of all, they 
emphasized that their Assizes provided another challenge to de Gaulle's power over the 
anti-war movement by politicizing it. "The Gaullist government's attitude largely suffices 
to calm uneasiness and emotional repulsion in reaction to the war," the CVN noted. "We 
can only give vigor and depth to a grassroots committee movement, to a veritable 
fighting front, by raising political conscienciousness by demonstrating the community of 
interests that tie us to the Vietnamese people over and above geographic distances[.]" 
Their objective, they explained, was to convince the French people that their participation 
was not only valuable but essential to ending the war and spreading anti-imperialism. 
"There are," the CVN remarked, "without a doubt skeptics who are led to minimize the 
effects of action in a country such as ours. We must tell them that it's not at all secondary 
that a large front of adversaries to aggression [...] develops in France and in Western 
Europe." Through anti-war action in France, the militants hoped to create "a counter-
escalation" that would challenge each move of the Americans and of imperialism.70 
Vietnam War protests would, therefore, challenge the power of de Gaulle's influence in 
France and, given the continuing existence of French colonies in the Atlantic region, 
place Gaullist France in with those who were to be resisted.  
 Yet conflict with de Gaulle was not the only problem facing the CVN. Their 
national group had also failed to connect with other groups on the same side. Although 
the group had professed that they had "no pretention to the exclusive direction of the 
struggle against American imperialism in France," as shown by their willingness to 
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participate in the Mouvement de la Paix's planned Estates General for Peace, they still 
insisted that the goal of the Assizes was to "unify all the [anti-war] actions in France." 
The PCF, however, did not participate at all in the Assizes. More seriously, the CVBs did 
not join the national directive. Originally, when the CVBs agreed to compromise with the 
CVN on joint control of the February 21st protest, the two intended to plan both that 
action and the CVN's Assizes. But instead, the CVBs used the motivation from the 
February 21st protest to form their own national directive. 
 The CVB's group, the Organization Assembly, demonstrated some of the 
differences in how the CVB and the CVN functioned, specifically underlining the looser 
organization and greater focus on the local groups characterizing the CVBs.  Rather than 
a directive planned for months in advance, the Organization Assembly came into being 
when the CVB members of the February 21st planning committee decided to continue 
meeting. Committees sent "comrades" to participate in the Organizations meeting, with 
up to 45 committees regular members. The group, which was "not an institution, [but] a 
weekly rendez-vous," had three functions: it helped committees work together on local 
actions; it held meetings where groups could keep each other informed about their actions 
and encourage other protests; and it helped organized centralized protests. It had its own 
managing group, but unlike the CVN's, this group simply organized the material and 
political efforts the committees put forth.71 While not yet definitive, the gap between how 
the CVN and the CVBs functioned was growing at a fast rate.  
 The CVN, CVBs and the Communist groups had, despite their differences, all 
agreed to participate in the Mouvement de la Paix's Estates General for Peace, which 
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attempted to unite "all Frenchmen concerned with justice and peace, all peaceful forces" 
in one meeting to discuss the direction of their anti-war action.72 Called initially by a 
group of Communist celebrities and Mouvement de la Paix activists including Louis 
Aragon and Elsa Triolet, the Estates General grew to involve all of the major groups and 
to be publicly supported by over 150 celebrities.73 Drawing off its namesake, the Estates 
General of the French Revolution, the protest called for participants to meet and address 
their concerns in small local Estates prior to coming together for a large meeting on May 
20th and 21st in Paris.  The meeting itself resembled both Six Hours meetings, with 
opportunities for participants to attend various workshops such as "The Origins of the 
War: International Relations and the Vietnam War" or "The Role of Public Opinion: The 
Responsibility of Academics," followed a plenary session at which political messages 
would be read, and ending with cultural performances including two of Roger Pic's films, 
a performance by a Vietnamese student group, and poetry readings.74 At the end, the 
group planned to put out a joint statement to show French support for the Vietnamese 
fighters. Through its setup and the multi-group involvement, the protest aimed to bridge 
gaps between different groups and work instead from their common group to move 
forward in unity.  
 Yet before the main Estates General could take place, serious clashes arose which 
threw the left into disarray. During the University's Estates General, which took place on 
May 9th at the Mutualité, Occident members attempted to attack the gathered 
intellectuals. They arrived in the Latin Quarter shortly after their staged protest at the 
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North Vietnamese delegation's headquarters, where they had launched tear gas grenades 
and Molotov cocktails at the building and ripped down the Vietcong flag before the 
police intervened. While security at the Mutualité meant that Occident could not inflict 
such severe damages there, they managed to get into several fights before the police 
began arresting people. Although Rivarol complained that the sentences they received 
were much heavier than leftwingers had received for their part in the Humphrey protests, 
it noted with satisfaction "Henceforth, the fact remains that the 'reds' know that they can 
no longer, with complete peace of mind, display their complicity with the worst enemies 
of France and the free world."75 While not able to stop the left-wing protests, the far 
right's actions reminded them that their views were not the only ones present in France.  
 Fisticuffs with the right were commonplace, however. The left was more 
surprised when actual fights broke out at a left-wing meeting in early May. Conflicts 
between the Maoist CVBs and the Soviet-aligned PCF had been bubbling dangerously 
near the surface for quite some time, a reflection locally of the Sino-Soviet split globally. 
The CVB and CVN's insistence on chanting "NLF will win!," in direct defiance of the 
Communists' chants for "Peace in Vietnam!," additionally exacerbated tensions, as seen 
in a May 3rd protest when a small group consisting mainly of youths hung back from the 
rest of the Communist-led procession, staying instead amongst themselves where they 
displayed Vietcong flags and called for a Vietcong victory.76 Two days later, several 
hundred PCF members kept a Maoist meeting for Vietnam from being held by occupying 
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the reserved room at the Mutualité and refusing to leave.  The two groups shouted 
Vietnam-related slogans at each other. Fights broke out, with, in some accounts, armed 
Communists attacking the Maoists and breaking chairs over their heads. Before leaving, 
the Communists ripped apart the propaganda the CVB members had brought with them, 
including copies of the Courrier du Vietnam and banners which read "US Nazis!" and 
"American Troops Out of Vietnam!"77 
 The fight brought the PCF-Maoist split out into the open. Each side spat 
recriminations at the other, revealing the severity of their differences. The Maoists, 
"vigorously protesting" the Communists' "savage" actions, questioned whether the 
Communists could really be in solidarity with the Vietnamese workers. "These hatchet 
men of the PCF were in no case grassroots militants," they sneered. "They were all men 
belonging to the apparatus, under the unconditional orders of the directors of the Party, 
who've become part of the bourgeoisie."78 They accused the PCF of using the Vietnam 
War "to support their policy of demobilizing the masses in France."79 L'Humanité, to the 
contrary, claimed their "more than a thousand militants" had stopped a pro-Chinese (and 
thus anti-proletariat) meeting, and that in its place the PCF had been able to organize a 
"powerful meeting of solidarity with the Vietnamese."80 Shortly thereafter, L'Humanité 
unleashed its venom on the Maoist Vietnam activists, rejecting any claims that they were 
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sincerely involved in peace efforts for Vietnam. Claiming that their groups were led by "a 
few sons of the upper bourgeoisie craving 'revolution' before they head off to run papa's 
business" (a charge they would level almost word-for-word at the activists at the start of 
May '68), the PCF went on to declare that the CVBs' activities were "financed by Mao 
Tse-Toung's troop and also without a doubt by other areas, always ready to support any 
groupuscule aiming to fight against the party of the working class." The implication with 
"other areas," that the Maoists were receiving support from the Gaullist government,  
appeared also in the PCF's insistence that the group received press and radio coverage 
despite the fact that they "exercised no influence over French political life." Refusing to 
grant any credence to the Maoist claims of solidarity with the Vietnamese, the 
Communists instead declared that "the pro-Chinese in France have only one concern: to 
see the war in Vietnam continue and drag on." The time had come, the PCF said, to "rip 
the masks off" these impostors. "In no protest, wherever it was, would the veritable 
friends of the Vietnamese tolerate the presence of these adventurers."81 The fight between 
the PCF and the Maoists had become a battle over who could truly claim to be anti-
imperialist and who, therefore, had the greater right to reach the French working class.  
 When the Estates-General meetings began, the divisiveness continued in spite of 
the professed push for unity. Asked to participate in the local preparatory meeting for the 
14th arrondissement, the Montparnasse Comité Vietnam de base accepted "with 
enthusiasm," looking forward to "the possibility of a unitary action." They threw 
themselves into the preparation, making over 500 posters, and planning a session on "the 
situation in Vietnam." At the actual meeting, however, they found their careful plans 
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thrown to the wayside. "The reunion that our committee imagined as a debate where each 
person could express themselves and propose concrete methods for truly and efficiently 
supporting the Vietnamese people," they complained, "was nothing but an interminable 
juxtaposition of opinions, interpretations and views often very divergent, instead of joint 
searching for the best means of support to offer to the Vietnamese people." Following the 
disjointed discussion, the group voted on a political text "intended to sum up all that had 
been said and serve as the base for a common action," but the CVBs claimed they and 
other participants found it so "confusing and ambiguous" they would not sign. Their 
primary critique lay in the text's avoidance of direct support for the "4 and 5 points," the 
"position of the Vietnamese themselves." The CVB offered themselves up as an example 
of how valuable taking a political line like this was. "We are currently about forty 
militants, each one of us knows perfectly well along which political line he has decided to 
support the Vietnamese people," they commented. "[T]his is why in spite of the large 
diversity among our beliefs and social origins, it never occurs to us to discuss endlessly, 
until we run out of breath, about nothing at all." The Communists' reluctance to take an 
aggressive political stand marked a clear separation between them and the CVBs, who 
insisted that their political line -- more true to the Vietnamese -- made them better 
activists. They ended their recounting of the meeting by proclaiming, "NO FAIR 
SUPPORT WITHOUT A FAIR POLITICAL LINE! NO WIDESPREAD SUPPORT 
WITHOUT A CLEAR AND FIRM UNIFIED POLITICAL LINE!"82 
 Similar divisions played out in the national media when the CVN clashed with the 
Mouvement de la Paix and the PCF just before the large Estates-General on May 20th 
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and 21st. In a May 20th article in Le Monde entitled "Outside the 'Estates General' of 
[Salle] Pleyel, the adversaries of American intervention are far from agreeing with each 
other," journalist Claude Julien described the current divisions among the anti-war 
movement and laid most of the blame at the feet of the Communist Party. "We know the 
Communists' traditional repugnance of supporting movements whose structures they 
themselves don't control," he remarked, "and which they fear they can not lead[.]" But as 
he noted, the Communists' usual controlling tendencies had been complicated in this 
situation because of the addition of the Sino-Soviet conflict and of the PCF's 
subservience to Moscow, specifically in its interest in fostering "peaceful coexistence." 
This kept the PCF from following the "NLF will win!" line over its preferred call for 
"Peace in Vietnam!" More significantly, Julien revealed, the in-fighting between leftist 
groups was becoming public knowledge. He cited a recent article in France-Nouvelle 
where a Communist writer had accused Laurent Schwartz and the CVN of taking money 
intended for the Mouvement du Milliard and using it instead for their own funds. While 
he didn't believe it was true, he found the accusation itself to be unsettlingly damaging, as 
it had "provided publications that are distinctly anti-communist and hostile to Hanoi with 
the opportunity to publish articles that discredited Monsieur Laurent Schwartz and, 
through him, the Comité Vietnam National." In Julien's view, the PCF's concern with 
promoting itself risked -- and already had started -- harming the potential of the anti-war 
movement in France.83 
  Laurent Schwartz wrote to Le Monde as the Estates-General began, refuting the 
accusations against himself and his group and insisting again on the importance of 
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unity.84 The main Estates-General meeting thus took place with tensions apparent -- and 
without the CVBs -- but with a hope for joint progress. Tribune Socialiste deemed the 
meeting itself a success, saying that the over 3000 delegates present from a variety of 
organizations showed that "it was possible to reach a new level in the counter-attack 
needed to fight American aggression."85 Following the discussion panels, the Estates-
General released a statement to the press celebrating the unity the meeting had 
demonstrated and calling the French to "increase without stopping their pressure, to end 
this war imposed on the Vietnamese people." "Let each French person express [their 
support for the Vietnamese]," the statement read, "let everyone proclaim together, with 
equal enthusiasm, with the same voice, throughout the country, along with peaceful 
forces throughout the world." They announced plans for Estate General militants to 
continue encouraging protests among "parties, unions, movements, organizations; 
scientific, literary and artistic celebrities," as well as calling for protests on June 16, 17 
and 18th. The statement avoided mentioning direct support for the NLF or for the "4 and 
5 points."86 
 Once again, divisions rose up. For militants aligned with the CVN, the political 
statements and the proposed future actions did not go far enough. Tribune Socialiste 
praised the accomplishments of  "[g]etting together three thousand delegates in Paris, 
having prepared this meeting by hundreds of local debates, having reached a certain 
political agreement among the groups determined to fight to support the Vietnamese," but 
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complained that only calling for "three days of action in the coming weeks without even 
specifying the necessary perspectives and modalities of coordination" was 
"insufficient."87 The CVN, which had refused to support the Estates-General's statement, 
issued its own communiqué explaining why it had distanced itself. Also bemoaning the 
"insufficiency of the political text," the CVN focused in on two issues which highlighted 
the conflict with the PCF: the question of the NLF and the way in which the text had been 
adopted. By "ambiguously" presenting the NLF's role, the CVN felt the Estates-General's 
text risked harming the NLF's chance of participating in peace negotiations. More 
extensively, the CVN complained that none of the texts debated in groups during the 
Estates-General had been retained, implying that the general tone of the released text had 
been planned in advance. As with the conflict with the CVBs, the PCF's need for control 
and apparent hesitancy towards revolutionary action seemed to hinder anti-war actions.  
 Although the CVN affirmed that its "reservations [towards the released text] did 
not weaken at all our desire to pursue communal action," the desired group coherence of 
the Estates-General had clearly fallen apart. In his description of the meeting for Le 
Monde, Jacques Decornoy remarked "The word 'unity' was endlessly taken up in Salle 
Pleyel on Saturday and Sunday.[...] But incantation can not bridge the divides, nor can 
certain procedures quiet the divergences." He commented on the "lively criticism" of the 
political statement, particularly by the CVN, and the lack of clear directives for future 
action. "Everything indicates," he noted, "that the Mouvement de la Paix and the 
Communist party intend to remain masters of all future actions, whose dates and slogans 
they will determine." Although the séance's president had yelled out to the rowdy room at 
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the end of debates "We are here for peace!" Decornoy pointed out that "Not even this 
'magic' word, no more than the word 'unity,' could erase the ideological and political 
barriers[.]"88 Rather than bringing together divergent groups into a common action, the 
Estates-General revealed decisive splits in the anti-war movement, and set up the 
Communist Party as the reticent opposition to the CVN and the CVB's more radical 
efforts.  
 In June, the CVBs held their own General Assembly. In the meeting, they made 
no pretence towards reaching unity with other groups. In fact, since May, the CVBs had 
declared their growing "isolation" from other groups, which they felt "tried to snuff out 
our actions, tried to make us take the blame for police provocations." But they embraced 
this isolation, noting that it was "an isolation from the false friends of the Vietnamese 
people, an isolation in relation to erroneous positions."89  Their meeting brought together 
different CVBs in the Mutualité, where they shared the propaganda posters they had 
created and the protest methods they had developed with fellow committee members.90 
Although the meeting had some problems, specifically with "militants speaking for the 
first time in a meeting [who] don't always know to get to the point," the CVBs judged the 
meeting to be a successful demonstration of their "sustained support" of the Vietnamese. 
Additionally, they used the meeting to mark the difference between themselves and the 
                                                 
88
 Jacques Decornoy, "Les états généraux pour la paix au Vietnam demandent la reconnaissance du FNL et 
l'arrêt des bombardements du Nord," Le Monde 23 May 1967. Two participants responded to his article. 
One, G. Leclerq, angrily refuted his charges of Communist manipulation, arguing that the political text had 
been approved by a "crushing majority." The other, Bernard Souyris, agreed with Decornoy, saying it 
appeared to him the political text had been "approved in advance." , "Après la réunion des états généraux 
pour la paix au Vietnam," Le Monde 30 May 1967.  
 
89
 No title, May 1967. BDIC F delta 701/2.  
 
90
 "Un Meeting pour le Vietnam a la Mutualité," Le Monde 25-26 June 1967.  
 
 133
other major anti-war movements. "We did not want this to be like a spectacle: no 
celebrity from the worlds of arts and letters came to speak," they reported in Victoire 
pour le Vietnam. "1000 people, and mainly militants present: comrades of the committees 
and people concerned about supporting the Vietnamese people, who knew the 
committees or had read their posters; no celebrities, no speeches, no 'artistic or cultural 
presentation,' no minutieuse ceremony."91 Instead, the CVBs participated in a simple 
sharing of information led by the political lines of the NLF and the North Vietnamese. By 
singling out the celebrity aspect of the CVN and the political weakness of the PCF, the 
CVBs willingly highlighted their "isolation" from other groups in favor of what they saw 
as a closer approach to the grassroots and the French people. As the anti-war movement 
headed into summer, it became clear that battle lines had been drawn among the left in 
France, as well as on the ground in Vietnam.  
"An Important Date in the History of the Struggle Against Imperialism:" 
The October 21st Protests in France 
 
 Over the summer, the conflict between a desire for unity among groups with a 
similar aim, and an awareness of serious differences, continued to grow. In early July, the 
PCF attacked the "narrow" and "sectarian" views of the CVN, "this group directed by 
Laurent Schwartz." Tribune Socialiste deplored the PCF's reluctance to work with the 
CVN, noting "More than ever the support we must bring to Vietnam requires that all 
subaltern quarrels be put aside."92 The CVN itself issued a call for leftwing unity in mid-
July, asking for all anti-war activists to help "create a coordinating organization of 
diverse movements" that would plan actions in common over the next year, and calling 
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for help in planning a protest that would gather 100,000 participants in Paris. It 
challenged the PCF's presentation of it, arguing that "the CVN, since it was founded, has 
never ceased in its attempts to surmount the narrowness and the esprit de chapelle which 
up until now have blocked a frank and veritable coordination of anti-war movements." Its 
desire for unity motivated it once again to "restate these propositions and declare that it 
[the CVN] is ready to examine all suggestions or counter-propositions concerning the 
unification of actions against American aggression in Vietnam."93 Yet the CVN's call 
went unanswered. In fact, the only unity achieved during the summer came on the far 
right, where former Algerian paratrooper Roger Holeindre succeeded in forming a French 
support group for South Vietnam, whose anti-communist views revealed themselves in 
the slogan they offered Rivarol: "We're for peace in Vietnam too, but not for the peace of 
the Red Guards, not for the peace of concentration camps, not for the peace of 
torturers."94 
 As the older far-right consolidated itself into a formal group, its younger 
counterpart Occident became more brazen. On October 12th, Occident attacked a Maoist 
exposition highlighting the progress of the Chinese people, destroying various baskets 
with Mao's image on them before stealing a billboard that they then doused in gas outside 
and lit on fire.95 Chased away, they gathered near Jean-Paul Sartre's childhood home on 
St. Germain des Prés and burned a Chinese flag -- despite the fact that Sartre did not 
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work with the Maoist students, but rather the Trotskyst.96 If no one else could unify the 
left, it seemed, at least the right could, by lumping them all into one communist group. 
 As left-wing protests picked up with the start of fall and the return to school, the 
push for unity came again to the fore with plans for a protest on October 21st meant to 
coincide with the American march on the Pentagon. The CVN, which had been 
encouraged to create a matching protest through its contacts in the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee and the Students for a Democratic Society, urged its militants to 
make the day an effective counterpart to the American protests. In a reference to the 
complacency de Gaulle's politics inspired in the general French population and to the 
small number of militants they had, the CVN admitted that  "The political conditions in 
our country, as well as the state of our forces, do not allow us to claim to try to organize 
actions of a comparable size as those planned by the US anti-war movement." But they 
still felt that they could create powerful protests by drawing on their local committees and 
working with other groups.97 For the CVN, this meant working with all groups "without 
exclusions" in an attempt to create the largest protest possible in France.98 
 While 32 groups in the end signed on to the October 21st protest in France, the 
unity between them was at most surface-deep.99 In its preparations, the CVN included 
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plans for expected difficulties from the Mouvement de la Paix. When discussing putting 
together a "large meeting for solidarity with Vietnam," the CVN decided that "in the case 
of certain organizations refus[ing to participate], the CVN will take it upon itself to 
organize a meeting where representatives of American organizations can speak." For the 
protest itself, the CVN decided to swallow its pride in the interest of the larger cause, 
noting that "in the case where the Mouvement de la Paix refuses our proposition [of a 
joint call to a street protest in Paris on the 21st], for the sake of unity the CVN will 
participate in their action[.]"100 Events proved the CVN correct in their concerns, as the 
PCF issued its own call to protest on the 21st. (The editors of Le Monde felt the need to 
point out, after reproducing the call, that a number of other organizations were involved 
as well, including the CVN.)101  
 Although the CVN did, as it had promised, fall in with the Mouvement de la 
Paix's protest, it still presented the protest's aims in ways that took swipes at the PCF 
along with the more obvious target of the French government. Writing in Le Monde, 
Laurent Schwartz declared that "this October 21st, unifying protest, must not be a day 
without a future." But while he noted that the protest originated from multiple groups, his 
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argument for how future protest should occur went directly against the Communist party. 
Proclaiming that the "true 'free world' is today in Vietnam," Schwartz threw out a 
challenge to Gaullist diplomacy by saying that French needed to "support [Vietnam] 
every day, in every way, and not simply through pretty words, while passively assisting 
their resistance or their death." He then went on with comments that challenged the limits 
of Communist contributions.  "We must," he wrote, "support them humanly, we must 
support the materially, because they need money, sanitary equipment; medicines. We 
must support them politically because, definitively, wars are not won by technical and 
military methods, but also by political actions." Through the reference to "technical and 
military methods," Schwartz critiqued the support provided by the Soviet Union, the 
PCF's leaders. It was a direct attack on the PCF's presentation of the ways to support 
Vietnam, as the day before the protest they had published an article proclaiming "the 
Vietnamese are not alone in their just combat. They have socialist countries with them, 
particularly the Soviet Union, which [...] has agreed to provide them even more important 
aide in the form of planes, missiles and arms of all sorts."102 Schwartz's insistence on the 
importance of "political actions" placed the CVN's support of the NLF's political lines 
above the phsyical aide being offered by Communist countries and the French 
Communist Party, implying that although multiple groups had come together for the 
October 21st protest, the only ones who could go forward to truly provide the Vietnamese 
aide were those in line with the NLF, like the CVN.  
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 The end protest brought together over thirty thousand militants from the thirty-
two organizations in Paris, marching from the Place de la République to the Bastille.103 
The Communist party put its leaders, including Waldeck Rochet, at the front of the 
"human wave," which stretched down multiple streets.104 Two groups stood out: a group 
of Vietnamese protestors, and a group of Americans, mainly belonging to the American 
group PACS (Paris American Committee to Stopwar, an anti-war group composed of 
Americans living in France). Representatives from both groups spoke as the marchers 
gathered at the Bastille. "French friends," the American vice-president of PACS declared, 
"support us until our troops unconditionally withdraw from Vietnam." The Vietnamese 
speaker thanked protestors for their support and said he saw "a brilliant proof of 
confidence in [the Vietnamese] victory" in the protest. One sour note stood out, when the 
last speaker, French novelist and activist Vercors, reminded the French of the help the 
Americans had provided in the past two World Wars, and found himself roundly booed 
for his efforts. 105 Nevertheless, Tribune Socialiste was so pleased with the protest that 
they declared "October 21st, 1967 is henceforth an important date in the history of the 
struggle against imperialism."106  
                                                 
103
 "PARIS: De la République à la Bastille," Le Figaro 23 October 1967; "Paris: plusieurs dizaines de 
milliers de manifestants," Le Monde 24 October 1967; "Paris: Ce fut bien la plus grande...," L'Humanité 23 
October 1967. The organizers claimed 100,000; Le Monde said 35,000 and Le Figaro "around 30,000." It is 
unclear if the CVBs participated. Their newspaper, Victoire pour le Vietnam, makes no mention of the 
protest in its November-December 1967 issue, but Le Monde's article mentions "the most anti-American 
slogans [being] cried by young people distributing the newspaper Courrier du Vietnam," the CVBs' 
newspaper of choice.  
 
104
 "Paris: plusieurs dizaines de milliers de manifestants," Le Monde 24 October 1967. 
 
105
 Ibid. 
 
106
 Manuel Bridier, "Une évolution irréversible," Tribune Socialiste 26 October 1967.  
 
 139
 For the CVN, October 21st marked a turning point in their protest methods, in 
particular bringing France to the fore. In what Manuel Brider deemed an "irreversible 
evolution" in his Tribune Socialiste coverage, this protest marked the first time that calls 
for "NLF will win!" and "With Vietnam!" had overwhelmed the usual "bleating for 
peace." While the calls had been used before, this time they dominated. It might have 
been, Bridier admitted, a simple "evoution of vocabulary," but he felt that "the choice of 
words used here translates an important revision of political positions."107 More 
importantly than switching the protestors to a more radical political view, however, the 
the protest also gave the CVN a jumping off point for turning their attention directly to 
France. In the aftermath of the protest, the CVN announced that the protest had inspired 
them to "move past actions aimed at a simple affirmation of solidarity in order to engage 
in initiatives touching political objectives of the struggle in France." In particular, they 
intended to attack the Atlantic Pact and any other aspect of "American 'protection'" in 
France. "As for Pax Americana," they declared, "it won't be for us, no more than it will 
be for any other people: such is the historic lesson given by the Vietnamese fighters."108 
Not a success in creating the unity militants had hoped for, the protest had managed to 
push French militants to the next level. In directly aiming their targets at the French state, 
the CVN challenged the Gaullist capitalist conception of France with their own more 
revolutionary version.  
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Ending the Year with Che and the NLF in Paris: 
The "Semaine Che Guevara" and the 7th Anniversary of the NLF Protests, 
December 
 
 The two protests which ended the year once again highlighted the divisions on the 
left, showed the growing conservatism of the de Gaulle government, and demonstrated 
the push for a more radical identity of France. The December staging of the CVN's "Che 
Guevara Week" and their second "Six Hours," this one titled "Six Hours for the Victory 
of Vietnam," in the first week of December, as well as the CVB's celebration of the 
NLF's 7th anniversary at their December 20th protest, featured all of the expected 
characteristics of both groups and all of the attendant drama. The conflicts involved set 
up the tension that would help propel the actors towards the events of May '68.  
 When Latin American revolutionary Che Guevara died in October, the Comité 
Vietnam National changed their plans for a weeklong protest of "solidarity with the 
Vietnamese people" into plans for a weeklong protest against imperialism worldwide, in 
honor of Che's memory. The CVN's newspaper Vietnam reproduced Guevara's call to 
anti-imperialists to rise up and create "2, 3 Vietnams," and his iconic picture graced the 
front page.109 But the CVN was motivated by more than Che's connection with Vietnam 
and a sentimental mourning for a lost revolutionary. Through the incorporation of Che 
and his causes, and through their growing connection with other third-world 
revolutionaries, the CVN intended to use the "Che Guevara Week" as a means of 
extending their committee's work into the anti-imperialist fight globally and, by doing so, 
creating an identity for the French left as key members of the revolutionary fight 
worldwide.  
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 To this end, although the protest drew upon the earlier used format of the "Six 
Hours of the World for Vietnam" meeting, the December 1-9 week was distinctly more 
international and more spectacular. Similar to the original Six Hours, this protest included 
a film showing (this time, the premiere of Roger Pic's Loin du Vietnam), and 
presentations from a variety of speakers. Speakers from the NLF and the North 
Vietnamese delegations also spoke out, as they had at the first meeting. But drawing on 
the international connections they had created due to their participation in the Russell 
Tribunal, the CVN managed to bring in Melba Hernandez, a Tribunal member and 
representative of the Cuban Communist Party, whose presence and comments added a 
strong Latin American dimension to the protest which extended beyond the simple use of 
Guevara's images and words. Her speech brought a new level of authenticity to the 
CVN's anti-imperialist stance, as she explicitly offered Cuba's support to the group.110 
Through this invocation of Latin American revolutions and revolutionaries, the CVN 
placed itself among the real anti-imperialist players around the world and challenged the 
complacency of the rest of the left. Manuel Bridier, speaking at the introductory session, 
insisted on the "interdependence of struggles fought against imperialism" and challenged 
those (meaning the PCF) who found Vietnam "politically dangerous," which Tribune 
Socialiste explained meant that it "dangerously troubled the comfort in which they 
wanted to stay installed."111 By bringing in other anti-imperialist struggles, the CVN thus 
pushed against the PCF's support of "peaceful coexistence," and insisted upon France's 
role as a member of the revolutionary groups. 
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 But the CVN's emphasis on radicalism at the conference did not just frighten the 
comfortable Communists. In their most spectacular move, the CVN managed to convince 
the revolutionary Black Power speaker, Stokely Carmichael, to come and speak.112 In his 
incendiary statements, where he called for a Vietnamese defeat and the destruction of the 
"structures of the United States," Carmichael put forth a radical and violent anti-
imperialist policy that Le Monde reported was "applauded for several minutes" by the 
four to five thousand people in attendance, who were mostly young.113 The support for 
violent action highlighted a growing split among young anti-war activists and older ones. 
Laurent Schwartz saw Carmichael's visit as a "strong influence" on the groups who felt 
that violence was necessary.114 The move towards more violent and more direct action, as 
shown in the chapter on the Russell Tribunal, meant that participation in anti-Vietnam 
War activities helped create the current that would propel the youth towards the events of 
May '68.  
 In addition to separating the young and the old on the left, Carmichael's presence 
in France brought the difficulties of the Gaullist government to the fore once again. Upon 
his arrival, Carmichael found himself held by authorities at Orly airport for seventeen 
hours before finally being allowed entry into France. His reputation made him an 
undesirable person, but authorities lacked a reason to hold him. The reluctance to let 
Carmichael into the country followed the government's refusal to grant a visa to Vladimir 
Dedjier of the Russell Tribunal. Both actions reflected the growing conservatism of the 
                                                 
112
 Carmichael, like Hernandez, had been a member of the Russell Tribunal. 
 
113
 "Le 'Pouvoir noir' à la mutualité," Le Monde 8 December 1967.  
 
114
 Laurent Schwartz, Mathématicien, 440.  
 
 143
Gaullist government, showing its conflicted relationship with anti-war activities. While 
during 1967 de Gaulle had continued his anti-war work, most notably deciding to allow 
American deserters and resisters to stay in the country and be granted work permits, he 
had also worked, as the Humphrey protests showed, to maintain some level of good 
relations with the United States.115 Moreover, he clearly did not wish to allow the left-
wing groups to get the upper hand. The CVN's insistence on a global anti-imperialist 
fight, and their rhetoric linking Gaullist France to imperialism, meant that the fight in 
France itself was growing ever more near.  
 Although equally anti-imperialist, the CVBs had not been part of the "Che 
Guevara Week," which featured exactly the sort of rampant use of celebrities and one-
moment spectacle they deplored. Since the start of the fall, the CVBs had been more 
clearly marking their differences from the Comité Vietnam National. The November-
December issue of their newspaper, Vietnam, featured an article on a Nanterre Vietnam 
committee which had switched allegiance from the CVN to the CVBs. Its description of 
its activities under the CVN perfectly encapsulated the difficulties the Comités Vietnam 
de Base had with them. "Discussions (unending) and confrontations (sterile); reports and 
counter-reports on the global strategy of imperialism and other problems just as large," 
the Nanterre group complained, adding they had had to deal with "invitations to eminent 
bourgeois celebrities; interruption and sabotage [...] to keep all serious discussion on how 
to support the Vietnamese from happening."116 Within the Comités Vietnam de base, 
however, the intense focus on the Vietnamese and the insistence on letting the 
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Vietnamese lead the way meant that more and better work could be done towards ending 
the war.  
 To this end, the main protest the CVBs held at the end of the year centered around 
a celebration of the 7th anniversary of the formation of the National Liberation Front. 
Cheering "seven years of heroic struggle, of exemplary struggle for exploited and 
oppressed people of the entire world," the CVBs urged for "a strong enthousiastic echo 
[to] respond to our heroic Vietnamese comrades!" through participation in a meeting at 
the Mutualité in Paris.117 Much larger in scale than their usual gatherings, which 
consisted primarily of committee members, the meeting offered the CVB the chance to 
speak "directly to the masses of [their] country."118 Three thousand five hundred 
participants -- by the CVB's count -- gathered together in a room decorated by the Ecole 
des Beaux Arts Vietnam committee with giant portraits featuring Ho Chi Minh and NLF 
president Nguyen Huu Tho. Surrounded by posters from each committee touting their 
work, the group listened to speeches about the NLF. An enthusiastic public, consisting of 
"[CVB] militants[,...] workers, office employees, high school students, college students," 
shouted over and over the slogan "NLF will win!" and applauded the talks furiously. The 
editors of Victoire pour le Vietnam marveled that the audience "seemed to want, through 
the vigor of its applause and the length of its cheering interventions, to participate as 
much as possible in this meeting to the support of the Vietnamese people."119 
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 Through the protest, the CVBs aimed to separate themselves from other groups on 
the left. Like the CVN, they challenged the PCF's lackluster call for "Peace in Vietnam," 
noting that "We can not put the emphasis on 'peace' in and of itself, as if there were only 
one problem: 'peace' right away and by any means necessary, as if, when you got down to 
it, the Vietnamese would have been better off not taking up arms at all[.]" Arguing that 
there were in fact two peaces possible -- one from a Vietnamese victory, one from an 
American, they put their vote for "Vietnamese peace in independence."120 The CVBs 
repeatedly emphasized that their support for Vietnam was a "political support," sought by 
the Vietnamese, which "could be nothing other than total support of the NLF, of its 
struggle, of its program[.]" As they explained in their meeting and in the writing, "The 
Comités Vietnam de base have no other political line. Their political support lies in 
popularizing throughout France the fight of the Vietnamese people, explaining the fight 
according to the positions laid out by the Vietnamese themselves, condemning American 
imperialism[.]" Material support did not offer enough; the CVBs needed to "for [their] 
part in France, contribute to isolating American imperialism by ripping the mask of its 
true nature for the masses."121 Like the CVN, the CVBs were searching for a more radical 
revolution.  
 But while the CVBs agreed with the Comité Vietnam National on their political 
line, they disagreed strongly with them on other aspects of how to protest the war. The 
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CVN's continual reliance on celebrity speakers and huge events appeared superficial to 
the CVBs, who noted that they had achieved a strong protest on December 20th without 
those methods. They worked, they explained, "without any publicity effect, without any 
of the usual 'têtes d'affiches,' without any celebrity 'from the world of arts and letters,' 
without any of these demagogic practices that the French organizations have become 
gluttons for[.]" Instead, they proclaimed, they had "count[ed] exclusively on the force of 
their political line, on the sympathy they'd found in the French people for the Vietnamese 
people's fights, count[ed] only on their own work of propaganda." Even more to the 
point, the CVBs claimed that their grassroots, non-celebrity, Vietnam-focused action had 
put them at the center of the anti-war movement in France. "[B]eing the only ones to 
celebrate, in a politically correct fashion and through mass action methods" the NLF's 
anniversary, the CVBs noted, demonstrated "not only that [they] were an important 
political force, but [also that] the Comités Vietnam de Base are the most strongly resolute 
force for the task of solidarity with the Vietnamese people."122 Their presentation of their 
protests and their aims gave the French revolutionary potential but placed them behind 
the Vietnamese, supporting them as they fought on the frontlines against American 
imperialism.  
Conclusion: "A New Step" 
 After the December 20th meeting, the CVBs felt increasingly isolated. Having 
offered up for the 7th anniversary "the only protest [showing] solidarity and confidence 
in the Vietnamese people," they found nonetheless that the press had "kept the most 
complete silence on this meeting." But they comforted themselves by saying this was the 
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logical result of a meeting true to their political line, with no publicity and with only true 
militants participating. They proclaimed proudly that "This meeting was in a new style, 
and by its success it is for us a new step towards mass support, enduring support."123 The 
CVBs ended the year with approximately 75 groups and a total of 1500 militants.124 
Although small, they would have a large impact. In addition to continual conflict with 
other left-wing groups, the CVBs offered the experience of small-group grassroots action, 
methods which would be essential for students during the events of May '68. Although 
unintended, the CVBs, while working for peace in Vietnam, prepared students for 
conflicts in France.125 
 As 1967 ended, no one expected the dramatic events which would erupt five 
months into 1968. But the continual discussions on the revolutionary role France should 
play, the increasing agitation of the right-wing students and their insistence, as they 
repeated in December, of "forbidd[ing] Marxists entry onto university campuses," and the 
growing conservatism of the Gaullist government when faced with the domestic aspects 
of his anti-war policy, meant that actions throughout 1967 had helped to pave the way for 
1968. Through their arguments, Vietnam war activists in France had set into conflict 
competing images of France. In 1968, they would change from the question of whether 
"Occident vaincra"  or "FNL vaincra" to the question of who would win in France.  
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Chapter Four: 
 
"At the Crossroads of Culture and Militancy:" The Collectif Intersyndical  
Universitaire and Armand Gatti's V Comme Vietnam on Tour, January - June 1967 
 
 Partway into the Clermont-Ferrand performance of Armand Gatti's V comme 
Vietnam, the stage came under attack. A commando group of mainly Parisian youths 
burst out of their seats, chucking stink bombs at the performers. As the noxious odor 
wafted through the opera house, audience members herded the perpetrators out of the 
building. Forced onto the street, they promptly began protesting, causing such a 
disturbance that the police arrested several of them. Tracts they left behind identified 
them as part of the "Committe France -- Young Homeland Nationalist Movement." 1 
 The nationalist youths formed part of a wave of protestors, generally originating 
from Paris, who took aim at Armand Gatti's play. Two weeks later, in Deville-les-
Rouens, the far-right group Occident stood at the entrance to the play and unfurled a 
South Vietnamese flag. The resultant uproar again required the police to intervene, 
detaining several members of Occident.2 Shortly thereafter, the Nationalist Students' 
Federation, in a move that mirrored the American army's practice of dropping 
propaganda leaflets on Vietnamese villages, showered theatergoings with flyers urging 
them to "End Communist aggression in Vietnam!" Gathered in front of the theater, they 
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pulled out a North Vietnamese flag and set it on fire. Irate audience members attempted 
to organize a counter-protest.  Yet again, the police had to intercede to restore order.3 
 The play which inspired the young right-wingers to drive out from the capital for 
a night of theater in the provinces was the joint undertaking of Armand Gatti and the 
"Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire d'action pour la paix au Vietnam," a collection of 
university unions working together to protest against American involvement in Vietnam. 
In a move never tried before in French theater or protest history, a union hired a 
playwright to write a play about the war, planning to have it debut at Gatti's theater in 
Toulouse before taking off on a spring tour around France. Through the play's production 
and accompanying propaganda and protests, the CIU aimed to underline how university 
syndicalism operated "at the crossroads of culture and militancy."4 It was a major 
undertaking, and, as several reviewers noted, an historic act. 5 
 Despite its uniqueness, no historical study of Gatti's play's creation and 
subsequent tour exists. Several literary scholars have analyzed the work in the context of 
Gatti's oeuvre, but it remains absent from research on French Vietnam War protest 
movements and on intellectual activity in the late Sixties.6 Yet V Comme Vietnam merits 
                                                 
 
3
 No title, Le Monde 31 May 1967.  
 
4
 Flyer, "Le Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire d'Action pour la paix au Vietnam," 1967, CAC 20000530.  
 
5
 Les Lettres Françaises called the play's creation "an event of considerable importance" (Crombecque, 
"'La Châtaigne' et le Peuple Combattant.,"Les Lettres Francaises 1178: 18). Gérard Guillot, underlined that 
the play's creation and presentation was a first for France, as did Robert Abirached, while J.N. Vuarnet for 
La Vie Lyonnaise highlighted the "originality and newness" of the play and its relation with the CIU 
(Gérard Guillot "Armand Gatti: V comme Vietnam et comme Vocation politique," no source or date, Fonds 
Armand Gatti: J 259/1 GAT D; Robert Abirached, "La forêt est en marche," Le Nouvel Observateur, 13 
April 13 1967; J.-N. Vuarnet, "V comme Vietnam d'Armand Gatti," La Vie Lyonnaise, June 1967).  
 
6
 Several works have examined Gatti and his theater, including V Comme Vietnam. Most recently, Olivier 
Neveux provided a synopsis of V Comme Vietnam in a section on French plays on Vietnam in his 2007 
work Théâtres en Lutte. He argues that the plays were unable to connect to a degree of militancy that was 
 150
a close study. An examination of the play and its production reveals shifts in French ideas 
about protest from the information and moral-based activities of 1965 and 1966 to a more 
direct action intended to engage a wider public. The tour throughout France provides 
historians a chance to see the relation between protest movements and a more general 
swath of the French public. Reaction from theatergoers -- from those who supported the 
play to those, like the nationalist students, who saw it as an affront to the Western world -
-  illuminated the political split in French society and the consequent division over 
France's role in the world. Moreover, Gatti's conception of his work, combined with 
popular and critical response to the play reinvigorated an ongoing dialogue in France 
about the intellectual's role in society, raising issues of literary engagement and an 
intellectuals' responsibility to social activism. The literary interlude offered by Gatti's 
play's production and its reception, by demonstrating the difficulties faced by artists 
attempting to work both creatively and politically as well as the limitations of protest 
activities around the Vietnam War, provides a unique opportunity to study developments 
in both culture and militancy in late 1960s France.  
"[We] Have Never Been Indifferent:" Histories of the CIU and Armand Gatti 
 By the time of the play's advent in early 1967, the Collectif Intersyndical 
Universitaire had already strongly established itself within French protest movements. 
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They worked to stay true to the proclamation accompanying the call for the Six Hours 
meeting: "Academics have never been indifferent when faced with war."7 
In the aftermath of the success of the May, 1966 meeting, the Collective expressed a 
desire to move into a new form of protest, one that would directly involve culture. 
Having decided on a play, they chose a playwright, Armand Gatti, who had a similar 
history of activism and desire to change the world behind him.   
 Born in 1924 to leftist parents, Gatti was only 16 years old when he joined the 
French Resistance. Caught a year later, he spent the remainder of the war in a work camp 
on the North Atlantic coast. A focus on literature and creativity drove him in his time 
there, leading him to believe that finding the right word at the right time  -- what he 
called "la parole errante," the wandering word -- could "liberate" a man.8 Upon his 
release, he continued work as a writer, becoming a journalist for L'Esprit and  Le 
Parisien Libéré and traveling as far as China and Korea. He credited this experience with 
giving him "a vision of the world on a planetary scale."9 Although not associated with a 
political party -- Gatti considered himself "an anarchist in regard to ideologies" -- Gatti's 
sentiments clearly lay on the left side of the political spectrum, and his writing reflected 
that.10 
 Although Gatti declared that he did not do political theater, finding it "too 
restricting," his plays often conveyed pointed commentary on a host of contemporary 
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issues.11 In addition to the political choices of his subject matter, Gatti wrote to challenge 
the idea that theater could provide a single culture to, and by extension provoke a single 
experience in, its audience. "I support a theater that divides, and not a theater that 
unifies," he explained. He refused to participate in what he saw as a bourgeois theater that 
presumed one mold fit all,  clarifying that he strove for "a theater that divided as deeply 
as possible."12 When his plays provoked reactions split strongly between the left and the 
right, as had his play on Sacco and Vanzetti, Gatti was pleased. In his view, "In theater, if 
everyone agrees, it's because the play is a failure."13 Gatti deemed his work part of the 
"théâtre d'agitation" (literally "theater of agitation,"), and he worked to provoke strong 
reactions by "bring[ing] [...] elements" in front of the spectator to challenge them.14 As he 
saw it,  
Theater is a medium; its business is not to provide answers, or say "this is 
what you must do when you leave the theater." Its business is to put the 
issues squarely before the spectator for him to question, because when a 
man starts asking questions he is beginning to change, and he could one 
day want to change the world. 15 
 
In this way Gatti's work fit within the parameters of the "engaged" intellectual defined by 
Jean-Paul Sartre in the aftermath of World War II. Rejecting the idea of "art for art's 
sake," the "engaged" writer chose to use their creation as a means of speaking out upon, 
and pushing for change in, the present-day world. "To speak is to act," Sartre had 
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proclaimed in his 1947 work What is Literature? "The 'engaged' writer knows that speech 
is action: he knows that to reveal is to change and that one can not reveal without 
intending to change."16  
  For Gatti, the central way in which to provoke changes was to write theater 
addressing current events. "In general, one waits for events to calm down to transport 
them to the stage," he remarked. "Myself, I'm for on-the-spot theater." Gatti made no 
attempt to hide that in this current-events reporting he was subjective, commenting "I am 
partisan. I take sides; I vomit those who are lukewarm, those who weigh and reweigh 
their options, and those who refuse to move; I'm a partisan, and I choose man."17 In 
general, however, Gatti's plays had dealt with subject to which he had personal ties. He 
had neither been to Vietnam, nor deeply studied the war. But his personal and 
professional history made him the logical choice for the CIU. As he put it, "The theater I 
have written up to this point led me directly to writing a play about Vietnam. I just 
needed the opportunity."18 When the Collective contacted him about working with them, 
Gatti "dropped everything" to work on the play. 19 
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"Chestnut" vs. the Nail-Studded Plank:  
The Creation and Story of  V Comme Vietnam  
 
 From the Collective's initial request at the end of 1966 to the final production 
touches in early February 1967, the creation of V Comme Vietnam took less than two 
months.20 Gatti estimated that he wrote the entire play in under twenty-five days, 
finishing on January 31st.21 He "threw himself" into work, reading through massive 
amounts of materials to get a better handle on the war in order to have as accurate a 
presentation as possible.22 "It would take too much space to even just mention the titles of 
works, accounts, reports from which Gatti drew, extracted the 'real material' of his 
oeuvre," a critic later wrote. "Let's say simply that this 'documentation' was considerable 
and often first-hand."23 Whereas his previous plays had deep connections to his personal 
life and indeed arose from his personal experiences, Gatti lacked any direct knowledge of 
the war and attempted to use the extensive information he had garnered to create an 
"experience by procuration." His distance from events often frustrated him. "They're 
fighting over there. I'm here," he told a journalist in 1967. "It's a terrible feeling of 
powerlessness."24 The near-obsessive reading of news dispatches and other reports gave 
Gatti at least the sentiment of having a "daily experience" of the war.25 
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 The primary source for the play's plot ended up being French journalist Marcel 
Giuglaris' Vietnam: The Day of Escalation, a 1966 non-fiction book detailing the 
development of the U.S.' warplans.26 Gatti drew in particular on Giuglaris' description of 
"Operation Silver Lance," a 1965 military training exercise that took place in Southern 
California as part of counter-insurgency training. The brainchild of Marine Lieutenant 
General Victor H. Krulak, the training sent 40,000 soldiers into "Lancelot," whose 
inhabitants, the "Lancelotians," were under threat from guerrilla bands from neighboring 
country "Merlin." Five thousand additional American soldiers were assigned to act as 
either "Lancelotians" or as members of the Merlin guerrilla units. Intended to expose 
American troops to the difficulties they would face in a location such as Vietnam, the 
exercise confronted soldiers not only with guerrilla actions but also with welcoming but 
clumsy locals who sometimes hindered soliders when they attempted to help, and an 
ambassador whose efforts nearly derailed military actions.27 Giuglaris' account 
deliberately highlighted the absurd aspects of the exercise. He additionally alleged that in 
order to make the "Lancelotians" seem foreign, the U.S. used Mexicans who spoke only 
in Spanish, and that during the operation, the guerrilla bandits played their parts so well 
they succeeded in capturing and holding for ransom the soldier playing Ambassador 
Cabot-Lodge -- an extremely embarassing situation for the American troops.  
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 As the "starting point" for the play, "Operation Silver Lance" helped overcome 
the problem of distance which had plagued Gatti by making that distance one of the 
central components of the play itself. Giuglaris claimed the exercise had provided much 
of the data that MacNamara and Johnson's other advisors were using to create, from a 
distance themselves, the data with which they would run the war. Gatti recreated this 
war-from-a-distance concept by placing the Pentagon and the administration's 
supercomputer, "Chestnut," at the center of the play, rather than focusing on action in 
Southeast Asia. This move underscored that for those outside of the war's theater -- the 
American administration in the Pentagon, Gatti himself, and the French who learned of 
the war through daily news reports -- "some idea of the reality of the fighting could only 
be arrived at through such means of communication, even [if] it was necessarily a 
fragmented reality."28 It thus presented the war in a way that allowed for detailed 
representation of the ongoing actions and debates but kept it at such a distance that it 
mirrored how the typical Frenchman gained access to war information, making it more 
real to the French audience.  
 The story which Gatti wove around "Operation Silver Lance" tracked the events 
of the exercise and its effect on the American administrators and military, while 
simultaneously showing scenes of life among Vietnamese guerrilla fighters. From the 
Pentagon, senior U.S. administrators use the super computer to follow developments in 
the exercise and pass orders down to subordinates. Discussions among them show how 
their decisions on the exercise and their views on the war in general are determined by 
machine-based calculations which do not take into account human emotions. This proves 
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problematic as the operation unfolds and the American soldiers assigned to play the 
Vietcong, Sophie and Stanley, begin sympathizing with the Vietcong's cause and acting 
as guerrillas. They kidnap the American ambassador, and when Sophie is caught and 
interrogated, she commits suicide, unable to handle the brutality of the interrogation 
tactics. Stanley, who until then had been a military man, announces his refusal to serve.29 
The administration, unable to correlate the events unfolding before them with the data 
upon which they base their decisions, begins to panic.  
 As this action occurs in the United States, Gatti continually cuts away to snippets 
of life and action among the Vietnamese. These actors, who appear on a separate part of 
the stage, generally lit by a single spotlight and invisibile to the rest of the players, 
recount stories which undermine the data professed by the American administrators. 
Their tales challenge the efficacy of the strategic hamlets, explain the attraction of the 
Vietcong, and show the resourcefulness of the Vietnamese freedom fighter. Unlike the 
Americans, who are cool-headed logistical fighters at the pinnacle of modern warfare 
with "Chestnut," the Vietnamese are motivated by love of country and freedom and rely 
on more primitive methods, most notably a bamboo plank studded with nails that they 
use to injure U.S. foot soldiers. At a key moment in the play, the nail-studded plank is 
introduced to "Chestnut," which is unable to process it. The Vietnamese manage to 
invade a real-life American operation center in Vietnam, something that should be 
unthinkable, and, from there the American operation center in the Pentagon begins to 
crumble. The play ends with "Chestnut" melting down, spitting out the coffins of 
American soliders dead in combat. Vietnamese soldiers swarm the stage as the actor 
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invoke the Nuremberg trials in his defense. Michel Roquebert, "Ce soir, à 20 h 45, au théâtre Daniel-
Sorano, Création mondiale de V Comme Vietnam,"  Dépêche du Midi 4 avril 1967. 
 158
playing the play's version of MacNamara removes his mask and admits that the data was 
wrong: the Vietnamese are unstoppable.  
 Although the work of Gatti alone, the play reflects the mindset of the French non-
Communist left around the war in the 1966-1967 time period. The ending in particular 
demonstrated the more radical views on the war that were developing. Frustrated with de 
Gaulle's calls for a negociated peace and for the Communist Party's insistence on 
protesting for "peace" in Vietnam, the non-Communist left had begun insisting on 
protesting not simply against the war but specifically for a North Vietnamese/NLF 
victory. Supporting the Vietnamese, the UNEF noted in November 1966, involved "a 
refusal to comport oneself like a good Apostle for Peace."30 Or, as the Trotskyst group 
Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionaire more bluntly put it, "Enough with blubbering 
[pleurnichard] petitions and peace delegations!"31 For this French left, to conceive of 
themselves as part of an international revolutionary force they needed to eschew half-
measures and take a stand clearly on the side of the Vietnamese.   
 The ending of V Comme Vietnam dramatized this insistence on choosing sides for 
a Vietnamese victory, rather than a simple hope for a return for peace. As Quadrature, the 
MacNamara character, rips off his mask, Gatti breaks through the fourth wall of the 
theater, having the actor speak to "the Pentagon" (the audience) as an actor rather than as 
his character. "It is no long Quadrature who speaks to you," the actor declares, "it is [the 
actor's name]. My role is over, but I am none the less enclosed in the seven letters that 
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make up the word VIETNAM. The entierty of humanity today is part of each of its rice 
paddies, each of its jungles, each of its high plains." Enumerating the ways in which 
Vietnam touched the world, the actor concludes, "There are gun which bring death at the 
end of their bullet's trajectory (these are yours). There are guns which, at the end of their 
bullet's trajectory, bring hope -- Vietcong will be the name of man standing upright in the 
sun (in our language)." With a solemn proclamation of "The forest is on the move -- let 
the prophecy be realized," the play ends.32 Through these words and actions, Gatti 
underscores the non-Communist left's break with peace-only protests. Quadrature's 
speech to the Pentagon -- really a monologue to the French audience -- insists upon a 
Vietnamese victory and pushes the listener to reconsider him/herself as part of an 
unstoppable revolutionary force on the way to victory. In Gatti's dramatization, each 
Frenchman is also enclosed in the seven letters which make up "Vietnam." 
 In addition to demonstrating the shift in French protest politics, Gatti's play also 
highlighted the limited way in which the French left conceived of the Vietnam War. 
Reviewers of the play praised it for being non-biased. Gatti, they claimed, could not be 
deemed anti-American because he avoided a Vietnamese/American good/evil split, in 
part by including sympathetic American characters who themselves opposed the war.33 
Yet both Gatti's character development and his presentation of each side's motivations 
showed an oversimplified conception of the Vietnam War.  
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 Character development was perhaps more noteworthy. Gatti's plays had always 
had an absurdist edge to them, and it was not lacking here, where dead American soldiers 
delivered soliloquys, Vietcong soldiers invaded the Pentagon, and four separate 
Shakespearian kings appeared on stage to dispense advice and commentary. Yet by far 
the most absurdist aspect of the play lay in the presentation of the American 
policymakers, who are thinly disguised and yet grotesque caricatures of their actual 
selves.34 MacNamara appears as Quadrature, obsessed with living by the answers his 
computer provides and unwilling to even say no without qualifying that he first needs to 
"verify the derivation of the function 'no'."35 His name, which invoked the French phrase 
"C'est la quadrature du cercle" ("It's like trying to square the circle"), indicated that his 
actions on Vietnam could not possibly provide a workable solution. 
Quadrature/MacNamara was advised by Théo/General Earl Wheeler, Théo being short 
for "Théorème," or "theorem," a name which reflected an ill-advised reliance on data 
over experience. Cabot-Lodge showed up as Ambassador Ventriloque, or Ventriloquist, 
whose name undercut the effectiveness of the American diplomatic effort, limiting it to a 
puppet show run from Washington. The military was represented by Admiral Pointu 
(Admiral "Pointy-headed," a clear play on the actual Admiral Sharp) and General 
Bulldog, actually General Krulak, who had put together the real Operation Silver Lance 
and who went in real life by the nickname "Brute." Like the animal which provided his 
name, General Bulldog's primary characteristic was tenacity: here, absolute belief in 
American military power and a refusal to consider the situation through any sort of 
                                                 
34
 Dorothy Knowles gives an excellent breakdown of the American characters and their real-life 
counterparts in her Wild Duck Against the Wind, 140.  
 
35
 Gatti, V Comme Vietnam, 14. 
 
 161
emotional lens. At one point, confronted by an upset Stanley, the General exasperatedly 
informs him "You shouldn't look for sympathy from anyone. Sympathy is stuck in the 
dictionary between shit and syphillis."36 
 By far the most ridiculous caricature, however, was that of President Johnson, 
who appeared on stage in full Texas garb as "Megasheriff." Megasheriff talked "Texan" 
and frequently invoked his "grandfather who had been killed defending the Alamo."37 He 
spent the majority of the play running the scene from his clinic bed (a reference to LBJ's 
1965 gall bladder surgery), because he claimed that "a sick person on a large bed thinking 
-- that's always impressive."38 Gatti's version of Johnson was constantly searching for 
advice, even though he told one character "With people like you, I'm going to end up not 
being able to find the end of my ass with my two hands."39 At one point the former 
president General Ilikike (I Like Ike) visits him in his clinic room, pushing him to use 
nuclear weapons. Most bizarrely of all, however, Megasheriff was beset by advice and 
commentary by five versions of himself, who represented the multiple sides of LBJ: the 
original Megasheriff, then "Megasheriff the Well-Liked," "Megasheriff the Builder," 
"Megasheriff the Good," and "Megasheriff the Liar." The group, Gatti noted, represented 
"all of the president's political career."40 
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 In contrast, the Vietnamese characters and the remaining Americans were played 
straight. Each had normal names - Phuong Coï, Nguyen Hun Tang, Huyn Dinh, Sophie, 
Dave -- and all dressed, spoke, and acted without any unusual mannerisms. Even the two 
characters who had their source in historical figures lacked any caricature. Stanley, as 
American resistant David Mitchell, appeared as a sympathetic, thoughtful soldier 
overwhelmed by his situation. On the Vietnamese side, Gatti had Nguyen Van Troi, 
attempted assassin of MacNamara, appear in the play, but he did nothing unusual -- aside 
from returning from the dead, and that is clearly acknowledged as a symbolic act. His 
appearance points out the immortality of the Vietnamese resistance. The Vietnamese who 
do not have historical ties are a also idealized, all lacking in faults and all supremely 
dedicated to their cause. This is not, however, a caricature; it demonstrated Gatti's (and 
by extension the French left's) idealized portrayal of the Vietnamese freedom fighter. 
Clearly removed from earlier racist Orientalist ideas (which Gatti has the Americans 
mouth), this depiction of the Vietnamese is nevertheless neo-orientalist in its own way: 
although no longer pejorative, its refusal to consider anything the Vietnamese do as 
wrong leaves them just as far removed from humanity.  
 The conception of the Vietnamese as noble and faultless compared with the 
ineffectual and unmotivated American administration continued in the plot development, 
where each side's war aims were drastically simplified. Gatti had already undermined the 
seriousness of the American war effort by presenting its main policymakers as cartoonish 
buffoons. Now in dialogue, he repeatedly underscored the worthlessness of American 
goals compared with the nobleness of Vietnamese aims. Early in the play, Dr. XXX, a 
psychiatrist working with the administration, reminds the policymakers that "History is 
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written by the victors." Quadrature immediately replies "Our cause is just because we 
possess all the necessary means to win," whereas Tang, off to the side, softly comments 
"We're fighting to defend the right of people to stage revolutions."41 Bulldog, the face of 
the American military, operates by the book and proclaims absurdities such as "What 
does the Marine breviary say? You shouldn't have sex before marriage (unless you're 
using a condom) and only trust in God and the USA."42 On the other side, however,  the 
Vietnamese fighters have deep, poetical conversations about their battle tactics and 
beliefs. They plan out a new dictionary to support their revolution, featuring entries on 
their non-modern weapons such as "B" for "Bees' Nest" and "N" for "Nail-Studded 
Plank," and the titular V. After proclaiming (in accordance with both the NLF's goals and 
the French non-Communist left's protest aims) that they are fighting for victory rather 
than peace, Tang gives the Vietnamese version of Bulldog's Marine breviary. "Luyen, I 
would like to add something to the Encyclopedia," he announces,  "an animal with a 
green coat (like elephant grass), difficult to capture and who once he stands tall changes 
the face of the world. The letter V (as in Vietnam)."43  
 Despite the play's apparent bias, Gatti did not believe the story amounted to a 
simple "denoucniation of a fight between the good guys and the bad guys." It was not a 
condemnation of American patriotism, or a support of Vietnamese communism, that 
provided his focus. In fact, Gatti left communism entirely out of the question, chosing to 
ignore the Marxist objectives of the North or the "domino theory" which had propelled 
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American involvement. Rather, he aimed to show the war as a struggle between "two 
conceptions of mankind:" the cold, hard calculations of a life run by technology, 
characterized by the American style of war, and actions determined by emotions and 
personal experience, which he saw on the Vietnamese side. "Between these two," Gatti 
argued, "there can be no compromise."44 Moreover, Gatti believed that the fight in 
Vietnam necessarily implicated all of mankind, and he wanted the French audience to 
realize that they too needed to take a side. Gatti used the play's structure, which eschewed 
normal conceptions of time and space, and his words to confront the audience with the 
fragmented reality of Vietnam as these two versions of mankind fought in Southeast 
Asia. "Writing theater is not about exploiting a subject that's currently popular," he 
argued, "but about becoming aware, causing others to become aware, obliging them to 
become aware."45 The best way to force this awareness came through the play's staging 
and subsequent tour.  
"An Escalation of Raised Consciousness:" V Comme Vietnam on Tour 
 "This is, let us repeat," a reporter from the newspaper Dépêche du Midi wrote as V 
Comme Vietnam began its run in Toulouse, "an event sufficiently unusual that we have 
every right to underline its importance[.]"46 The production and tour planned around 
Gatti's play was like nothing ever seen before in France. Working with Gatti and his local 
theater, the Grenier de Toulouse, the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire arranged for V 
Comme Vietnam to show for twenty nights in Toulouse before beginning a tour of  thirty-
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two university towns around the country, including a multi-night showing at the 
prestigious Théâtre de l'Est in Paris.47 By its end, the play would have shown 57 times in 
front of 38,000 spectators.48  
 More than a first in theater history, this union-author joint enterprise demonstrated 
a shift in protest methods surrounding the Vietnam War. Buoyed by the success of its 
"Six Hours for Vietnam," the Collective had sought out Gatti as part of a "new cultural 
initiative" that would "make action against the Vietnam War more sensational  [donner à 
l'action contre la guerre du Viet-Nam un plus grand retentissement] and give it greater 
popularity, notably in the provinces."49  The choice marked a sharp move away from their 
previous meetings, public lectures by university figures which greatly resembled 
American "teach-ins." The goal now, the CIU noted, was "not simply to inform the 
public, but to make it aware of the gravity of this war, of the consequences the war risks 
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causing, and to bring the public to reflect upon its own position in relation to the war."50 
Co-opting Johnson's term for announcing troop increases in Vietnam, the Collective said 
that they aimed for "an escalation of raised awareness and reflection to respond to the 
esclation of aggression."51 The Collective's plans for producing the play and for 
contacting the masses during its tour, combined with Gatti's creative ideas for reaching 
out during the shows, provided the perfect combination of cultural and militant action.   
 To fully realize his vision of the play, Gatti worked closely with his long-time 
collaborator, Maurice Sarrazin, director of the Grenier de Toulouse. Sarrazin had 
embraced the idea for the play as soon as he heard of the Collective's offer. In his view, 
the play's topicality returned theater to its most basic function: a poet addressing his 
fellow citizens. "The theatrical gesture is fatally political," he argued. "In presenting V 
Comme Vietnam I have the impression of living in my time, all while performing my job 
exactly, which does not consist of recreating repertory pieces but in creating new 
objects." All would be won, he proclaimed, if the new works managed to be both good 
dramatically and disquieting to the general populace.52 
 Sarrazin's support was essential, because producing Gatti's play in Toulouse 
required a major upheaval for the Grenier. The Daniel Sorrano Theater, which the 
Grenier ran, had already produced one Gatti play in its schedule for that season, and was 
slated to perform Shakespeare's "Twelfth Night" (in French, "La Nuit des Rois," or 
"Night of the Kings,") in April of 1967. Twelve thousand tickets had already been sold.53 
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Aware that he risked upsetting ticket holders, Sarrazin decided that performing V Comme 
Vietnam was more important, and switched out the shows.54 In his defense, Sarrazin 
argued that Shakespeare, whom Sarrazin considered a political playwright himself, would 
have approved of the change. "Shakespeare wrote that 'life is a story full of sound and 
fury,'" Sarrazin explained. "More than ever, this phrase concerns us."55 In Sarrazin and 
Gatti's view, the "sound and fury" of the Vietnam War held just as much cultural value, if 
not more, than a Shakespearian classic. To underline the play's cultural importance, 
Sarrazin went a step beyond simply replacing "Twelfth Night" in the theater's program. 
For the Toulouse appearances, Gatti's play received the incredibly long name of 
"Shakespeare's La Nuit des Rois, Interpreted By the Actors of the Grenier de Toulouse 
Faced With the Events in Southeast Asia -- Armand Gatti's V Comme Vietnam."56  
 As was expected, the move infuriated some members of the public. Vandals 
smashed "two or three" of the theater office's windows, and anonymous letters 
encouraged people to "Crush the valets of the Vietcong!"57 The virulently right-wing 
newspaper Rivarol cried out against this "Shakespeare à la sauce Vietcong," protesting 
the switch of a classic for a play by "a verbal, political-lyrical maniac, specialist in the 
anti-'fascist' struggle ([which he does by] exploiting the snobbism of Marxists in their 
Jaguars and the naive faith of pale and hairy students)."58 The paper was convinced the 
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switch was the work of the Gaullist government, which they believed to be secretly 
supporting a Communist uprising. On the other side of the political spectrum, some 
complained that the Grenier's switch did not go far enough -- that such engagements 
should drive the theater's showings and that the theater was too politically lukewarm.59 
But perhaps the most important reaction to the choice for Sarrazin and Gatti came from a 
local Vietnamese man, who claimed "Within a few days of the creation of V Comme 
Vietnam, the maquis fighters will know that this play has been written and performed. For 
them this will be the most beautiful encouragement..."60 
 Once the switch was definitive, Gatti and Sarrazin went to work crafting a 
production that would reflect the political goal's of Gatti's writing. When some of the 
Grenier's actors expressed disappointment they would be acting in V Comme Vietnam 
rather than in Shakespeare, Gatti attempted to use this to his advantage and cast them as 
the hawkish Americans.61 Set with his own actors in the other parts, and with Maurice 
Sarrazin as Quadrature -- part of the American administration, but key to the 
dramatization of the realization of the power of the Vietnamese -- Gatti and Sarrazin 
worked with Hubert Monloup to create a set which reflected Gatti's conception of the war 
as a fight between "two conceptions of man." Monloup responded by placing the 
supercomputer, "Chestnut" at the center of the stage. ("The machine takes up all the 
stage," Gatti crowed. "This man [MacNamara] has ended up by resembling the machine, 
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by thinking like the machine[...] and what's thinking is 'Chestnut'."62) Actors appeared on 
its various "screens," either via actual televisions or through trompe-l'oeil staging. Behind 
the stage, instead of a curtain, Monloup placed a giant sky-blue V. The letter was 
surrounded by the names and dates of key American battles such as Hiroshima and 
Geronimo.63 The presence of the large "V as in Vietnam," along with the massive 
supercomputer which allowed them to experience the "deliriousness of the Pentagon" and 
the fragmented reality of the war, visually imposed the play's message on its audience. 64 
 Just as Quadrature broke through the fourth wall with his mask removal at the end 
of the play, Gatti and Sarrazin strove to create a performance that shattered the typical 
boundaries of theater. The performance, in fact, consisted of three parts, only one of 
which was the actual play. As the curtain rose in Toulouse, spectators saw the actors in 
the midst of performing a scene from "Twelfth Night." Before the scene progressed far, 
reality broke in, as another member of the company burst on stage, reading out the day's 
dispatches about the war.65 Having received the current reality of the war, the audience 
was then thrown into the actual play. But Quadrature's unmasking did not end their 
theatrical experience: after each performance, Gatti and the Collective organized 
discussion groups with theatergoers and with local workers who may or may not have 
attended the play. With this mix of the classical, the actual, the theatrical, and the 
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conversational, theater spilled into the real world as the real world spilled into the theater, 
creating a perfect mix of culture and militancy.  
 The CIU used the spectacle Gatti had created to give more oomph to some of their 
more traditional protest methods. Throughout the play's Toulouse run they staged outside 
meetings, including a multi-day event in mid-April that featured lectures on the war by 
American sociologists and playing of documentarian Roger Pic's anti-war films.66 At 
each show, in Toulouse and on tour, members of the Collective (generally university 
students) took advantage of the play's run to poster the town, sell a variety of Vietnam-
themed books, organize debates, and raise money for the Collective's project for a 
university library in Hanoi.67  
 Central to each performance, however, remained the planned discussions with 
audience members. Gatti relished these opportunities to interact with his viewers, and 
was delighted that during the V Comme Vietnam tour there were at times five to eight 
meetings a day.68 The Collective had reached out especially to local workers, and various 
unions put tickets aside that workers "desirous of demonstrating their solidarity with 
Vietnam" could pick up if they wanted to attend the shows.69 Local organizations 
scheduled meetings for Gatti to attend and speak at.70 These debates, the third part of the 
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play, were intended to continue the reflection the play had provoked and make the viewer 
realize they had to take action. Gatti recounted one particular dialogue between himself 
and an audience member which demonstrated the combined power of the play and the 
debate. At a mixed-class meeting in a new neighborhood, a "lady" responded to a 
question about what symbolism lay behind the nail-studded plank: 
The lady: I understood that the nail-studded plank is the American 
conscientious objector, the person who says "No" to the Vietnam war. His 
refusal is the nail-studded plank!  
Gatti: Madame, your response is that of the real spectator, the kind who 
brings their own intervention parallel to the play they have seen, and ends 
by creating their own play at the same time. Madame, I say to you "Well 
done!" 
The lady blushed and replied: Sir, since I've seen the play, I've wanted to 
be a nail-studded plank myself!71 
 
 By bringing the play on tour, the Collective created its own version of the JCR's 
declaration "Enough with blubbering petitions and peace delegations!" The play's format 
challenged the typical informative meeting the Collective offered, pushing the viewers to 
become aware and react, rather than telling them what to think. By bringing the play on 
tour, and working with local groups to attract local workers and others to come out, the 
Collective tried to spread beyond its normal boundaries. Simultaneously, Gatti and 
Sarrazin's creation pushed the limits of traditional theater, mixing current events and 
creativity in an attempt to, as Gatti had stated, force a man to think so that he might begin 
to change the world. Both Gatti and the Collective's moves reflected the change 
underway in the French left from simply informative protest to more direct action. 
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"A Theater That Divides": 
Critical Reaction to V Comme Vietnam as a Method of Protest 
 
 The debates provoked by V Comme Vietnam delighted Gatti, who informed an 
interviewer during the play's tour that "In my view, if the show doesn't provoke fights, 
something's gone wrong. We've fallen into inertia."72 No such problem existed for V 
Comme Vietnam. As one reviewer noted, "At every showing, there are quarrels. People 
are for it, people are against it, but there's always discussion [ça fait du bruit]."73  
Conversation amongst viewers at the play had its counterpart in published critiques of the 
play, where reviewers addressed not only the theatrical but also the political merits of 
Gatti's work. From these reactions, both those negative and those positive, a sense of an 
on-going cultural battle in France over its cultural identity, and over the role of its 
intellectuals, came to light.  
 For the French far-right, there was no question of finding merit in Gatti's work. 
"'V' as in 'vide!' [empty!]," the reviewer for Le Monde et la Vie exclaimed. "Mr. Gatti 
confuses that which is 'hollow' with that which is 'deep', that which is 'political' with that 
which is 'preachy' [.]" 74 Lucien Rebatet, the well-known fascist and anti-semitic 
intellectual, went one step further in his review for Rivarol. "Mr. Gatti is a primate," he 
sneered. Deeming Gatti a "crank deprived of all talent," Rebatet described the play and its 
message as "a string of asinine remarks [âneries] in capital letters." Unfortunately for the 
play's viewers, Rebatet noted, "this was not a parody. It's propaganda, equal in its 
vulgarity and its puerility to Pekin's wall murals and caricatures." He bemoaned the 
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intellectual vapidity that he claimed made Gatti produce such tripe: "Poor little poorly 
put-togther head, incapable of an embryo of reason, of criticism, where hollow truisms 
ring like bells."75 
 Although Rebatet considered Gatti and his work "pathetic and grotesque", he 
nonetheless found it important to attack Gatti's play because of what he and others on the 
right felt the play represented: an all-out war on Western civilization, taking place in 
France, with the full support of the Gaullist government. Upon hearing of the planned 
tour, Rebatet had complained of the leftist tint of French cultural production. "[S]uburban 
theaters, cultural centers, none of this is anything anymore but marxist propaganda under 
a humanitarian mask, rehashings of Brechtian themes, dump trucks of shit disgorged onto 
Western man," he wrote. "Open up editor's catalogues, bourgeois weekly papers, turn on 
the television," he continued, "everything that's for sale today is dedicated to the 
emminent civlization of the Bantus, of Négritos, to the heroic memory of Cuban, Polish, 
or Spanish communists or to the endless recollection of the fascist monster, always ready, 
of course" he sarcastically noted, "to come back." It represented a horrific affront to 
French cultural traditions. "One reflects upon all the dead polemicists, half or nearly half 
of French literature," he commented nostagically. "The country of Rabelais, of Agrippa, 
of Aubigné, of Pascal, of Rivarol, of the political articles of Chenier, of Léon Bloy and of 
Céline: has it degenerated to the point of passively sitting by, without even an ironic or a 
disgusted reflex, during this stupid liquidation, this rotting via the brain, this tidal wave of 
the deepest and most dismal conformism?" 76 
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 Rebatet's use of "degenerate," with all the racial baggage it entailed, was hardly 
accidental. Gatti considered his play as showing the war as a combat between two types 
of man, one driven by technology and one guided by the heart. Rebatet and the right, 
however, saw it as a combat between the West and the East -- and thus between white 
man and the other. This right-wing conception of the war had not come about with the 
opening of Gatti's play. In early 1965, supporters of far-right presidential candidate 
Tixier-Vignancour released an announcement "respectfully saluting all American 
solidiers, who are not fighting against the NLF but waging the battle of the West against 
the yellow world."77 The radical student group Occident, which participated in protests of 
Gatti's play, took as its motto simply "Defend the West." For the right, the frontlines of 
the fight for white man and Western civilization lay in the struggle against Communism. 
The student groups which attacked performances of Gatti's play thus invoked imagery to 
align themselves with the American side of the war, by releasing flyers urging an end to 
"Communist aggression," by displaying the South Vietnamese flag, and by burning the 
North Vietnamese flag. They also took pains to highlight their own place connections to 
white Western traditions, by emphasizing their heritage through their names: "Occident;" 
"Committe France -- Young Homeland Nationalist Movement." 
 For the French right, perhaps  the most infuriating part of Gatti's play and its 
attack on the west was that its support of the Vietcong apparently came with the implicit 
approval of the French government.  Rebatet christened Gatti "the official dramaturge of 
the Fifth Republic." "All cultural centers are open to him, bookstores and kiosks are filled 
with his brochures, they've organized a tour of all of France for V Comme Vietnam," he 
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grumbled. "No citizen should ignore such a perfect transcription of the Elysée's politics 
and of the aesthetics of its favorite minister, Mr. Malraux."78 While no actual direct 
connections to the French government existed, the CIU did hope the play would 
demonstrate French solidarity with the Vietnamese, drawing upon a French tradition of 
cultural action and protest. For the right, this was intolerable. When the nationalist 
students lobbed stinkbombs into the audience, they were not only protesting a pro-
Vietcong showing but also refusing to allow France's cultural production to be co-opted 
by an anti-Western, and thus anti-white, left.  
 Not all negative reaction to the political elements of Gatti's play came from the 
right, however. In a move that demonstrated divides on the French left, the French 
Communist Party also protested aspects of the play. In particular, the Communists 
objected to Gatti's presentation of the Vietnamese as fighting on their own. "The 
maquisards' nail studded plank is not the only thing which disrupts Megasherrif's, 
Quadrature's and Bulldog's plans," the reviewer for the Communist paper Humanité 
Dimanche chided. Complaining that the only foreign aid for Vietnam appeared to come 
from "the activity of Berkeley students and some old quotes of Mao Tsé-Tung's," 
Humanité Dimanche opined that Gatti's writing showed "at the least, a strange lack of 
knowledge about the facts."79 The Communist Party additionally decried one of the 
Vietnamese characters, Phuong's, proclamation that Vietnam was looking for "not peace 
but victory."80 These complaints highlighted the on-going split on the French left between 
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the Communist Party, still protesting for peace in Vietnam, and a growing number of the 
non-Communist left who insisted upon Vietnamese victory. For the French Communist 
Party, protesting for peace was essential because a fight for peace fit into the Soviet line 
of "peaceful coexistence." While the Party correctly noted that Gatti's depiction of the 
Vietnam War omitted key international players, their real complaint was with his failure 
to highlight Soviet actions; this also was motivated by a desire to toe Moscow's line. The 
French Communist Party wanted absolute control over the French left, and Gatti's 
presentation of the war broke from the story they wished to present. The production and 
tour of the play, led by a group not under the Communist umbrella (and a group with 
which the Party had previously clashed) only served to underline that the French left was 
slipping further and further away from the Communist Party.81  
 Excluding the Communist Party's nitpickings, the French left widely approved the 
political message of the play. Reviewers applauded Gatti's ability to demonstrate the 
importance of the war. In Le Monde, Claude Sarraute praised Gatti's deconstruction of the 
American war effort, writing that the play was "the acknowledgement of a failure, of a 
rout: the myth of modern technology collapses faced with the eternal soul, the crazed 
policies of one nation explodes when it comes into contact with the wisdom of other 
nations."82 The reviewer for Les Lettres Françaises extolled Gatti's illustration of the 
war's impact upon all mankind, even those not in Southeast Asia. Rephrasing 
Quadrature's closing monologue, he enthused "V Comme Vietnam brings out the evidence 
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that we are all 'enclosed' in the seven letters which make up the word VIETNAM."83 
Other reviewers expressed delight in how the play drew the audience in. "No theater 
demands the spectator's participation as much as Gatti's, but this is not a sentimental 
participation," André Alter declared in the leftist Christian newspaper Témoignage 
Chrétien. "If ever a theater has been an instrument in raising consciousness, this is it."84 
His fellow reviewer P. -I. D. put it even more emotionally: "The enthusiastic welcome 
that this play receives from its passionate audience is reason to not despair in the 
rationality and the heart of mankind."85 
The "Power of Literature:" 
Critical Reaction to Vietnam and the Question of "Engagement" 
 
 The central issue for all reviewers, however, was not the political message of the 
play, but if the play had a right to be political at all. More than whether or not Gatti's play 
successfully convinced people of the need to pay attention to Vietnam, critics were 
focused on whether the play could attempt to spread a message without losing its artistic 
integrity. As Benoit Denis has shown, "engaged" writers looking to address their cause in 
their literary works walked a fine line between managing to produce simple testimony or 
actual literature. At all times, but especially since Sartre's call to create engaged literature, 
critics indicated a fear that engagement would drive literature into the realm of 
propaganda. While no one commented Gatti's right to draw on his social capital as an 
intellectual  to participate in protests against the war, commentary about the play raised 
the issue of engaged intellectuals' politics seeping over into their creative activity. The 
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discussion highlighted shifts in the conception of the French intellectual, revealed the 
right's desires for participation as intellectuals on their own, and showed changing views 
on what role and how the intellectual should play in political issues in modern France. 
 For Rebatet and the right, the engaged work's political posturing destroyed its 
artistic aspirations. Rebatet believed that inclusion of the Gatti's message reduced the 
play to, as previously noted, just "propaganda." "You say to yourself  'He's going to 
finally manage to spit it out, to drag out a sentence,'" he wrote in his review of V Comme 
Vietnam. "But no. He babbles on, stuttering and stammering, for an hour that we must 
'promote the new man, make ideology the servant of mankind and not mankind the 
servant of ideology,' that the theater character must fuse with the actor and the actor with 
the character." Rebatet felt that the heavy-handedness of Gatti's message was only 
compounded by his poor actors and by his simplistic characterizations, where the 
Vietnamese were martyrs and the Americans were Nazis "more terrifying than Himmler 
because of their infatuation with technology." By placing politics into his play, Rebatet 
believed, Gatti lowered the quality of his oeuvre.  
 It did not help, of course, that Gatti and other engaged writers worked from the 
left in apparent or overt support of Marxism. Although Gatti's play did not explicitly 
mention Communism, Rebatet grouped it, as has been shown, with the other "Marxist 
propaganda" which made up the "dump trucks of shit disgorged onto Western man." But 
Rebatet's reproach to the Marxist leanings of the play held an interesting note of envy. 
Commenting on how Maurice Sarrazin had proudly argued that all real theater was by 
necessity engaged, Rebatet bitterly remarked "If only we could see shows, let's say fascist 
shows, in the same style as the anti-fascist Gatti! What mocking, carefully justified, 
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would greet them!" In part a denunciation of how engaged writing was actually limited to 
writing that supported leftist politics, Rebatet's comment also revealed a longing for the 
possibility of expressing right-wing politics in literature. Although the right decried the 
creative weakness they saw in engaged literature -- a fellow writer at Rivarol wondered in 
July 1967 if engagement wasn't "a means for many writers to guarantee themselves of an 
impact and an audience that their work doesn't merit on its own"86 -- the cultural mandate 
the far right claimed to uphold had distinct political undertones of its own. Rebatet sought 
to preserve and continue a certain French cultural tradition when he expressed regret that 
Marxist-tinged literature was overrunning the "dead polemicists" who made up "half or 
nearly half of French literature." His list of "polemicists" included not only canonical 
French authors such as Rabelais and Pascal, but also well-known and controversial 
conservative writers who had let their politics into their work: Antoine de Rivarol, a 
Royalist exiled during the Revolution with a noted talent for barbed insults for whom 
Rebatet's paper was named; André Chenier, a conservative poet guillotined at the start of 
the Terror; and Louis-Ferdinand Céline, a talented novelist with a nasty anti-Semitic 
streak who had fled to exile with the discredited Vichy government upon France's 
liberation. Rebatet's choices demonstrated a desire for a creative voice for right-wing 
politics.  
 In his article deriding the announcement of the V Comme Vietnam tour, Rebatet 
deplored the "wall of silence built up around us [right-wing authors] for the past twenty-
two years." His time frame linked  the silencing of the right in culture to the end of World 
War II and thus of fascist politics, but also tied it closely to the emergence of the theory 
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of engaged literature. Unfortunately, Rebatet noted, the left's voice in cultural matters had 
become so powerful that the only way for the right's "fight against decadence" to be 
heard would be if they managed to get a leftist to switch sides. (It had to be possible, 
Rebatet argued, as not all of the left "could be struck with permanent idiocy.") Through 
his denunciations and wistful asides, Rebatet's reactions to Gatti's play showed more than 
a simple refusal of the concept of "littérature engagée."  Rather, Rebatet's remarks 
exposed the far-right's desire to participate as engaged intellectuals on their own,  
dispersing their own social and creative capital. 87 
 Although already positioned as engaged intellectuals, the left was nevertheless far 
from a unified view on the value of inserting politics into creative endeavors. While they 
did not abhor the message as Rebatet did, some critics agreed with him that in attempting 
to communicate his cause, Gatti abandoned his art. Matthieu Galey, writing for Les 
Nouvelles Littéraires, chastized Gatti for his outlandish caricatures of the American 
administration. "Why destroy the relative impartiality of the play in one fell swoop by 
presenting puppets worthy of Punch and Judy [?]" he queried. "The theatrical 
construction collapses upon itself: nothing is left but a parody of propaganda[.]"88 Emile 
Copfermann also saw the characters as "puppets," but felt that the real problem for the 
play was that in attempting to tell so many stories, Gatti got bogged down in confusing 
details. "Was his aim to show through these characters machine and man? Technology 
dominating man versus man dominating his destiny?," Copfermann wondered. "It's 
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possible, but frankly, I'm not sure. If that's what it was, I admit that I'm lost." Copfermann 
complained about the combination multiple intersecting storylines and absurdist 
portrayls. "Events happen on scene that totally escape us," he griped. "Who are all these 
sherriffs?" 89 
 Both Copfermann and Galey acknowledged that Gatti's primary goal was not to 
create an artistic masterpiece, but they insisted that the aesthetic qualities still mattered. 
"[A] play is neither a newspaper story or an investigation," Galey declared. "Another 
dimension must be reached, which for Vietnam would be that of tragedy. It appears that 
Armand Gatti has failed in his attempt to bring one of our bloodiest present-day conflicts 
to the stage, because of his constant wobbling between grotestque satircal-political 
caricature and higher, but confused, ambitions."90 Copfermann expressed similar 
disappointments. "Perhaps Gatti and his friends at the Grenier de Toulouse will deem my 
reserves uncalled for, the essential being the Vietnam War [...]," he acknowledged. "I 
don't underestimate the importance of what's at stake [.] I think that one of the objectives 
-- the political aspect -- was reached. But we were asked to give our opinions on a 
performance. That is what I tried to do."91 In Copfermann and Galey's view,  the attempt 
to include a strong political message derailed the creative elements the theater needed in 
order to be a success.  
 Other reviewers felt, to the contrary, that the creative demands of theater hindered 
Gatti's ability to make a strong political statement. The French satirical paper Le Canard 
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Enchainé complained that Gatti's innovative dramatic presentation resulted in an 
"overstuffed theater." In general no fans of Gatti's style ("We appreciate that Gatti has 
gone off the beaten path," their critic noted, "but why doesn't he use less torturous 
roads[?]"), Le Canard Enchainé found that his elaborate staging, including the multiple 
use of television screens, overwhelmed his message. "Gatti should put some of his sound 
effect and visual tricks machines back in the proproom, and put a few supplementary 
projectors in their place," the Canard snarked. "His intention needs to be spotlighted."92   
 Yet others claimed Gatti's aim was not harmed by his dramatic whistles and bells 
but because a dramatization of the war could not bring out the true horrors of what was 
going on it Southeast Asia. "Current events are too hot to be shown under theater lights," 
remarked the critic at Jurinal. "The obligatory transposition betrays the facts." For the 
reviewer at La Tribune des Nations, the fallback on dramatization also harmed attempts 
to organize protest movements against the war. "[T]his type of theater ends up doing 
exactly the opposite of what it was trying for," the critic explained. "Liberating the 
oppressed, revolution: it's now done from an theater seat, with the approval of unions, 
leftist parties and the government who, if necessary, underwrites this unoffensive 
enterprise." Rather than the new active method of reaching the public that the C.I.U. 
hoped for, the critic believed the use of Gatti's play risked turning protestors into 
armchair revolutionaries. What made it even worse, the critic claimed, was that they 
wouldn't even have enjoyed themselves in the process. "They came in [to the Théâtre de 
l'Est Parisien] with their desire for justice, their love of peace, and they were promised a 
play about Vietnam," he noted. "They saw it, and they applauded... because they couldn't 
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do otherwise, because it would have required great intellectual courage to say that they 
were bored[.]"93 
 The critics who found that the drama of the play detracted from the real-life 
drama of the war seemed to be at the opposite end of the spectrum from those critics like 
Copfermann and Maley who found that the demands of a political agenda deprived the 
play of its dramatic viability. Yet in actuality, both groups viewed the play as part of the 
same Catch-22. Their comments revealed a tension which suggested that an engaged 
creative work necessarily neglected either its creative or its political component. For 
these leftist critics, the idea of a writer being socially engaged and throwing his weight 
behind a cause did not pose a problem, nor did they have issues with Gatti's message 
about the war. But they doubted that a work could attempt to both participate in political 
protest and make a worthwhile creative contribution, without falling short in one or the 
other area.  
 Maurice Sarrazin argued, however, that what V comme Vietnam demonstrated was 
precisely the value and necessity of combining social protest and dramatic production. 
"You see that it's not just a question, on our part, of a simple intellectual engagement," he 
told an interviewer in April. "It goes much further. [In] my eyes, such an engagement has 
no point unless it matches up with, on the level of professional theater, an equally 
important gesture. In putting on V Comme Vietnam, we are making a gesture that 
responds to an anxiety of all of contemporary theater." 94 Creating the play, in Sarrazin 
and in Gatti's view, did not limit theater but rather brought it to its essential role. Aware 
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that the work would not necessarily change how the war played out, both nevertheless 
considered it an important action for both theatrical production and social protest.  "It 
would show ridiculous vanity to believe that a play could bring any type of support to 
those who are fighting in the rice paddies. That would be scandalous!" Gatti explained. 
"But I am persuaded that [...] theater can play a role, in the same way that I am persuaded 
that the result of the Vietnam War will change the face of the world."95  
 Several critics agreed that Gatti's play had once again demonstrated the political 
and creative viability of théâtre engagé. Writing for the Dépêche du Midi, Michel 
Roquebert argued that with V Comme Vietnam Gatti and Sarrazin had proven "that 
theater can be something other that a delectable aesthetic enjoyment reserve for a small 
group of fans cut off from the world; [proven] that it can be also, in its way, a witness to 
our times, to the most burning realities, to dramas whose outcome could change the face 
of the world, to mechanisms that could crush us all, tomorrow." He saw the play as 
successful both in its theatrical and its political aspects. "V Comme Vietnam manages the 
miracle of being at the same time a denunciation, a cry of alarm, a position which takes 
its stand without detours or ambiguities  -- and theater in its purest state," Roquebert said, 
praising the play for being "a work filled, in its contstruction, its form, its language, its 
production, with so much creative richness and so many beautifies, that in it reality truly 
transforms into art." 96 In Le Quinzaine Littéraire, Bernard Dort also praised Gatti for 
creating work that refuted the dichotomy between cultural aesthetics and current events. 
"With [Gatti], theater is neither an instrument of propaganda or a means of amusing one's 
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self," he proclaimed. "It is the most serious and the most cheerful game: a big puzzle that 
.allows the audience to compose and to recognize their own image."97 Gérard Guillot felt 
that the way Gatti's play broke free of either political or dramatic limits solidified Gatti's 
place in French literature, remarking "The greatest merit of the creation of V Comme 
Vietnam is to have obliged all of those who tried to shut Gatti into a political system, all 
those who doubted him as an authentic creator, to recognize his importance, his liberty, 
his originality... rank[ing him] at the top of comtemporary French drama."98 
  Yet even those positive reviews which felt Gatti had succeeded in marrying 
theater and politics also carried a tinge of regret, this time for the apparent movement of 
drama away from current events. For Michel Roquebert, Gatti's engaged effort had 
returned theater to its origins. "Do we forget that the history of Western theater began 
practically with a play oh, so political and 'engaged'?" he queried. "The author denounced 
the folly of war to his contemporaries. His name was Aeschylus.[....]" Roquebert felt that 
Gatti had been "courageous" to "reach out his hand across twenty-five centuries to what 
theater had been at its birth," and urged theatergoers to "thank God to have dared to have 
made this immense and yet so simple gesture of speaking to us about that which concerns 
us all."99  Another writer for the Dépêche du Midi declared that Gatti's play and the tour 
held special significance because they "proved that contemporary theater can escape its 
isolation, abandon its intellectualist character, and be the grand human and social 
phenomenom that it should never have ceased to be."100 J. Vuarnet, writing for La Vie 
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Lyonnaise, continued along the same theme, emphasizing that theater and creative works 
in recent years had become too apolitical. V Comme Vietnam, he asserted, "revived a 
power of literature that we had believed lost." The impact of such theatrical acts served as 
a warning: without care, the influence of engaged creative acts could be lost. "We must 
believe in ideas, believe in theater, believe in art," Vuarnet urged, "and believe in a 
resolutely modern way -- or risk having the shadows lengthen."101 
 Such comments reflected that while debate over the value of engaged creative acts 
continued in France, the creative acts themselves had tapered off. Around the world, the 
Vietnam War had inspired a number of theatrical events, including Peter Brook's US in 
London and the Vermont Bread and Puppet Theater. But in France, the war had not 
inspired a large amount of work.102 A couple of plays had predated V Comme Vietnam, 
but they were small productions without much resonance. 103 Although the moment 
seemed opportune -- as Roger Kanters noted in L'Express, war always inspired and given 
the Gaullist government's apparent anti-Americanism artists had no need to fear 
repercussions -- French theater was largely quiet.104 A Scandinavian publishing company, 
collecting international works on the war, wondered where the French creative voice was. 
As a blurb on the anthology explained, "Although Guernica, and closer to home the 
Algerian War, struck French writers' consciousness, those in Scandinavia are astounded 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
101
 J.-N. Vuarnet, "'V comme Vietnam' d'Armand Gatti," La Vie Lyonnaise, June 1967. 
 
102
 See Olivier Neveux' comments on French dramatists' reactions to the war in his Théâtres en Lutte.  
 
103
 Gérard Guillot. The plays were André Benedetto's "Napalm" and the Franc Théâtre's presentation of "La 
Guerre entre parenthèses." 
 
104
 Robert Kanters, "Les horreurs de la guerre: 'V comme Vietnam' d'Armand Gatti et le théâtre politique," 
L'Express, 12-18 June 1967. 
 
 187
that the events in Vietnam have not inspired more works in France and that, for example, 
Armand Gatti's play is a relatively isolated testimony."105  
 The comparative silence of the French artistic community faced with the Vietnam 
war stemmed from two reasons. Firstly, the apparent lack of intervention actually 
revealed a shift in comment form. While few creative fictional interventions on Vietnam 
existed, filmed commentary, specifically in journalistic or documentary form, had 
exploded. The war figured heavily into television reporting, bringing the reality of the 
day's fighting into the living rooms of the French viewing public. Reports had an 
impressive effect. Responding to a 1966 segment dedicated to life in Hanoi on the 
popular program "Cinq colonnes à l'une," Le Monde's critic Robert Gauthier commented 
"You think you've seen it all and then you discover that not everything has been said, that 
the reality is even more tragic than we expected. And this without seeking to shock, 
simply by the succession of images [....]"106 Protest meetings often included films, 
notably ones by French documentary filmmaker Roger Pic and Australian filmmaker 
Wilfred Burchett, who had strong connections to the French film community. Gatti 
himself, in fact, had been responsible for presenting the film section of the evening at the 
Comité Vietnam National's "Six Hours for the Victory of Vietnam" meeting in November 
                                                 
105
 "Les poètes américains et la guerre du Vietnam: subsection 'Pour une anthologie internationale,'" Le 
Monde supplement 5 July 1967.  
 
106
  Robert Gauthier, "L'Algérie en devenir, le vietnam en guerre à 'Cinq colonnes à la une,' " Le Monde 8-9 
May 1966.  Although these programs were supposed to be objective - they were generally split between a 
South Vietnam segment and a North Vietnam segment - they still revealed a strong bias towards a pro-NLF 
interpretation of the war. Because French TV and Radio were state controlled, the extreme rightists at 
Rivarol took this as proof of the government's support of the North and of communism. " M. Pierre 
Lazareffe exagère,"Rivarol 12 May 1966. 
 
 188
of 1966.107 Many seemed to agree with the Jurinal critic's observation that ""Current 
events are too hot to be shown under theater lights," preferring instead the vividness and 
perceived realness which came through the film projector. 
 Secondly, the move away from dramatized representations of the war also 
reflected a shift among French intellectuals from creating fictional works (however thinly 
veiled) which took a political stand, to using their previous works as support for, rather 
than engagement with, current issues. This represented in part the deployment of accrued 
social capital by well-known intellectuals. Those who, like Sartre, or Simone de 
Beauvoir, or François Mauriac, had previously established themselves as politically 
engaged, carried enough clout with them from the reception of earlier works and from 
their public activities to be able to take a stand on Vietnam and gather notice.  
 But this did not mean that creative works were absent from the scene. Rather, they 
took a supporting role within the drama around Vietnam, serving as background players 
used to attact the audience. The announcements for "Six Hours of the World for 
Vietnam," for example, made special note of the fact that well-known painter Max Ernst 
had designed the event's poster.108 The Collective, during the tour of Gatti's play, 
organized an "Art for Peace" sale to better aid in raising money for the Hanoi library 
project. Works by a group of recognizable artists had been made available for purchase at 
prices of 100, 120 and 150 francs. 109 In his pamphlet essay for the sale, art critic Jean 
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Cassou framed the artist's participation as an engaged act. Noting that all artists 
approached by the Collective had donated, and that the works present "represent[ed] a 
complete and significant panorama of modern-day art," Cassou went on to present the 
show as the perfect marriage of political activism and artistic creation: 
For the artists, this protest-exhibit is an act of conscience. They have, by 
this, shown that the artist is not a man who lives shut up in his studio, 
soley concerned with his productions and his relations with those who 
judge them and those who buy them, but a man to whom nothing of 
humanity remains foreign and who, like all men, takes a stand when faced 
with events in the world. This is his way -- and it is the most simple and 
the truest way -- to feel, in current events, engaged. And he knows that, 
doing this, he sacrifices nothing, neither of the purety, nor of the liberty of 
his creation. This is why the present exposition, searching to support a 
great human cause, that of the destiny of a people and, through them, that 
of peace, is also a demonstration of the artistic genius of our time.110 
 
 Cassou's conception of engagement differed radically from Gatti, and in a way 
that could not simply be attributed to their different artistic mediums. For Gatti, 
engagment meant dealing with topical issues through creative work. For Cassou, 
however, the artist managed to maintain independence and keep his art "pure" by creating 
artwork separate from political imperatives, and then contributing it to a political cause. 
The dearth of French creative works dedicated to Vietnam, and the popularity of events 
like the "Art for Peace" sale, seemed to indicate that in spite of the success of Gatti's play 
and its tour, Cassou's conception of artistic engagement held greater currency with the 
French public.  
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Conclusion: "At That Moment We Sincerely Believed" 
 The V Comme Vietnam tour ended on June 15, 1967, with a performance at 
Macon. A print edition of the play came out at Editions de Seuil shortly thereafter.111 Due 
to the popularity of the shows, the Collective announced a second tour in France in the 
fall.112 International showings were planned for New York, Venice and Frankfort, and the 
Collective approached a theater company about the possibility of arranging a 
performance in Algeria.113  Although none of these performances occurred, the play was 
translated into German as "V Wie Vietnam" and performed at the Schauspielhaus in 
Leipzig in July, 1968.114 Despite the failure to reach a large international audience, the 
original tour had made a mark on French theater. Its creation showed that plays could be 
created outside of normal circuits, with political topics, and that they would find an 
interested audience.115 
 After the play's run, the Union National des Etudiants Français put together a 
report for their national commission assessing the overall impact of the tour. Although 
they admitted they were lacking some essential information that would have allowed 
them to come to definitive conclusions about the success of the play (they did not, for 
example, have full financial results of the play), the information they did possess shed 
light on the difficulties the tour and the protest movement had faced.  
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 In terms of practical aspects, the UNEF noted that adequate personnel to handle 
set-up, especially advertising and propaganda, were not always available from all of the 
unions involved in the Collective. They had to wait a long time for flyers and information 
to become available, and these were not plentiful when they arrived. The International 
Committee of the Association Général des Etudiants de Lyon ended up responsible for 
"the essential, if not the totality, of public work," including "distributing tracts, posting 
posters, selling the text of the play, setting up communications with the press and with 
the theater." They were able to adopt an efficient system for getting publicity out, 
working with militants both on and off campus, but they noted that the "division of 
chores" did not improve over time.116 The disorganization extended to a hodge-podge of 
ways set up to house the traveling theater troupe from Toulouse, and to the handling of 
funds. "A similar tour could not be organized unless we were sure in advance of the 
revenue," the UNEF noted, claiming that even without the final accounting done, it 
appeared that the deficit -- 8 million old francs -- was "greater than expected."117 
 More significantly, however, the UNEF report revealed that the propaganda 
movement intended to accompany the play's performances frequently ran into difficulties 
which revealed rivalries on the left, conflicts with hosts, and overall the limited reach of 
the protest movement. At each performance, Collective members were meant to provide 
an exhibition on Vietnam, sell books, set up a debate, and collect money for the 
Collective's university library project in Hanoi. But when the tour stopped at some of the 
professional theaters, their hosts did not always allow them to carry out all of their tasks. 
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In Nice, in fact, the theater blocked them from doing any of them. At other times, 
Collective activists struggled not with conservative theater hosts but with a hesitant 
coalition of leftists. In Rouen, for example, worried about "breaking 'the unity'" between 
the groups involved, no debate was able to be had. The political groups involved 
expressed concern that "provocateurs" -- the term for extreme-left activists, generally 
Maoists -- would show up and bother the "tieds" (individuals with half-hearted 
involvement).118But even more important than the times when debates could not be 
organized was the issue of who was there when debates were held . Except for five towns 
(Lyon, Brest, Tulles, Troyes, and Nantes), the UNEF felt that the majority of the people 
at the play and participating in the conversation afterwards were connected to the 
university milieu. Despite the tour's publicity and its movement around France, the 
organizers had not been able to expand beyond those people they generally consorted 
with. In short, as they put it: "We reached a public that was already convinced."119  
 Upon reflection, Armand Gatti too came to feel that the play and its tour had not 
made the kind of connections it sought. In a 1971 interview with Denis Bablet, he 
explained that while he had "dropped everything to jump into work on the play, because 
it seemed to correspond to something for me," he and the other participants quickly 
realized the "infinite number" of difficulties they faced. In Gatti's view, for such a 
political play to have its full effect everyone involved in its production needed to share its 
views. "We realized we couldn't do political theater like that with an established theater 
corps, that it wouldn't do to have just any actor, but that we needed actors politically 
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prepared and ready to lead this fight like a real fight, in it for the long run," he explained. 
The difficulty came in part from the set-up of bourgeois theater in France.  "[P]olitical 
combat is an immediate response, and theater is an institituion that is often slow," Gatti 
noted. "To set up [V Comme Vietnam] we needed locations that belonged to this person 
and that person, and if all of them were not in solidarity with the fight for Vietnam little 
leaks sprung up everywhere."120 His comments echoed the U.N.E.F.'s report of 
difficulties with establishing the propaganda aspect of the tour at various theaters around 
France. As a protest movement which often depended on people exterior to its cause, the 
tour and activism around V Comme Vietnam frequently ran into insurmountable 
roadblocks.  
 Gatti also came to critique the public debates which surrounded the play and his 
theatrical work of the period in general, considering them later on as an activity for leftist 
intellectuals that never really reached a more general public. "For a whole period of time, 
I played my role of a product of the left," he told Marc Kravetz in 1987. He admitted that 
at the time he had really enjoyed his meetings with the workers and his relations with 
various workers unions, but he doubted he had actually transmitted a message. "For each 
play there were always fifteen or so factories or businesses to visit, " he remembered. 
"[T]his let me carry on what I thought to be a dialogue, but what I'd more likely see 
nowadays as a variant of marketing."121 He explained to Bablet that he connected this to a 
mistakenly elitist understanding in all of French intellectual activity of the time of how to 
reach the general public, and specifically the working classes. "At that time we sincerely 
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believed that to bring culture to the workers was to bring them a weapon," Gatti said, 
"that the fact of putting their daily alienation through the lens of culture would better 
allow them to respond to a boss, to insert themselves into the class struggle."122 The 
uprisings of May '68 changed his views on the value of "engaged" work drastically. "May 
made the contradictions explode," he stated. "We realized that at the bottom of it all, we 
were looking more to justify our role, to find ourselves a useful place in this society, in 
this system, than to have a real action."123 Inspired by his frustrations in staging V Comme 
Vietnam and his philosophical reactions to the May uprising, Gatti moved to change his 
theater style. Rather than a production which brought a message to the people, Gatti 
strove after '68 for a theater that involved the people in the creation of its message.124 He 
attempted to work less with large theater companies and instead did small street 
productions, although his plays still got widespread attention. Ironically, one of his 
returns to a bigger production, the 1969 attempt to stage "The Passion of General 
Franco," a play critical of fascist Spain, was banned by a French government which had 
become more conservative in the post-May era.  
 Prior to the tour opening, the Collective had published a query it felt summarized 
the importance of the play's undertaking: "Should theater limit itself to being nothing 
more than an indirect discourse on history and reality or can it take as its subject the most 
burning issue of the day, and bring it on stage so that it becomes an exemplary image 
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which can cause action on this issue?"125 The historic undertaking of V Comme Vietnam's 
creation and production demonstrated that at the very least there existed a strong passion 
which wished to link theater and culture to current events and use the two together for 
activist purposes. But the play's own biased set-up, the difficulties encountered during the 
tour, and the critical reception of the work showed more about divisions in French society 
than about the power of a culture-based protest movement. The play demonstrated the 
narrow view of the French left on the war, and reaction to its politics highlighted the 
depth of an already-known rift in French politics over the international role of France. 
Debate in the critical commentary over the function of the intellectual exposed the on-
going French concern over the possibility of mixing creative enterprises with political 
activism while simultaneously demonstrating that creative activities had in fact moved to 
a supporting role for engaged political activists. A valiant effort, in the end V Comme 
Vietnam showed nothing more clearly than the drama inherent for those who in 1967 
tried to stand at the crossroads of culture and militancy.  
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Chapter Five: 
 
"Against the Crime of Silence:" 
French Intellectual Protestors and the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal,  
1966-1967 
 
 Gisèle Halimi climbed carefully into the remnants of the North Vietnamese bomb 
shelter. There on the ground in front of her lay the body of a six year old girl, Nguyen Thi 
Han, a Vietnamese peasant child. The force of the explosion had blown the child's brains, 
nearly intact, out of her skull. Her young face was spattered with blood. As Halimi and 
the villagers stared in horror at her prostrate form, the mother arrived from nearby fields. 
Prior to leaving home that day, she had had four children; now, only three. News of her 
loss drove her into a frenzy. Desperate with grief, she grabbed on to Halimi. "They're 
assassins! Assassins!" she cried to the French lawyer. "Don't you know that? Now go tell 
them how these Americans are killing our children. You're going to tell them, aren't 
you?"1  
 Halimi visited Vietnam for the sole purpose of determining if the Americans truly 
were "assassins" in Vietnam. She had traveled to the country as part of an investigatory 
team for the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal, an international group of 
intellectuals intent on determining if U.S. actions in Vietnam constituted war crimes. The 
group, gathered by aging British philosopher Bertrand Russell in 1966, worked 
throughout 1967 to collect evidence of American war methods and any resulting 
atrocities. Meeting in Stockholm in the spring and Copenhagen in the fall of 1967, the 
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group acted as judges, listening to a multitude of scientific presentations, witness 
testimony, and intellectual analysis before "trying" the U.S. as war criminals under 
guidelines derived from both the post-war Nuremburg trials and the later Geneva 
Convention. In the end, the "Tribunal" found the U.S. guilty of, among other things, 
intentional genocide.2 
 The Tribunal had little effect on the international situation. Although one of their 
scientific reports forced the U.S. to admit to using cluster bombs near civilian areas, the 
"judgment" in no way altered American intentions nor really affected international 
opinion on the war. Yet the Tribunal was a sincere effort, a period of, as French writer 
Simone de Beauvoir remembered, "total mobilization."3 While the Tribunal was 
ineffective as an international body of law, it holds value as a case study of the changing 
dynamics of the French anti-war protests. In this chapter, I examine the experiences and 
rhetoric of French members of the Tribunal, focusing in particular on their conceptions of 
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protest activity, their conflict with de Gaulle, their presentation of French history, and 
their interactions with different protest groups.  Through this, I demonstrate that 
participation in the Tribunal and the resulting debate between French activists and 
political figures made the Tribunal a way not only of condemning U.S. activity in 
southeast Asia but also of discussing France and France's role in the world. As the 
members of the Russell Tribunal attempted to tell the world about the experience of a 
Vietnamese peasant woman and the actions of the United States, they also told much 
about their aims for and beliefs in France.   
Moving Beyond "The Domain of Passion:" 
Creating a Tribunal and a New Form of Protest 
 
 In April 1966, English philosopher, mathematician and pacifist Bertrand Russell 
contacted Jean-Paul Sartre about the possibility of forming a tribunal to investigate 
American war crimes in Vietnam. "My secretary, Ralph Schoenmann, has recently been 
to North Vietnam obtaining evidence regarding U.S. bombardment of hospitals, schools, 
sanatoria and leprosia," Russell wrote to "dear Professor Sartre." "It is overwhelmingly 
clear that the U.S. is engaged in a sustained series of war crimes against the people of 
Vietnam. I am anxious that there should be a highly representative and respected 
international Tribunal to hear the full evidence concerning the U.S. war crimes."4 
Russell's inspiration for a Tribunal came from the experiences of American David 
Mitchell, who had been put on trial in 1965 for resisting the draft. Russell's group, the 
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, had provided support for Mitchell's defense, and 
Schoenmann's travelled to Vietnam in order to collect evidentiary support that the U.S. 
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was in fact committing war crimes and Mitchell was therefore justified in refusing to 
serve.5 While the data Schoenmann found was not admitted in court, the publicity garned 
from the Mitchell trial motivated Russell to attempt a larger study of American war 
crimes, in the form of an International Tribunal which would function in a way similar to 
the Nuremberg Tribunals of post World War II.6 He hoped by this tribunal to establish 
legal precedent which conscientious objectors could use as reason to avoid military duty.7 
 For Jean-Paul Sartre, the letter and Ralph Schoenmann's 1966 visit to discuss 
participation with himself and Simone de Beauvoir offered a chance to expand anti-war 
protests beyond their typical form in France. Sartre was a logical choice for inclusion in 
the Tribunal. During the Algerian War, he had been one of the principal signatories of the 
"Manifesto of the 121," a 1960 document which proclaimed the right of French men to 
refuse to serve the French army in Algeria. By 1966, he had already made an overt stance 
against the Vietnam War by refusing to travel to the United States, and was moving to the 
forefront of the French anti-war movement with the fall 1966 formation of the Comité 
Vietnam National. Beauvoir had similarly been involved in Algerian War and Vietnam 
War protests. Although hesitant about the time committment the Tribunal would require, 
Beauvoir and Sartre were convinced to join by Schoenmann's assurance they would only 
definitively needed for "two or three days for the final decisions," and by the urgings of 
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their longtime friend "Tito" Gerassi, who was active in anti-war protests in the States.8 As 
the summer went on, Russell gathered other prominent intellectuals to his cause, ranging 
from the old and established such as Vladmir Dedjier (known for his biography of Tito), 
to the young and radical, such as Stokely Carmichael (then chairman of SNCC), and 
Sartre and Beauvoir soon became involved well beyond their original two or three day 
commitment9 With its wide range of participants from multiple countries, involvement in 
the Tribunal offered the French contingent the possibility of reaching a larger audience 
through an international forum.   
 The Tribunal formally announced its existence in August, and intensive planning 
began that fall.10 Before sitting judgment the following spring, the Tribunal sent a 
number of experts to Vietnam to conduct research and gather evidence of any war crimes. 
They intended to analyze carefully these groups' discoveries during the trial, in addition 
to evaluating witness testimonies from the Vietnamese, dissident American soldiers, and 
international scientific experts. Working from the basis of the set-up of the Nuremburg 
trials and the regulations on war crimes laid out by the Geneva Convention, they 
employed a number of international law specialists in an attempt to make the Tribunal 
into a legitimate war-crimes court. Sartre considered the group to be a citizens' tribunal,  
a group that "had been created to allow the citizen to participate in justice."11 Only 
governments or the people could organize a tribunal, Sartre explained, but governments 
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would not do so because they feared being judged themselves and the people tended only 
to act only in revolutionary times. Intellectuals had therefore designated themselves as 
the Tribunal because "no one had done so."12 Their goal was not to allocate legal power 
to themselves but to spread knowledge with a legal basis to the masses, thereby allowing 
the masses to take the necessary revolutionary action. The intellectuals constructed the 
tribunal in a way that bypassed the state's authority, but used laws that states claimed to 
support. It was extra-legal international legality.  
 For the French intellectuals participating, the legal format of the Russell Tribunal 
meant that this action exceeded the limits of normal anti-war protests, particularly by 
expanding the intellectual's role. Sartre remained aware that the Tribunal's chosen format 
and its lack of actual power had caused some to condemn it as a "kangaroo court."13 
However, he felt that the chosen set-up provided the necessary push that intellectuals' 
protest movements needed. "Any judgment which is not executionary is obviously 
derisory," Sartre noted. "I can't really see myself condemning President Johnson to 
death."14 No one in the Tribunal pretended to have any executionary power, however. 
Their goal was rather to "give a juridical dimension to acts of international politics, in 
order to combat the tendency of the majority of people to only pronounce practical or 
moral judgments on the behavior of a social group or a government."15 Moving from the 
moral to the legal level marked an important transition in protest activity. "When we yell 
in a meeting 'The Vietnam War is a crime!' we're in the domain of passion," Sartre 
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remarked. By moving from a rendez-vous of protesters to a tribunal using an international 
legal base, the members of the Tribunal intended to change the force of protestors' words. 
More than a simple appeal to the emotions of the general public, the Tribunal's judgment 
would be a legally constituted fact, a plea resting on empirical evidence and extending 
therefore beyond the moral plane.  
 Sartre additionally intended to use the Tribunal as a means of pushing beyond 
simple condemnation of this particular war, to a challenge to the entire imperialist 
system. He saw the struggle of third world nations as "nothing more than the 
transposition, on the international plan, of the class struggle." As such, a regular 
condemnation would have no effect; but the intellectual and protestor, by demonstrating 
how the imperialist mechanism worked (and, within the Tribunal, how it violated 
international law) could manage to combat it; governments could restrain it through 
politics, or an armed fight could overcome it.16 In any case, America needed to be made 
aware that it was not the center of the world, not the hegemonic power it conceived itself 
to be.  
 Yet French protests faced an additional obstacle in attempting to put the U.S. back 
in its place: the members on the Tribunal found that their views of American action in 
Vietnam did not differ much from the views of the French government. For Sartre, 
however, the Tribunal's set-up gave protestors the chance to surpass de Gaulle's rhetoric 
and challenge him as well. This was first of all because Sartre did not believe de Gaulle's 
stances against the war were sincerely intended to restrain American action, but rather to 
make de Gaulle look powerful in the eyes of the world. Sartre would not concede that de 
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Gaulle was an anti-imperialist.17 Moreover, Sartre considered the intellectuals' 
intervention important because they were not simply calling for peace; they were 
condemning imperialist actions and supporting colonial movements that were leading 
towards the socialist revolution that apparently could no longer take place within Europe. 
The call to the masses that the Tribunal was launching was therefore not just a reiteration 
of the Gaullist condemnation of American aggression, but an attempt to "wake up" the 
petit-bourgeois masses, and convince them, "by legalism," that a union with the working 
class was desirable.18 
Deriders of the Tribunal questioned whether the attempted juxtaposition of 
intellectual/protestor/jurist held any validity. French President Charles de Gaulle, who 
refused to allow the Tribunal to meet in France, sharply reminded Sartre that "all justice, 
in its principle as well as in its execution, belongs only to the State."19 In a letter to the 
editor of Le Monde, a Frenchman complained that he couldn't tolerate the idea that 
"individuals would give themselves the right to judge, and, in contempt of all laws, 
improvise being justices, therefore participating in their own way to the disorganization 
of an already messed-up world."20 Conservative columnist Thierry Maulnier bemoaned 
"the well-known taste of leftist intellectuals to have a certain majesty of proceedings, 
which makes them change their opinions into verdicts, and dress up, at least ideally, in 
the toga and the robe, which makes them look serious." He accused the group of 
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attempting to manipulate psychologically the public by calling itself a "Tribunal," since it 
gave their judgment a universal appearance. He charged that they deliberately embraced 
the ambivalent in order to confuse and to disseminate their propaganda more 
effectively.21 
Whether they looked better in judicial robes or intellectual garb remained unclear, 
but it was certain that the French members of the tribunal had a difficult time keeping 
their positions as prosecution witnesses and trial jurors separate. After the first 
expeditionary group returned from its evidence-gathering trip to Vietnam, the French 
contingent held a press conference to discuss its findings. French lawyer Léon Matarasso 
declared that a detailed investigation from the group had determined that "the Americans 
in Vietnam were undertaking an intensive and systematic bombing of the civilian 
population."22 Former French Army weapons inspector Jean-Pierre Vigier displayed 
cluster bombs the Tribunal had collected, explaining how the fragmentation system 
worked to destroy humans, rather than military installations. Sartre and Schwartz, jury 
members, stood and listened as the evidence was presented and Matarasso and Vigier 
publicly declared their belief that the U.S. was committing war crimes in Vietnam.  
Holding a press conference and releasing the evidence months before the 
Tribunals' actual session seemed to be in violation of its determination to decide on the 
U.S.' guilt based on an in-court legal evaluation. Sartre and Schwartz were far from 
innocent bystanders; they had organized the conference. Sartre even provided Vigier with 
space in Sartre's review, Les Temps Modernes, to reiterate his findings in printed form. 
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But if the goal of the Tribunal was, as Russell had said, to "prevent the crime of silence," 
then the information that its investigative teams gathered needed to be distributed as early 
and as often as possible. Information that might help prevent further damage within 
Vietnam could not be confined to the court room; rather, the court room was to be the 
setting which transposed this speech onto another level of presentations, the legal level. 
Although the verdict appeared to be decided in advance, the judicial process would give 
the work its final seal, while additionally justifying the expanded role of the engaged 
intellectual and anti-war protestor. As a brochure by the "French Friends of the Russell 
Tribunal" explained, the Tribunal would use all arms at its disposal to help in the fight 
against imperialism. "The celebrity of its members, the rigeur of its investigation methods 
mean that its decisions will have a large international reach," the "Friends" noted. "These 
decisions can facilitate rising consciousness in the western world; they can -- and this is 
without doubt the most important aspect -- reach large groups of American citizens, thus 
helping the movements which, in difficult situations, have undertaken the struggle against 
the war on American soil itself."23 Legality and science would provide extra oomph to 
celebrity and spectacle which, the Tribunal hoped, would change the protest into a 
powerful international statement and motivator.  
The Problem of "A Dozen Silly Intellectuals:" 
Conflict Between the Tribunal and De Gaulle 
 
Before the Tribunal could deploy its protest arsenal, however, it ran into 
unexpected trouble over its planned location. Originally, the group intended to "try" the 
United States from Paris. But on October 8, 1966, Le Monde published an article 
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asserting that Bertrand Russell had received a "discreet warning" from the French 
government that his initiative would not be welcome within the hexagon. "According to 
the interior minister," Le Monde claimed, "the French government allegedly let the 
British philosopher know that his project was 'unthinkable,' that a celebrity could not in 
any case be a substitute for justice, and that in consequence 'judging' President Johnson in 
France was not a possibility." The government had apparently made it clear that while 
they would not stop Russell from entering the country, they could not guarantee visas for 
his companions.24 The "French Friends of the Russell Foundation" quickly shot back a 
denial. "Convinced that the French government would not consider bending to the 
pressures the United States government is putting on it in this issue as in many others, the 
French Friends of the Russell Foundation declare that the Russell Foundation's projects 
remained unchanged," they wrote.25 Shortly thereafter, the Russell Foundation itself 
issued a statement that any pressure to change venues was "entirely false."26 Yet behind-
the-scenes negotiations demonstrated that the French government would in fact "bend to 
pressures" from the United States. The ongoing discussions between the United States 
and France over the Tribunal, and the resultant public conflict between Sartre and de 
Gaulle once de Gaulle banned the Tribunal from meeting in France, demonstrated the 
power of the State while additionally opening a new avenue for French protestors to 
challenge de Gaulle.  
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From a very early date, the American Embassy pushed the French Foreign Affairs 
Ministry to block the Tribunal's scheduled meetings. On August 5, Etienne Ma'anach, 
director of the Asian sector of the French Foreign Affairs Ministry, inquired about what 
legal means existed to refuse permission to the Russell Foundation.27 He found a variety 
of possibilities available: a law from 1881 prohibiting Frenchmen from insulting foreign 
heads of State; administrative power which could prohibit the tribunal based on "public 
order;" the possibility of a lawsuit for "defamation;" and even the charge of "interfering 
with public services," for which the recipient could receive jail time.28 By August 19th, 
Ma'anach's group moved to keep the Tribunal from appearing. In a note explaining his 
reasoning, Ma'anach specifically invoked the danger the Tribunal could do to France's 
role in the world, stating "we have the greatest interest in keeping intact a position of 
perfect objectivity... in view of preserving, in our country, the chances we have of 
contributing to the pacification of Indochina." It was in France's best interest, given the 
possibility of a negotiation, to "keep its credit available to be able to act efficiently with 
all interested parties." This would not be possible, he explained, "if America ended up 
believing that French authorities let [American] leaders be 'put on trial' on [French] 
territory at a moment where, up against serious difficulties, [Americans] are particularly 
sensible to foreign reactions."29 Opting not to pursue any of the legal options as of yet, 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry quietly informed the North Vietnamese in late August that 
no visas would be granted to any potential Tribunal participants.30 By November, they 
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had told the American Embassy the Tribunal would not take place in France. Ralph 
Schoenmann, visiting Paris for preparations, found himself detained at Orly for 24 hours, 
an act which a ministry employee described as a "friendship gesture" to the United States. 
In March 1967, the French Foreign Ministry communicated their refusal to Bertrand 
Russell; as they told North Vietnamese representative Mai Van Bo the same month, they 
would not be allowing this "parody of justice" to occur in France.31 But it would take 
until late April 1967 for the Ministry negotiations to burst upon the public scene, when de 
Gaulle wrote to Sartre to refuse to allow the Tribunal to meet in Paris.  
Sartre, suspecting something amiss when Tribunal member Vladimir Dedjier was 
denied a travel visa, promptly challenged de Gaulle to explain himself. "I want to believe, 
monsieur le président de la République, that our fears are in vain and that we are not 
learning about government decisions in an indirect manner, through the actions of 
embassies or consular services," Sartre wrote. Implicit in Sartre's hope that it was all a 
"misunderstanding" was the accusation that de Gaulle had caved to foreign pressures and 
was betraying his own stance against the war. Pushing de Gaulle to prove himself by 
issuing all other visas without difficulty, Sartre ended his letter by signing himself "Jean-
Paul Sartre, president of the Russell Tribunal."32 
De Gaulle promptly took up the challenge to his authority and responded to 
Sartre's implied questioning of his policies in a letter he addressed not to the president of 
the Russell Tribunal, but to "mon cher maître," a term reserved more for those in the 
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education profession than in the business of organizing international legal bodies.33 His 
first move was to shoot down any insinuation that he feared criticism of American leaders 
on French soil. "Independent of the fact that writing and speech are free in our country," 
he reminded Sartre, "there would be no reason to keep out private individuals whose 
ideas, what's more, are, on this topic, akin to the official position of the French 
Republic."34 Clearly therefore visa rejections were not due to Gaullist ideological 
differences with the Tribunal's positions. Yet de Gaulle sharply admonished Sartre that 
even if the Tribunal's views were acceptable, the government had to be on its guard: It 
would not be appropriate, de Gaulle noted, for France to allow a country that was its 
"traditional friend" to be subject to such a "proceeding exorbitant in both law and 
international customs."35 This underlined de Gaulle's position that French criticism of the 
United States did not mean a total split between the two countries and emphasized that 
the government was working with its own history of French-U.S. relations which 
trumped Sartre's concerns about imperialism. The comment additionally placed a clear 
divide between the rules governing interactions between governments, and the actions 
allowed to protest groups. De Gaulle intended to maintain diplomatic relations with the 
United States, and to reserve the sphere of legal judgments for the government alone.  
"I don't have to remind you," de Gaulle chastised to Sartre, "that all justice, in its 
principle as well as its execution, belongs only to the State." Since the State was the only 
recognized legal entity allowed to participate in international relations, de Gaulle 
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explained that it was impossible for the French government to allow the Tribunal to meet 
on French territory.  He suggested in his conclusion that the intellectuals involved drop 
their juridoc-political pretenses and return to their normal domain, since "certain people 
gathered around Lord Russell could have a moral credit, while lacking a public office[.]" 
It did not make sense, de Gaulle argued, that they felt they would make more of an 
impact by "putting on a toga [judicial robe] borrowed for the occasion."36 The President 
signed his letter with a traditional French politeness formula: "Please accept, my dear 
teacher [mon cher maître], the assurances of my distinguished consideration." 
Sartre was well aware that de Gaulle's letter was intended to remind him of what 
role he was supposed to have within society. "I'm only maître to café waiters who know 
that I write," he sneered in his response interview in Le Nouvel Observateur.37 De 
Gaulle's appellation was, in Sartre's view, an attempt to ignore Sartre's role as Tribunal 
president and reduce him to a simple intellectual. Yet for Sartre, the intellectuals' role in 
the Tribunal was essential, as he saw these intellectuals as representing the masses' right 
to participate in judiciary affairs. The jury the Tribunal constituted was one that should 
have existed somewhere, but did not, because governments feared the judgments such a 
jury might produce. Intellectuals had therefore designated themselves as a Tribunal 
because "no one had done so."38 The intellectuals involved in the Tribunal were no more 
than an important cog in the machine of knowledge distribution; they were the site of 
praxis. By choosing to focus on them, the cog, as de Gaulle's insistence on calling Sartre 
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"maïtre" indicated, the government was undermining the intellectuals' attempt to merge 
with a larger cause and by extension suppressing political speech. 
Sartre used de Gaulle's refusal of the Tribunal as a means of challenging the 
legitimacy of de Gaulle's government. He argued that de Gaulle feared that the 
revolutionary potential the Tribunal could unleash would harm his power, and accused de 
Gaulle of offering platitudes against the war rather than any real action. As Sartre stated, 
"a country is not limited to its government. The attitude [of de Gaulle's government] that 
consists in blaming via speeches and measured words the policy of the United States, all 
the while forbidding the masses to directly demonstrate their opposition to the Vietnam 
War, is completely anti-democratic."39 By limiting the intellectuals to "moral credit," de 
Gaulle was endeavoring to fit their comments into the "speeches and measured words" 
his government allowed. Sartre wanted to extend beyond any formulaic condemnation of 
the U.S. to a more spectacular protest that would offer the masses the chance to truly 
speak -- and perhaps act -- out.  
Like many commentators in the newspapers, Sartre thought that de Gaulle was 
scared, and as he remarked to his interviewer, de Gaulle "definitely wasn't afraid of 
Bertrand Russell, who's 94, or of myself, who's 62, or of our friends. If we were simply a 
dozen silly intellectuals who were pretending to be judges, they'd let us be. Why are they 
scared of us?" he queried. "Because we pose a problem that no western government 
wants posed: that of war crimes, which once again all [governments] want to reserve for 
themselves the power to commit."40 If the group of intellectuals formed a citizens' 
tribunal, they claimed a right to morality, legality, and politics in a way that governments 
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wanted to reserve only to themselves. De Gaulle was not willing to let intellectuals take 
that step.  
In their reactions to the conflict, the French press underlined the challenge to 
traditional protest methods and intellectual actions that the Tribunal posed, and analyzed 
the reasons for de Gaulle's firm stance. L'Express reprinted Sartre's comment about "a 
dozen silly intellectuals" and noted that "even if de Gaulle ignores sillies, he's still wary 
about intellectuals."41 As Le Monde remarked, this wariness towards intellectuals seemed 
to be directly related to the General's uncomfortableness with the "toga" they intended to 
wear. The paper invoked de Gaulle's previous attitude towards intellectuals in the 
Algerian War, when, despite Sartre's frequent proclamations that he had signed the 
"Manifesto of the 121," he was not arrested when other signatories were, in part because 
of de Gaulle's intervention. Le Monde reminded its readers that de Gaulle was supposed 
to have chided over-eager security ministers by saying "Let the intellectuals do what they 
want!"42 It was the intellectuals' attempt to overcome their particular position and adapt 
an international legal basis, giving themselves a universal standing in the courts of 
justice, however, that made the President of the Republic so eager to lock the intellectual 
into his traditional place. 
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"It's the Same Thing in Vietnam:" 
Comparing the French Colonialist Past and the American Imperialist Present 
 
Sartre's conceptualization of France in the world, based as it was on a 
revolutionary ideal, conflicted far too drastically with de Gaulle's own certain idea of 
France for the Tribunal to be permitted to take place on French soil. The Tribunal was 
forced to move to Sweden for its first session.  The exchange highlighted, however, that 
the true conflict extended beyond different understandings of France's present role in the 
world, to different understandings of France's actions in the past. In talking about the 
Vietnam War, French intellectuals frequently dug into France's colonial past, and 
specifically into the topic of wartime crimes committed by France during the Algerian 
struggle. While de Gaulle struggled to move past the divisions caused by the Algerian 
War, Sartre sought to keep them fresh in everyone's minds, arguing that they had not 
been studied enough.  
 For the French contingent, the Tribunal offered the possibility to once again to 
pass judgment on French imperialism. At a press conference in November 1966, historian 
Pierre Vidal-Naquet remarked that he found it a shame that such a Tribunal had not 
existed during the Algerian War.43 Vidal-Naquet's comment implied that participants 
wished to correct a mistake intellectuals had made in the past by preparing a new form of 
legal and intellectual action in the near future. Sartre expanded on Vidal-Naquet's view in 
a November 30th article in Le Nouvel Observateur entitled simply "Crime."44 The 
Tribunal differed from typical intellectual criticism, he explained, because of its interest 
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in seeing if U.S. acts could be qualified as "criminal." Such a move could not be 
implemented against the current French government policy, but it could have been during 
the Algerian war, when "the torture, the regroupment camps, the reprisals against civilian 
populations, the executions without judgments were similar to certain crimes condemned 
at Nuremberg."45 Sartre stated that had a war crimes tribunal been constituted then, he 
would have agreed to take part in it; and just because such a Tribunal had not passed 
judgment then, was no reason not to do so against the United States. Through their 
comments, Sartre and Vidal-Naquet equated French actions in Algeria with Nazi war 
crimes, a damning comparison, while also arguing that intellectuals could become more 
powerful in their protests by supplementing their moral judgments with legal means.  
 Reproached during his interview with Le Nouvel Observateur with the fact that 
the Tribunal was not also trying North Vietnam on war crimes, Sartre reacted by 
invoking the precedents he had set for himself during the Algerian War. "I refuse to put 
on the same level the actions of a group of poor, beaten peasants, who are forced to have 
an iron discipline among their ranks, and the actions of an immense army supported by an 
over-industrialized country of 200 million inhabitants," he explained angrily. Vietnam 
had not invaded America; therefore they were not the aggressors here. "During the 
Algerian war," Sartre reminded his interviewer, "I always refused to compare terrorism 
by bombs, which was the only arm available to the Algerians, and the actions and 
exactions of a rich army of 500,000 men occupying the entire country. It's the same thing 
in Vietnam."46 In linking his reactions to the Algerian War to his stance on the Vietnam 
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War, Sartre linked French imperialism to American imperialism, creating a continuity 
and symmetry between the two.  
References to Algeria additionally allowed Tribunal members to put forth a 
version of French society that had intellectuals at the center as moral and political 
arbiters. All of the prominent intellectuals involved had been deeply involved in protests 
against the Algerian War. Sartre, Beauvoir and Schwartz had signed the "Manifesto of 
the 121;" for their pains, Sartre had his apartment bombed several times and Schwartz 
lost his position in the French university. Gisèle Halimi had written a book with Simone 
de Beauvoir exposing the brutal rape and torture of an Algerian woman, Djamila 
Bouchpa, by French soldiers. The intellectuals had been at the head of the social protest 
movement which helped in part to lead to the removal of France from Algeria. They 
hoped to recreate that situation within France as they protested the Vietnam war, usurping 
de Gaulle's place as political mediator and shifting the internal power dynamics to better 
allow engaged intellectuals space to work. In their view, French society necessarily 
involved active intellectuals. 
 In his closing remarks, after the Tribunal had decided to convict the United States, 
Sartre presented a long exposé on genocide to justify the Trbunal's decision which both 
invoked French history and underscored the contemporary French connections to the 
Vietnam War.  In a move that once again tied the Vietnamese situation to the French past, 
Sartre focused a large part of his analysis on the experience of French colonization in 
Algeria. Describing the systematic destruction of Algeria's economic infrastructure by the 
French occupation, he claimed that "colonization is not a matter of mere conquest as was 
the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine; it is by its very nature an act of cultural 
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genocide."47 But the French, Sartre, explained, could not proceed to a physical genocide 
in Algeria because they were too economically invested in the country. The genocidal 
tendencies which marked colonialism were checked by monetary needs. The United 
States, on the other hand, had no economic attachment to Vietnam. Sartre made it clear 
that the U.S. had not fully committed genocide yet, but stated that its actions reflected an 
attempt to do. He argued that because of the close ties of the modern world, all were 
touched by the Vietnam War. In addition to the guilty verdict, two messages were clear: 
the French government had the capacity if not the will for genocide, and the French 
people needed to speak out. As intellectuals had led the way against the French regime in 
the past, so would they challenge the American regime today.  
The Problem with "Men of Committment:" 
The Russell Tribunal in the French Anti-War Movement 
 
Throughout their work, Tribunal members had endeavored to tie their efforts into 
the on-going French anti-war protest movement. In its call for help with the Tribunal, the 
French Friends of the Russell Tribunal emphasized that while those looking to participate 
could provide financial aid to offset costs, the main work needed were "above all political 
tasks." "In the coming weeks," they explained, "all those who realize that the Vietnam 
War is the key to the international system must become militants, propagandists of the 
International Tribunal." Partisans needed to "explain the reasons for its formation, make 
its objectives known, spread the results of its inquiries and its deliberations: in short, 
create a climate of opinion such that the Tribunal can not become a victim of a boycott by 
silence." They emphasized the importance each supporter could have and the changed 
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exuberance they hoped the Tribunal would bring, stating "Each one of us is on his own a 
means of fighting against aggression in Vietnam, by preparing new battles at an even 
higher level."48 
The Tribunal members' main connection to the French protest movement came 
through the Comité Vietnam National, founded by Sartre, Schwartz and Vidal-Naquet. 
From its creation, the CVN announced that it would be supporting the Tribunal's efforts 
as part of its ongoing anti-war activity.49 In a recruiting pamphlet, it offered participants 
who believed that "[the Vietnamese's] fight concerned all people of the world's right of 
liberty" the chance to "support Vietnam with all [their] might" by, among other options, 
"support[ing] the action of the International Tribunal Against War Crimes and [being 
kept] informed about its activities."50 The CVN also organized a meeting to allow 
Tribunal researchers the opportunity to present their finds, as well as joining with the 
Tribunal and other groups to support an art show, "Art for Peace," to raise money for the 
Vietnamese people.51 Pour le Vietnam, the CVN's newspaper, put out a special issue in 
early 1967 dedicated to the Tribunal. Called "A Tribunal To What Ends?" [Un tribunal 
pour quoi faire?], the issue offered readers the chance to learn about the Tribunal's 
findings, read special reports on attacks on dikes and leper colonies by experts, and view 
photos of alleged war crimes which Sartre hoped would force militants to become more 
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active and "choose" liberty via protesting the war. In the issue's editorial, the newspapers' 
staff underlined their belief in the importance of the Russell Tribunal to motivating and 
propelling French protest activities."The moral condemnation of the Tribunal which is 
denouncing torture, 'illegal' arms, etc... could appear very idealistic," the paper admitted, 
"but if this condemnation finds an echo in large swaths of the population and marks itself 
as a step in the climb [comme un étape] towards more and more massive mobilization 
that will have an effect against the Americans, should we forbid it? The National Bureau 
thus calls upon the committees to guarantee that the special issue has a large diffusion 
and to place this action [for the Russell Tribunal] within a plan for greater activity 
[relancement] this year."52 
Yet if the CVN worked willingly with the Tribunal and was joined in its efforts 
by CVN-connected groups such as the Paris American Committee to Stopwar and the 
Parti Socialiste Unifié, this did not mean the Tribunal was free from the in-fighting which 
wracked the protest efforts of the French left.53 Unsurprisingly, there were conflicts with 
the French Communist Party. Forever concerned about being passed on the left, the PCF 
had been struggling to retain its early hegemony over Vietnam War protest movements. 
As French doctor and Tribunal researcher Jean Krivine noted, the PCF "viewed with a 
mauvais oeil" any actions which escaped its control.54 The first session of the Tribunal 
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was completely ignored by the PCF, but, as part of its attempt to keep itself in the loop, it 
reversed course for the November meeting, giving ample coverage after a note from 
higher up came down on October 31, 1967: "Give a good summary of the Russell 
Tribunal meeting in L'Humanité."55 Yet while conflict with the PCF existed, the main 
division brought to light by the tribunal was the growing gap between old guard 
intellectuals and their younger counterparts. Interestingly, the clearest example of the 
emerging split comes from the different accounts of the first session in Stockholm by 
Sartre and an American civil rights activist, Julius Lester.  
Writing for Le Nouvel Observateur at the end of May 1967, Sartre recognized that 
while many media outlets had covered the trial, "all, however, passed by the essential: the 
drama that played out in Stockholm during little over a week, a drama that was not only 
lived by the Tribunal's members but by those who followed our debates, including 
American journalists." In Sartre's view, "the way in which we arrived at our conclusions 
[seemed] almost as important as the conclusions themselves." Evoking the behind-the-
scenes debates in a play on the title of a famous film, he called his article "Twelve 
Unangry Men."56 
Sartre described his time at the Stockholm hearings as a moment of transition 
from awareness to knowing. "Personally, I wasn't ready to say at the start that 
bombardments of civil populations were systematic and deliberate," he explained. "What 
was important to me was the passage from this vague idea, already insupportable: 
'They're killing children, women, the elderly in Vietnam,' to this precise and odious idea: 
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'They're doing it on purpose.'"57 By arriving at this judgment, and by having all of the 
Tribunal's members do so together, Sartre felt that the Tribunal was a success. "I said it 
before," he told the interviewer, "we would prove our existence as we went along. If the 
Tribunal succeeded, it was because it had the right to hold court; if it failed it was 
because it didn't have the right." In his view, the Tribunal had proved its right to exist.  
As the interview underlined the Tribunal's legitimacy, it also attempted to make 
up for the lack of press coverage. Sartre's presentation for the reader of himself and the 
other intellectuals in the debating room, arriving at their decision, replicated the moment 
of praxis, the transition from passionate ideas to certain knowledge and then to judiciary 
action. "How could I know," he asked, "what had been going on, during these ten days, in 
the spirit of a non-violent activist and American pacifist like David Dellinger, in that of 
another American like Oglesby, in that of a Pakistani like Mahmud Ali Kasuri, of a 
Phillipino like Amado Hermandez, of an Englishman like Isaac Deutscher, or of the 
others who had seemed rather reserved to me at the start?" From the variety of the people 
involved, the personal experience was bound to differ widely. Yet the end judgment of 
each was the same, a unanimous guilty verdict. The individuality of the Tribunal jury 
members was thus secondary faced with the universal legitimacy of the information they 
were evaluating. Sartre's recounting justified the Tribunal's existence and made it into a 
valid and successful protest action.  
Yet Sartre's presentation of the unanimity and joy of Tribunal members 
participating in the session contrasted sharply with the description of a young American 
involved, Julius Lester. Lester, a member of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
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Committee and a rising black nationalist, had been asked to Stockholm, as had Stokely 
Carmichael, to represent the activist view of African-Americans in the U.S. Sitting in on 
the Stockholm meeting in a non-jury position, he offered some scathing observations 
about the proceedings. Ignoring the warm feeling that Sartre evoked in his descriptions of 
the unanimous decision, he focused instead on the debate over how to announce the 
results, which he claimed was arranged when Sartre threatened to leave unless things 
were done his way. "Possibly," Lester observed, "he should have been allowed to."58 
Lester's main concern centered on the way European intellectuals had chosen to 
fight the war in Vietnam. "Since World War II," Lester noted, "a mystique has grown up 
around 'acts of conscience' as if it were enough, in and of itself, to speak out in the face of 
injustice." While Lester admitted that avoiding "the crime of silence" was better than 
doing nothing at all, he felt that words alone could not change political reality. As he put 
it, "America is fighting for its own salvation, and you can publish a million photographs 
of napalmed babies and by the time you're finished, you'll have a million more to 
publish."59 Lester felt that the older, European contingent in the Tribunal simply did not 
understand life in the Sixties and the moves necessary to make a revolution. Because of 
their insistence on words, the old guard of intellectuals had prevented real action. "I 
couldn't help but feel that Sartre was as much my enemy as L.B.J., " Lester wryly noted. 
"Both are men of commitment."60 
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Lester's attitude reflected the widening divergence between the intellectuals who 
had lived through the second World War and those who were coming of age in the 
sixties. To this generation, change would come more from doing than through saying. 
Lester summed up the difference when he remarked, "Commitment is something that 
Sartre has written extensively on, and I presume that his involvement at Stockholm was 
an example of his commitment. If so, possibly what this age needs is not commitment but 
just caring about other people and being willing to die because you care so much."61 
The tendency to move from words to action was also appearing in the French 
scene, most notably among the Maoist CVBs and the younger, Trotskyist members of the 
CVN. Although the youths often worked jointly with the CVN leadership in Vietnam 
protests, they favored street action over amphitheater protest. To the CVB,  in particular, 
the intellectuals' initiatives were mired down in "spectacular actions without follow-up;" 
they searched more to reach directly to the masses, through continual propaganda and 
direct action.62 They critiqued the CVN and the Tribunal for not getting down to the 
peoples' level, instead relying on the words of specialists and other well-known 
personalities.63 Their desire for real action coexisted with a more violent approach to 
protests, typified by July 2, 1967: Teenagers enraged over the war smashed windows at 
the Thai embassy before spraypainting in blood red slogans such as "US=SS", "Support 
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Vietnam," "FLN will win," and "Stop sending Thailand troops to Vietnam." Two were 
arrested.64 The CVN released a statement supporting the arrested youths, but the 
difference between the CVN's officially planned acts and the students' acts remained.65 In 
his memoirs, Laurent Schwartz acknowledged the sharp differences. "According to the 
youth activists," he remembered, "simple protests, far from the American embassy, were 
of no interest; they were inefficient and "a bummer  (tristounettes)." But Schwartz didn't 
see how else to act - as he put it, "In any case, we weren't going to [...] bomb around the 
American embassy!" Schwartz realized in retrospect that the different sentiments arose 
from a sense of frustration. The violence, he explained, "expressed a certain 
powerlessness when faced with a war of unheard of brutality."66  
The French and American youth currents intersected during a CVN-sponsored 
"Che Guevara Week", which coincided with the Tribunal's second session. Stokely 
Carmichael, invited by the CVN leaders who knew him because of his connection to the 
Tribunal, spoke before a packed house at the Mutualité. Addressing Vietnam, Carmichael 
proclaimed, "We don't want peace in Vietnam. What we want is a Vietnamese victory 
over the U.S. In spilling our own blood to help this victory, we feel that we're not paying 
too high a price, even if we have to destroy the structures of the United States."67 
According to the reporter, young people accounted for most of those present.  
The full effect of the large split between the intellectual old guard and the up-and-
coming youth would remain ungrasped for another five months. The Tribunal ended its 
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session convinced that by speaking out, it was doing its part. In Sartre's closing address, 
he underscored again the value of speaking out. "The Vietnamese fight for all men and 
the American forces against all," he claimed. "Neither figuratively nor abstractly. And not 
only because genocide would be a crime universally condemned by international law, but 
because little by little the whole human race is being subjected to this genocidal 
blackmail [....] This crime, carried out every day before the eyes of the world, renders all 
who do not denounce it accomplices of those who commit it, so that we are being 
degraded today for our future enslavement."68 For their part, Tribunal members had no 
intention of being accomplices or preparing their enslavement. To a packed room in 
Roskilde, they announced their verdicts: guilty on all counts.69 Applause burst out, and 
Tribunal members embraced.70  
Conclusion 
Although the North Vietnamese government issued Russell Tribunal 
Commemorative Stamps, it would be difficult to deem the endeavor a success.  Despite 
members' best efforts, press coverage remained limited, and transcripts and reports 
printed in 1968 had a low readership in France.  Most significantly, the Tribunal had no 
strong impact on American public opinion.  
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Yet the Tribunal had a strong effect on the French intellectuals who had 
participated in it. They kept fond memories of their involvement. Beauvoir, for one, 
looked back on the period of international activism with nostalgia. Once back in France, 
group members continued to meet regularly at the house of Madeleine Garaudet, a 
communist activist. "Every two weeks, I think," Schwarz noted in his memoirs, "I met 
there Jean-Paul Sartre, Léo Matarasso, Marcel-Francis Kahn and his wife Réna Mireille 
Gansel, Roger Pic, and frequently Maria Jolas [an American expatriate]. An official 
Vietnam delegate also frequently came."  The information the group received from the 
Vietnamese official allowed them to continue their fight against the war and for an FNL 
victory.  
Participation in the Tribunal was also significant because it allowed the 
intellectuals to reconceptualize their role in terms of national and international powers. 
The loss of her colonies and the strengthening of the Cold War had moved France to a 
lesser position on the international playing field. By taking part in the Russell Tribunal, 
French intellectuals found themselves face to face with both their own country's status 
and with the question of how France should be involved in international affairs. They 
dealt with both questions by carefully linking the Tribunal's cause to the French past and 
by linking the Vietnamese struggle to a revolutionary future. Frequent mentions of 
Algeria and the French colonial struggle there made the Tribunal and the efforts of the 
FLN all the more accessible to French observers. Commentary also offered a clear link 
between a decidedly French past action (the struggle over the end of French Algeria) and 
a Tribunal geared towards events outside the country. Moreover, by constant reflection 
on the French past and by continued work through the CVN at home, Tribunal members 
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managed to weave the international effort into the national French intellectual 
community.  
Part of the reason the Tribunal call resonated sprang obviously from the fact that a 
good percentage of the French population was already against the war. In particular, the 
strong stand that Charles de Gaulle had taken against American intervention made the 
intellectuals speaking out risk being nothing more than echoes. For a country where the 
intellectual had often taken a stand against the government's regime, the situation was 
unsettling. The Tribunal offered the possibility of recasting the struggle against the 
American presence in Vietnam in terms that allowed the intellectuals' calls to exceed 
those of the government. The form chosen for the Tribunal, moreover, permitted the 
intellectual to step out of their traditionally defined sphere of moral influence into that of 
political impact. That the move had strong ramifications could be seen from the severity 
of de Gaulle's replies to Sartre. Even if in the end many felt the Tribunal had still not 
earned its name, participation in the project allowed the intellectuals involved to combine 
moral, political and legal agents in a new and international fashion, attempting to create 
new protest forms for the anti-war movement.  
De Gaulle's attack on Sartre, and the press' reaction to it as well as to Sartre's tiff 
with Dean Rusk, revealed one major problem with the Tribunal: there was no way for the 
protestors to truly overcome their celebrity and let the facts speak for themselves. It had 
been a delicate balancing act to begin with, since the people chosen to participate in the 
Tribunal were using their celebrity capital to garner attention to their movement. The 
desire, once attention had been focused on the Tribunal, to let the testimony speak and 
have the intellectuals merely as its vessels, was stymied by the continued interest in the 
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intellectuals themselves. Rather than becoming agents of praxis, they became objects of 
curiosity. Participants would have to learn how to best manipulate this interest in 
themselves, as they used their personal accounts and their talents as writers to better 
allow the average French reader to grasp the gravity of the Vietnamese situation. 
The action of '68 seemed at first to pose a serious challenge to the concept of the  
engaged intellectual, working from the base of his or her celebrity to draw attention to a 
cause and bring others to act, that had underpinned the Tribunal's undertaking. Because 
the violent action of the May events seemed so much more revolutionary than the praxis 
method practiced by the traditional intellectual, the traditional intellectual seemed in 
danger of being replaced. Sartre himself drew upon the example of those who had used 
their knowledge to speak out against Vietnam as a way of defining the classic 
intellectual: they were old-fashioned precisely because they depended upon their 
established position within society in order to pass on their message.71 New protestors, 
with their drastic actions, accepted that the society they hoped for would have no place 
for them: their violence was therefore aimed internally, towards themselves in society, as 
well as externally, towards society in general. They insisted on moving beyond talk. 
French intellectuals in the Russell Tribunal may not have challenged their right to 
exist as such, as the intellectual would in the moments following May '68, but their 
participation in the Tribunal represented an attempt to adjust their protest methods to a 
changing world. Involvement in the Tribunal allowed the intellectual entry into different 
areas of politics and law, while reinforcing his purpose. It also gave the French protestors 
a chance to resituate themselves on an international level, while not sacrificing their 
French connections. The deep participation within this framework of committment may 
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have strengthened the cracks between generations that would become apparent when 
May '68 broke out. But the intellectuals, like the rest of the world, had no idea what was 
coming.  Working from their understanding of the intellectual's social role and the value 
of protest, French members of the Tribunal did their best to avoid the crime of silence. 
Granting the wish of the Vietnamese mother who had begged Gisèle Halimi, they made 
sure to "tell them" all what was going on. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Six:  
 
"La France S'Ennuie"? Vietnam War Protests  
and the "Events" of February, March and April, 1968 
 
 President Johnson hung precariously from St. Michel's neck. The straw-filled 
effigy of the American president had been placed inside the Latin Quarter fountain by 
protestors who had declared February 21, 1968 "Heroic Vietnam Day." Moments before, 
their procession had woven through the streets of the University District, chanting 
"Johnson, assassin!," "US = SS!" and "De Gaulle is complicit!," slapping handmade 
placards over the French street signs, rebaptizing locations with Vietnamese names to 
turn the Latin Quarter into the "Heroic Vietnam Quarter" for the evening. Earlier, 
activists had played a variation of tag with Parisian firemen, hanging the Vietcong flag 
from the Sorbonne rooftop, waiting for city officials to remove it, and then sneaking back 
out to replace it. Now, in a Latin Quarter plastered with Vietnamese symbols, they 
gathered in front of the fountain to listen to the demonstration's organizers speak. As the 
leaders congratulated the protesters on acts which they felt showed the power of the 
Vietnamese freedom fighters and the value of French involvement in the anti-war 
movement, they shouted that participants next needed to rename the American embassy 
in Paris. It was, they declared, "no longer the time for processions." An outstretched hand 
struck a light and, as the crowd let loose raucous cheers, President Johnson burst into 
flames. 1 
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 Only a week before, journalist Pierre Viansson-Ponté wrote in Le Monde that, 
boisterous protests against the Vietnam War to the contrary, France was bored. The war 
"moved them," he claimed, but "did not really touch them," as was demonstrated by weak 
collection numbers for the recently launched "A Billion Francs for Vietnam" campaign. 
In any case, he remarked, "with the exception of a few activists on one side or the other, 
everyone, from the biggest to the smallest, sees the war with the same eyes." In a France 
"reduced to the Hexagon" and "at peace with the world," what happened in Vietnam was 
really "their business, not ours." None of the actions surrounding Vietnam had serious 
political repercussions domestically, Viansson-Ponté argued, and French politics were 
slipping into apathy. This, he noted, could prove extremely dangerous: bored Frenchmen 
had an annoying habit of amusing themselves by starting revolutions, to see if another 
government would be "more fun." If the country did not watch out, he warned, France in 
its current political state quite literally risked "dying of boredom."2 
 When May '68 burst upon an unsuspecting French public a few months later, 
Viansson-Ponté's words appeared almost prophetic. While historians have since revealed 
many of the numerous cracks under the façade of boredom and apathy that paved the way 
for the events of May '68, the role of French Vietnam War protests has not been fully 
appreciated. When examined at all, attention focuses primarily on the actions of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1
 "21 février," Vietnam 4 (March 1968): 8; "Manifestations en France et à l'étranger: Paris: Cortège au 
Quartier Latin et bagarres devant l'ambassade du Vietnam du Sud," Le Monde 23 February 1968; "Huit 
mille personnes ont manifesté à Paris contre l'action américaine au Vietnam," Le Figaro 22 February 1968; 
"Manifestation au quartier Latin," L'Humanité 22 February 1968.  
 
2
 Pierre Viansson-Ponté, "Quand la France s'ennuie," Le Monde 15 February 1968. The "Campagne du 
Milliard" ["A Billion Francs for Vietnam"] was an inter-group effort launched in 1967 which encouraged 
each Frenchman to give the equivalent of a day's salary to help out the Vietnamese.  
 
 231
extreme left.3 Vietnam War protests still appear as Viannson-Ponté described them: a 
diversion for fringe groups to pass the time until something more exciting and actually 
important happened.  
 Although there  is some truth to Viansson-Ponté's portrayal of general French 
unity against the war -- an IFOP poll in February indicated that three out four French 
supported De Gaulle's foreign policy on Vietnam4--  the remainder who took issue with 
de Gaulle's foreign policy comprised an active, dedicated, and extremely vocal minority. 
This faction consisted of militants on both the left and the right who played a large role in 
shaping French political and social life in the months preceding May '68.  To these 
groups, the battles in Vietnam concerned the whole of humanity, and not least of all the 
French.  
 These strong sentiments about the war translated into action. Between January 
30th and April 30th, Vietnam activists held at least nineteen separate protests or large 
meetings of a thousand or more people in Paris alone -- an average of one major event 
every three days. Of these, right-wing groups organized four, as well as holding an art 
show in support of South Vietnam at the end of April. Collections for Vietnam also took 
place: although the campaign "A Billion Francs for Vietnam" did not reach its goal, the 
campaign "A Boat for Vietnam" handily collected 400 million ancien francs in monetary 
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donations and goods.5 While clashes between right- and left- wing groups around the 
Latin Quarter had broken out on a near-daily basis for some time, six fights related to 
Vietnam War protests during this time period were violent enough to merit newspaper 
coverage. Protest activity escalated to the point that three American businesses in Paris 
were attacked with plastic explosives.  
 French protests about the Vietnam War in early 1968, far from stemming from 
boredom, represented a sincere involvement of French citizens in the international arena. 
Moreover, their outcry was not significant merely as support for either the Vietcong or 
the American fighters. Protests and interactions concerning the Vietnam War created a 
political atmosphere which determined how some of the tensions at the start of May '68 
exploded. In this chapter I will show how interactions on the French left during protests 
exacerbated the split between the Communist Party and gauchistes while also revealing a 
growing tendency among young militants for more violent, direct protests. Studying the 
protests also challenges the traditional narrative of the coming of May '68, which puts the 
right to the side, instead demonstrating that constant conflict between right and left in the 
months before May broke out laid the groundwork for the format of May protests. It also 
emphasizes how arguments over Vietnam reflected growing divisions in ideas about 
France's identity, which would explode in May. Although a full crisis did not develop 
until May 3, May 1968 had been rehearsed for months before. Only by understanding this 
and the way public activism about the Vietnam War developed in the spring of 1968 can 
we understand the particular form that May 1968 took. 
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 Everyone in the Same Boat: Attempts at Unified Protest on the Left 
 As 1968 opened, major leftist groups opposing the war continued their efforts to 
present a unified front and work together, despite continual failure to reach unity in the 
past. Agreement on all political aspects might be difficult to achieve, but activists still felt 
that by joining forces they could have a greater impact. This held especially true in cases 
such as the March 23rd antiwar "Meeting of Intellectuals" and the ongoing "Boat for 
Vietnam" campaign. Cooperation could produce larger concrete contributions for the 
Vietnamese cause and expand public calls for an end to the Vietnam war. These multi-
group activities marked the left's efforts to establish their position in the fight against the 
war, and to give the left a more powerful moral suasion that would make their efforts on 
behalf of Vietnam seem a real part of the Vietnamese fight.  
 In early December 1967, seventeen prominent French intellectuals including 
Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, François Mauriac and Louis Aragon published a "Call to 
Intellectuals" demanding that all those who could be called intellectuals -- "artists and 
writers, scholars and practicioners, engineers and technicians, doctors and teachers" -- 
pool their cultural capital take a stand against the Vietnam War.6  Intellectuals of all types 
quickly signed on: by early February 1968, the petitioners had collected 4,000 signatures; 
by March 16th, over 8,000; by the day of the meeting on March 23rd, 17,000. They 
planned a meeting that was to be a cultural smorgasboard, including teach-in style "round 
tables" by experts on Vietnam such as Jean Chesneaux and Dr. Krivine, who had recently 
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travelled to Vietnam as part of the Russell Tribunal investigative team; a general meeting 
of intellectuals led by the seventeen original signers; showings of paintings and other 
antiwar art inspired by the war by prominent artists, including Picasso; and continual 
playings of Joris Ivens' recently released film "Le 17e Parallèle." A small bookstore 
would also operate during the meeting, allowing those interested to buy the most recent 
works on Vietnam. Expecting a crowd, the organizers reserved one of the large halls at 
the Parc des Expositions at the Porte de Versailles on the outskirts of Paris.7 
 The numbers who responded to the call gave French intellectuals a sense of power 
through unity in action. A delegation of the original signers met with Mai Van Bo, the 
North Vietnamese representative in Paris, to inform him of the petition's success and 
explain that they intended to "converge the action undertaken" in the March 23rd 
meeting. Mai Van Bo responded that North Vietnam would send its own intellectuals to 
participate on that day, thus establishing a direct connection with the Vietnamese 
fighters.8 Vercors, writing in Le Monde, rhapsodized about the meeting's plans, 
proclaiming that it was proof that the world, especially the French, had had enough of 
American atrocities and was no longer willing to sit back and do nothing. "In a few 
weeks," he exclaimed, "without publicity, more than 7000 signatures!" Many had given 
money or goods. Those who signed, he noted, came from "all the disciplines, all the 
horizons," including "prestigious persons -- and among them a number of people who 
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have never before signed anything." The togetherness was refreshing. "A sort of sacred 
union," Vercors sighed. "It warms the heart."9 
 The "sacred union" played into a long tradition of French intellectual petitions and 
meetings on behalf of perceived aggrieved parties. As Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch 
wrote in L'Humanité, "this is not the first time that French intellectuals, in large numbers, 
take the part of the victim against the aggressor: our history teems with examples." In 
France, an intellectual's actions had strong ramifications for the country as a whole. 
Thorez-Vermeersch noted, "Intellectuals play a considerable role in the nation, by their 
thoughts, their words, their writings, the expression of their art. The works of writers, of 
poets, just like the role of the teacher, intervene in a considerable fashion in the formation 
of generations."10 With the petition and the March 23 meeting, French intellectuals were 
attempting to insert their anti-war efforts into a French tradition dating back to the 
Dreyfus Affair. Taking an engaged position, they argued that because of their status as 
cultural creators their words and images resonated in a way that could affect change: by 
voicing their opposition to the Vietnam War, they believed they gave tangible support to 
the Vietnamese fighters while guiding others in their country to this support as well.  
 The day itself was a rousing success. Attendees, estimated at 12,000, heard 
numerous luminaries speak. Picasso informed the crowd that "All of modern art is with 
Vietnam!" and the plethora of well-known sculptors and artists present seemed to support 
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his contention.11 At the end of the day, the group released two more calls to intellectuals. 
One, addressed to French intellectuals, asked that the French effort be continued and 
expanded. "May thousands more signatures come join those 17,000 intellectuals who 
associated themselves with the Call of the 17," the authors proclaimed.  "May, in the 
major cities of France, intellectuals converge their action in days of intellectuals for 
Vietnam, similar to what we have done today." Asking for money so that they could 
publish this call in American newspapers, the authors then concluded, "We will thus 
bring our contribution to the efforts of all those who, in the world, act for Vietnam."12 
The other call cast its net wider, addressing itself to "intellectuals of the world." In it, the 
authors remarked that "By expressing together their consciences' revolt, intellectuals are 
bringing an irreplacable contribution to the general movement in favor of Vietnam." They 
proposed an "international meeting of intellectuals for Vietnam," stating "May the 
intellectuals of the world unite their voice, and, supporting the liberation fight of the 
Vietnamese people, may they respond victoriously to this challenge thrown to the values 
of human culture."13 With the gauntlet thus thrown, the meeting dispersed, in a confident 
showing of intellectual influence and unity.  
 The other major unitary action of the French left during this time period had more 
concrete goals than providing moral support for the Vietnamese. With "A Boat for 
Vietnam," campaigners aimed to gather money and supplies for the North Vietnamese, 
who, they argued, had lost much due to constant American bombing. Thirty-six different 
                                                 
11
 Martine Monod, "Ample succès du rendez-vous du parc des Expositions, des milliers d'intellectuels avec 
le Vietnam. Ils invitent tous les intellectuels français à développer l'action et proposent une rencontre 
internationale," L'Humanité 25 March 1968.  
 
12
 "Aux intellectuels de France: Poursuivons notre action," L'Humanité  25 March 1968.  
 
13
 "Aux intellectuels du monde: Recontrons-nous," L'Humanité 25 March 1968.  
 
 237
French organizations joined together to launch the collection effort, including the Parti 
Communiste Français, the Comité Vietnam National, the Collectif Intersyndical 
Universitaire, the "Billion Franc" campaign, and the French Committee of Christian 
Conscience for Peace.14 Participants were encouraged to contribute whatever amount 
they could give. Organizers published lists of essential items which could then be bought: 
surgical trousses for 200 francs, a kilo of quinine for 250.15 All materials would then be 
delivered to le Havre, where they would be shipped on the Soviet boat the "Akademik-
Krylove," or Marseille, where they would travel with the Soviets on the "Solechnogorsk." 
Moscow had volunteered to provide free transport.   
 Before the project ended with the boats' departure in late February, participants 
provided nearly 450 million ancien francs worth of goods. The Secours Popualire 
Français gathered 20 million ancien francs, which it converted into three ambulances and 
50 tons of merchandise.16 From the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire came a ton and a 
half of scientific publications for use in North Vietnam era universities. The "Billion 
Francs" campaign donated 25 million ancien francs which became, among other things, 
1000 surgical trousses and 300 defribillators. 17 A French firm, working with French 
doctors who had visited Vietnam, created a "Vietnamese bicycle" for medical workers. 
Smaller in size than normal bikes, it had been adjusted to allow for travelling along dark 
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and damaged roads, and came equipped with a saddlebag containing medicines, a 
defribillator and a surgical trousse.18 At a gathering to celebrate the boat's launch, one 
excited protestor even handed over his guitar, which, Rivarol snidely remarked, was such 
a beautiful gesture it almost made the folks at L'Humanité cry.19 
 Even without musical accompaniment, the launches were a large party. At Le 
Havre, protestors bussed in from Paris joined with protestors hailing from the Normandy 
region in a large procession down to the quai, yelling "Peace in Vietnam!" and "Johnson, 
assassin!" Politicians who witnessed the boats' departure included members of the PCF 
and of the Parti Socialiste Unifié, as well as Tran Viet Durig, representing North 
Vietnam, and Boris Soukharev from the USSR.20 Upon loading the boats in Marseille, the 
dockers were purportedly so moved by the gifts and the thousands demonstrating that 
they donated their daily salaries.21  
 To the organizers, the flood of contributions demonstrated that the French left 
could overcome their political differences in support of the Vietnamese people. The 
National Committee, comprised of the 36 participating organizations, published an 
announcement congratulating itself on the campaign's success. "Millions of Frenchmen 
and Frenchwomen, of all opinions and [social] conditions, participated in this effort. We 
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thank them very warmly."22 Through the joint action, two large boats had departed with 
essential cargo for the Vietnamese. More than just calling for peace in Vietnam, as the 
government did while maintaining a neutral stance, the left, through the "Boat" 
campaign, actively supported North Vietnam and the Freedom Fighters by sending them  
important material goods. It was a perfect mix of moral and concrete assistance that 
mirrored the perfect mix of political groups participating. As L'Humanité described it, the 
Campaign had allowed, "through a popular outburst of exceptional size, to show that 
Frenchmen and Frenchwomen of the most varied political, philosophical or religious 
opinions wanted to jointly demonstrate their solidarity to the Vietnamese people."23 
Cracks in the Facade: Growing Clashes on the Left 
 Divisions on the left had become so strong, however, that even a unitary effort 
like the "A Boat for Vietnam" campaign could not be free from in-fighting. While 
political parties and organizations on the left had always indicated diverse opinions and 
resultant conflicts, and while the Vietnam War had given rise to previous clashes, the 
months preceding May '68 held a special significance because it was during this time that 
clashes with other leftist groups and a growing youth power caused the French 
Communist Party to shift some of its approaches. During these three months, the PCF 
changed its slogan on Vietnam from "Peace in Vietnam" to "The National Liberation 
Front Will Win." It also created its own Vietnam committee, the "Comité National 
d'Action pour le soutien et le victoire du peuple vietnamien," [National Action 
Committee for the Support and Victory of the Vietnamese People, henceforth CNA], 
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characterized notably by the development of "local-action" committees that resembled 
the Maoist Comités Vietnam de Base. The PCF's changes and the dialogue that emerged 
from the conflicts around them demonstrate the increasing tension among the left and the 
rising importance of youth activists.  
 The fight around the "Boat for Vietnam" arose from an earlier joint protest 
planned for February 13th. Multiple organizations called for a protest in front of the 
American embassy "to support the glorious fight of the Vietnamese people."24 An event 
poster created by the Comité Vietnam National proclaimed "Long live the Vietnamese 
people! The NLF in Saigon! The Americans out the door!"25 The CNA, the PSU and the 
CGT threw their weight behind the call, as did others.26 Preparations were well under 
way when the préfecture de police refused to authorize the protest location. Forced to 
regroup quickly, the organizers released a statement condemning the police refusal and 
asking protestors to participate instead in a march from the République to the Bastille.27 
 Despite a constant downpour, the protest drew several thousand people, who 
marched through the streets carrying North Vietnamese and NLF flags along with 
caricatures of President Johnson and "Che" Guevara. Counter-protestors at one point 
broke into the march attempting to rip down the red flags, but order was quickly restored 
and the rest of the demonstration went off without a hitch. No incidents occurred at the 
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Embassy, which had been surrounded by a large police contingent and metal barriers just 
in case. Simultaneous protests in the provinces marched in front of their respective 
American Consulates, brandishing similar flags and yelling similar slogans. All in all, the 
demonstration was a success. 28  
 It was thus much to the Communists' surprise when the CVN, a week later, 
published a statement in Le Monde arguing that the protest, "which unfolded without 
incident, should have, as they had asked the organizers, taken place at the Place de la 
Concorde and not at the Place de la République." The Communists immediately objected.  
They denounced the CVN's claim that they had not wanted the march at République, 
pointing out that all organizers had been informed when the original location was 
forbidden and Nicolas Boulet of the CVN had agreed to the location change. They then 
accused the CVN of hypocrisy, asking, "Why are the Comité Vietnam National's 
directors disavowing today what they approved yesterday? Why [does the CVN] always 
try to give lessons to everyone else, even though at this date of February 19th they still 
have not given any money to the Boat, whereas the PCF, the object of their attacks, has 
sent off 205 million [ancien] francs?"29 
 The CVN's response to this riposte brought into sharp relief the on-going tensions 
between itself and the French Communist Party. The CVN had, they noted, given money 
to the "Boat" campaign. But to the Comité Vietnam National, the way this accusation 
defamed their character had more to do with the Communists's desire for control, than 
with how much money the "Boat" had collected. The CVN noted that during the 
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February 13th protest in Nice, which was supposed to be unitary, members of the PCF 
had ripped down CVN banners and tore up a Hanoi newspaper CVN members were 
distributing. Allegedly, the federal secretary of the Communist Party had even smacked 
one of the Comité Vietnam militants.30 For the CVN, the Communists's desire to control 
everything was not just hurting the CVN, but was hurting the cause as well: working 
together to support the Vietnamese should have been the "primordial concern of all 
organizations."31 
 In an attempt to re-assert control over the general movement, the PCF, as noted,  
changed its slogan from "Peace in Vietnam" to "NLF will win!"  The underlying call for 
an end to the war remained the same, but the new version took a stronger stand in favor 
of the North. That the slogan was not entirely original did not escape observers. 
L'Express noted that the new, less "timorous" call copied from "the slogan in use for 
more than a year now by leftist groups: the "Billion Francs" groups, organized around 
intellectuals Paul Fraisse, Jérôme Lindon, Aimé Césaire and René Capitant, or the 
Comité Vietnam National, led by Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir."32 The CVN 
commented complacently that it "congratulated itself that the committee recently created 
by the Central Committee of the PCF [the CNA] is basing its action on watchwords 
identical to the CVN's."33 It seemed nothing more than an attempt to position the PCF at 
the forefront of a movement over which it was rapidly losing power, and indicated the 
PCF's growing fear of the strength of groups farther to the left than itself.   
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 If the CVN found the slogan switch suspicious, their views were nothing 
compared with the vitriol of the Maoist CVBs. "If [the Communists are] talking about 
victory [now]," the CVBs noted, "it's so they don't have to explain themselves." In the 
view of the CVBs, "pacifism [for the PCF] may have passed to the second plan, but it's 
far from having disappeared."34 The CVB sanctioned only specific ways of supporting 
Vietnam, and most of the PCF's -- and the CVN's -- actions fell outside of this realm.  
Instead of large-scale protests featuring big names, the Maoist groups still insisted on 
small, local activities which closely followed their reading of the Vietnamese line. A 
minority group but extremely vocal, the CVBs' actions established strong cleavages in the 
left between mass groups with prominent, adult members, and the burgeoning numbers of 
student activists.  
 Unlike other groups, the CVBs absolutely refused to participate in the "Boat" 
campaign. Their political agenda insisted that they follow "a line based on the defense 
and the popularization of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the NLF's positions," 
and if these positions were supported, the CVBs would participate. But they would not 
advocate unity for unity's sake. If the political view was "erroneous, pacifist for example, 
then unity of action is impossible, at the grassroots as well as at the summit."35 In the case 
of the "Boat" campaign, the CVBs believed that the other groups had deviated 
egregiously from the acceptable political line. Because the "Boat" campaign's political 
call was "Peace in Vietnam," the campaign was pacifist; thus participating in it -- even if 
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it provided important materials for the freedom fighters -- meant taking away from the 
real propaganda fight for victory in favor of pacifism.36 
 Moreover, the CVBs argued against any action that smacked of paternalism. 
Continually desirous to study at "the school of Vietnam," they resented actions that 
implied the Vietnamese rebels would not be able to defeat the U.S. without outside help. 
The boat, with its collected goods, represented nothing more than a hand-out. Rather than 
encouraging the Vietnamese, the CVBs argued, this campaign, based on the "ultra-
demobilizing sentiment of charity," would drag them down, reminding them of their 
subordinate position to the West.37 Instead of offering a book or a bicycle, activists in 
France needed to spread the Vietnamese message, as the Vietnamese stated it, and 
encourage others to believe their views.  
 For the CVBs, however, this question of influence could not come through the 
intervention of well-known intellectuals. One of their central reproaches to the CVN lay 
in its formation around a group of "well-known personalities" who seemed more 
interested in how bright their own stars shone than in distributing information about 
Vietnam.38 The CVBs continually complained that a focus on high-level personalities 
meant that work at the base got neglected. Instead of supporting the Vietnamese on their 
own terms -- most notably through distribution of the Hanoi-produced Courrier du 
Vietnam -- the CVBs claimed the CVN used its star power to create a momentary, 
spectacular impact with no follow-up. Instead of mass appeal, they felt, the CVN offered 
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bright lights and bureaucracy. But big names were not necessary to move forward the 
fight; local, direct action worked better. 
 It should be noted that dissension over the influence of big names and protests 
versus direct action did not exist only between the CVBs and the CVN. In fact, a division 
arose within the CVN itself, between those who took a more political line and a younger 
crowd looking for more violent displays. As committee founder Laurent Schwartz 
remembered, to these youth simple demonstrations "were just not interesting, not 
important, inefficient and sorry-looking. I knew it was true," he lamented, "but I didn't 
see how to go farther. After all, we weren't about to set bombs in front of the American 
Embassy!"39 The push for violent actions would have an important impact as events 
unrolled before May '68.  
 But in the Maoist view, the division within the CVN did not matter: only the 
CVBs had properly supported Vietnam's fight. "In spite of the victorious development of 
the Vietnamese people's war, no one has popularized this war of the people," the CVBs 
concluded in a report written at the end of their mass meeting in February 1968. "No one 
distributed their political positions[...] No one explained the profound reasons for their 
victories, or the consequence of these victories for all the world's people."40 Instead of 
acting in a way that highlighted the strength of Vietnam, French protests had offered a 
series of actions that painted the Vietnamese as weak.   
 The largest split on the left lay between the PCF and the CVBs.  Conflicts over 
how to protest and whom to reach exacerbated an already wide ideological gulf. The 
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Communist Party, to the Maoists, was guilty of subordination to Moscow and its belief in 
"peaceful coexistence" which denied revolutionary movements the chance to go forward. 
Their recent embrace of the slogan "NLF will win!" was therefore suspect. By supporting 
methods which were disconnected from the Vietnamese people, they were nothing more 
than "false friends" of Vietnam. 41 To the Communists, the Maoists were nothing more 
than troublemakers. By striking out against the PCF - at least once physically attacking a 
PCF cell - the CVBs disrupted the chances for supporting Vietnam. In fact, the 
Communists did not hesitate to suggest that the CVBs were not really Maoist 
revolutionaries at all, but rather tools of Gaullist oppression. Their newspapers, the PCF 
noted, regularly attacked the Communists, but spared the government. Wondering where 
the CVBs got money for their publications (although not outright accusing them of 
receiving Gaullist funds), the PCF decried CVB actions as disrupting revolution in 
France. "You can not be simultaneously with the Vietnamese communists and against the 
French communists. You can not be simultaneously against American imperialism and 
with French imperialism," the PCF argued. Those who accused the PCF of being 
revisionist, those who "spread divisions, preach anti-communism," the PCF warned, 
"should not be surprised to find us strongly blocking their path, solidly holding our post 
in both the ongoing battle for Vietnam and in the ideological struggle against all the 
thrill-seeking groupuscules who are doing the work of the international and French 
reactionary community." The PCF claimed it would not tolerate any dissension, and in 
challenging the CVBs it professed to be acting in a revolutionary fashion: "[We do this] 
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in the interest of the Vietnamese and the French people, for their common and rapid 
victory over imperialism."42 
 In order to combat fully the CVBs' influence, the PCF set its sights on the 
demographic most attracted to the CVBs: youth. When the Parti created the Comité 
National d'Action, "Action Committees" comprised a central component. These 
committees were intended to be small groups of activists operating at a local level, 
dedicated to work on Vietnam. All interested "men, women and youth" could join.43 
Within a month and a half from the creation of the CNA, 1500 action committees had 
been formed. Action committees were special, PCF leader Georges Marchais explained, 
because experience had shown that they allowed "a large number of men, women and 
youth, of diverse opinions but feeling solidarity with the noble cause for which the 
Vietnamese people are fighting" to join up with the Communists. By working in action 
committees, activists could have "simultaneously the constant expansion of the mass 
movement in support of heroic Vietnam, and the permanent and efficient organization of 
solidarity with the Vietnam people."44 The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Communiste de la 
France greeted the move enthusiastically, declaring that "this great initiative fully 
responds to the aspirations of hundreds of thousands of young Frenchmen." It would, 
they affirmed, "allow them to organize themselves on a more massive level against the 
criminal aggression of American imperialists in Vietnam."45  
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 That the "action committees" seemed to be imitating the format of the CVBs' 
local-based groups was not lost on observers. Yet in reality, the overall structure of the 
"action committees" within the CNA replicated the structure of the Parti Communiste 
Français: an "action committee" (which corresponded to the local "cellule")  reported to a 
"departmental action committee" (which corresponded to departmental Communist 
authorities), which in turn reported to the Comité National d'Action (which corresponded 
to the PCF's ultimate control). But the attempt to create even the appearance of a local, 
youth-oriented protest format revealed the Party's desire to capitalize on youth energy 
and, as L'Express remarked, "their fear to see themselves overtaken by some 
'uncontrollable leftist elements'." Indeed, the threat to the PCF appeared so great that 
L'Express captioned a photo of Communist demonstrators armed with clubs with the line 
"Out of fear of the pro-Chinese." Aware that anti-Vietnam War protests were drawing 
more young people than any other political activity, the PCF staked out its territory and 
attempted to establish control. 46 The move indicated both the sharp divisions between 
many young activists and the party, and the perceived growing threat of a youth-based 
movement on the left, which accepted neither national control along party lines, the 
influence of big names, nor the rationale for indirect action. These developments would 
have would have important implications on how various elements of the left reacted 
when May '68 broke out.  
Same Day, Different Protest: 
Examples of Divisions on the Left in the 21 février Protests 
 
 Splits on the left played out in a clear fashion during the protests planned around 
February 21, 1968. The year before, leftist activists had reclaimed the day, previously 
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used to protest imperialism but fallen into disuse since the end of the Algerian War, as a 
day specifically concentrated around anti-Vietnam War protests. The choice of this date 
placed Vietnam War demonstrations into a French tradition of resistance against violent 
aggression. A flyer placed by the CVBs presented the protests as part of a continuum, 
calling people to participate and proclaiming: 
February 21 1944: 
A group of foreign-born resistants are shot by the Nazis for having participated in 
the French people's fight for independence. This date is traditionally an 
international day against colonialism and fascism. A few years ago, workers' 
unions and students launched protest marches against the Algerian War.  
February 21 1968: 
Today the most powerful imperialism, US imperialism, is unmasked in the eyes of 
the world by a barbaric aggressiveness, a fascist repression in Vietnam. 47 
 
Cast in this light, those who fought in France against the war in Vietnam marched in the 
footsteps of French freedom fighters before them. The day had strong symbolic import, 
and all groups planned actively for its undertaking. Yet each group's planning followed a 
different path, demonstrating both the PCF's continued attempts to hold on to the youth 
element and the growing divisions over types of appropriate protest.  
 When the PCF gathered at the Cirque d'Hiver on the afternoon of February 21st, 
they did so with the youth elements of their party at the forefront. Aware that their young 
members had "their eyes fixed on Vietnam" and "lived" to see Vietcong victories, the 
Party organized an event that would place them into contact with young Vietnamese 
students. It would, they assured, give the youth "the possibility to say to the young 
Vietnamese themselves: we are your brothers, your sisters, your fight is our fight." The 
meeting would be a send-off for numerous other meetings to show solidarity, and in the 
                                                 
47
 "Un mois d'action pour le 21 février", February 1968, BDIC F delta Res 613/5.  
 
 250
view of the PCF "nothing more effective could be done that day" to support the 
Vietnamese.48 
 In addition to establishing contacts between young French communists and the 
Vietnamese, the meeting offered another treat for participants: a special viewing of the 
program that the television show "Ce jour-là" had created around the Communist protest 
on November 26, 1967. For the segment, cameramen and an interviewer had followed a 
group of Communist youths as they went door-to-door in their city, drumming up 
donations for Vietnam, before taking a bus trip to Paris to join 70,000 others in protesting 
the war.49 The thousands who had taken part, organizers assured, "are going to want to 
see the film of their protest, relive this unforgettable day, an important stage in the raising 
of consciousness, of action, and of combativity of young French people for the support 
and the victory of Vietnam."50 Through links with past activism and a present-day 
connection with real live Vietnamese people, the Communist version of February 21st 
aimed to cement the significance of the Communist youth movement to Vietnam and to 
France's understanding of the world.  
 When the meeting took place, L'Humanité rejoiced. Thousands of Communist 
youths turned out to watch international leaders speak. "On this February 21st, a day 
against imperialism across the world for the young and students, Paris was singled out," 
Charles Silvestre cheered. Talking to the Communists "and through them, to the youth of 
our country," the leaders explained the Vietnamese fight. "This could not have 
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happened," Silvestre explained, "if millions of our country's youth were not intimately, 
individually, scandalized by American aggression, and if hundreds of millions of them 
were not ready to express their sympathy for the Vietnamese."51 For the PCF, their 
Communist youth led the fight in France.  
 Reading L'Humanité, one would have believed that the Cirque d'Hiver meeting 
had been the biggest happening of the evening. The article on their young comrades 
covered part of the first and fourth page. Tucked away in the center of the fourth page, a 
small article mentioned that there had been some disturbance in the Latin Quarter. With 
no analysis or extra commentary, they gave a bare-bones sketch of events. "At the start of 
the afternoon," L'Humanité noted off-handedly, "students gathered in the courtyard of the 
Sorbonne and marched down the Boulevard St. Michel, whose plaques had been replaced 
by others: 'Heroic Vietnam.' Shortly thereafter the name of Nguyen Van Troi was written 
on the walls of the lycée Saint-Louis, and finally an effigy of Johnson stuffed with straw 
was hung from the archangel's head in the St. Michel fountain was lit on fire by the 
students."52 
 Their description, while accurate, muted the spark of the real events. The Latin 
Quarter undertaking had been coordinated by a number of groups, most notably the CVN 
and the UNEF. In protests aimed at turning the Latin Quarter into the "Heroic Vietnam 
Quarter," activists claimed several key landmarks for Vietnam as part of the international 
struggle, hanging the NLF flag from the Sorbonne and renaming streets and a high 
school. Rather than an indoor gathering with speeches such as the Communists planned, 
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this protest featured marches, burning effigies, and a large banner with "NLF will win!" 
in flaming letters. It drew more participants and generated more press attention than the 
Communist meeting.  
 Part of the difference in the protests arose from a recent push for more direct 
protest by the CVN. Although the PCF had adopted some of the slogans and structures of 
its younger counterparts, it retained its overall bureaucracy and traditional protest modes. 
For the CVN and the UNEF in early '68, simple demonstrations no longer sufficed. The 
Vietnamese had won important military battles against the U.S., the CVN explained, but 
American imperialism "also needed to be isolated politically."53 Since it was "no longer 
the time for processions," the new protests aimed to connect actions in France directly to 
the Vietnam movement by moving from "humanitarian aid to political support," so that, 
as the UNEF wrote, "we respond to the escalade of [American] aggression with an 
escalade of solidarity, each day more efficient."54 Such political action particularly 
needed to take place in Europe, because "the roots of aggression can also be found in 
Europe in the support that most of the Western European governments and a large 
number of European trusts brought to the American war effort."55 In retaking the Latin 
Quarter for Vietnam, the groups planned to create a French space in which to carry on the 
fight against American imperialism.   
 The protests went off without a hitch, receiving a large amount of press, but even 
this "political" action against imperialism did not suffice for the CVBs. Early in the 
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planning, they rejected the CVN's invitation to work together, claiming that the CVN's 
refusal to distribute the NLF's political program and its criticism of some of the NLF's 
stands made them guilty of "hypocrisy" and "treason."56 Instead of a "false unity," the 
CVBs planned to have a number of local base groups work throughout the day, diffusing 
Vietnamese propaganda, before meeting at a central point. Activists showed up on the 
Champs-Elysées -- a protest location that the préfecture had forbidden -- with newspapers 
and "explanatory panels," and clashed with police, resulting in nearly 40 arrests. In an 
attempt to take even more direct action, they moved from there to the South Vietnamese 
embassy. Before being dispersed by the police, they hung the NLF flag from the building 
and threw rocks through the windows. Their night ended in a fight with police at the 
Place de Clichy. This kind of direct action with propaganda, in their view, made the fight 
on French soil a more real part of the Vietnam War. Like those who went before them, 
they were resisting imperialist powers at home and abroad, but in their separate actions 
they were creating important divisions among the left. 
Street Battles for France: 
Fighting Between the Right and the Left 
 
  However, conflicts during this time period did not consist solely of in-fighting 
among leftist groups. Just as important was an on-going clash with the extreme right. As 
historians have noted, the Vietnam War did not mobilize the right, especially right-wing 
intellectuals, to the extent that the Algerian War did.57 Yet if no "petition war" took place 
this time, several pitched battles did.  Right-wing editorialists and journalists lashed out 
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against the leftist activists in France and argued in support of the American war effort. 
Right-wing student groups, notably "Occident," fought viciously with left-wing student 
groups for control over university areas. These arguments had two significant effects on 
developments in France during the period preceding 1968. First, the battles of words 
between left and right wingers highlighted the radically divided images of France at 
work, and the continual struggle over French national and international identity. Second, 
the physical battles on and off the streets between armed right and left-wing groups 
created an atmosphere of violence which generated tensions and heated up the forms 
protests took. 
 For many on the far right, the war in Vietnam fell into the worldwide fight 
between communism and liberty, characterized by a belief in the Domino Theory. In 
France, they saw opponents of freedom in the shape of the Communist Party, the leftist 
student movements, and in De Gaulle, whom right-wing activists frequently denounced 
as an "agent of the Kremlin."58 While writers frequently mocked the seriousness of left-
wing commitment to the Vietnam struggle ("One fights for Vietnam from 5 to 7, now and 
then, before going out to the cinema or to check out the latest books at Maspero's store," 
one article remarked,) they felt a strong obligation to check perceived growing leftist 
activity in France.59 Frequently, their attacks on the left were met with counter-attacks, 
both verbal and physical.  
 A notable fight played out on February 7, when activists including anti-
communist intellectual Suzanne Labin and former paratrooper Roger Holeindre staged a 
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meeting for "friends of South Vietnam"  at the Mutualité in Paris. "By your presence, you 
will show your support to the soldiers of the Free World who are fighting to save South 
Vietnam from communist dictatorship," the call for the meeting announced. "You will 
demand the end of communist aggression in South Vietnam and the installation of a just 
peace."60 The rendez-vous would include lectures on the situation in South Vietnam. 
Holeindre and the nationalist student group Occident intended to provide "security."61 
 Students within the CVBs immediately launched plans to protest the meeting. 
Their calls reflected the way that Vietnam stoked opposing views of France, cand the 
way in which past French events came continually into play during Vietnam protests. 
"No, French neo-nazis will not insult the heroic Vietnamese people!," CVB flyers read. 
Denouncing participants as "the collaborators of 1940, the killers of the OAS," people 
who had formerly supported the "repression of people under French imperialism," the 
CVBs claimed that the right-wingers had found their new champion in the U.S. "Those 
who applauded the execution of the FTP resistance group on February 21, 1944 are, 
today, the most loyal supporters of the new Nazis, the American imperialists," the CVBs 
declared. They refused to allow France to become a pro-American location, announcing 
"we can not tolerate having the Americans' fascist valets expressing themselves in Paris," 
and encouraging supporters to come out and counter-protest. They ended on an ominous 
note: "The French neo-nazis will meet the same end as their masters of yesterday and 
today." 62 
                                                 
60
 Rivarol, 1 February 1968.  
 
61
 Frédéric Charpier, Génération Occident, 150.  
 
62
 "Non les néo-nazis français n'insulteront pas l'héroique peuple vietnamien," 1968, BDIC F delta Res 
613/5. 
 
 256
 The threat appeared serious enough to mobilize the Paris police force: when fights 
broke out on February 7th, they occurred between each groups' protestors and the police, 
rather than between the two groups themselves. The CVB mobilized over 3,000 counter-
protestors on short notice, all of whom gathered at Place Maubert in the early evening on 
February 7th. Unable to stop the meeting, they nevertheless changed its tenure: because 
of the fear of possibly violent disruptions, organizers were forced to ID everyone 
entering, thus limiting the public reach of their words. Extremely pleased, the CVBs 
noted afterwards that the anti-imperialists were the only ones "who were able to speak in 
the road for the general population."63 But as the meeting began under heavy police 
guard, chaos broke out in the streets. Shouting slogans such as "We won't tolerate 
shaved-headed fascists in para-trooper uniforms!," "Johnson, more violent than Hitler!," 
and singing the NLF's anthem, students attempted to get around the police blockade and 
enter the Mutualité by the back. Their charge was brutally pushed back by the police. 
Regrouping shortly thereafter on the Boulevard St. Germain, helmeted and sometimes 
armed protestors clashed with police again. This time, the police launched tear gas 
grenades, one of which landed in the middle of the well-known leftist hot spot, the café 
Deux-Magots, and caused the dining room to be evacuated in a panic. 64 The streets were 
cleared of left-wing protestors when the meeting finally let out two hours later. Militants 
pouring into the streets shouting "Vietcongs, assassins!" found the police waiting for 
them near the Odéon metro station. More fights broke out. In the end, thirty police 
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officers had to be treated for injuries and two protestors, one from the right and one from 
the left, were arrested. 65 
 Between the right and the left, then, the fight over Vietnam also served as a fight 
over France: what the country had been in the past, and who could speak for it now. To 
the left, the right-wingers in Occident and the "Front uni de soutien pour Vietnam de 
Sud" (United Support Front for South Vietnam, or Front uni,) contained the worst of 
France's repressive ancestry, from those who attacked the Resistance to those who 
supported the OAS during the Algerian War. As such, they could not be allowed to speak 
for France as the left envisioned it. Standing up for the Vietnamese meant placing France 
on a progressive course. For the right, the left-wingers represented the betrayers, those 
who had lost Algeria and France's glory, and who failed to appreciate those who had 
fought for this cause. To challenge this treason, the Front Uni organized two days of 
protests on March 30 and 31st, encouraging "each Frenchmen to place individually a 
simple bouquet on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier - or the monument closest to where 
they live - in memory of those who died for the noble cause of liberty, and more 
particularly those members of the French Expeditionary Corps who died in Indochina."66 
More than just a fight over who should win in Vietnam, the left-right clash concerned 
whose conception of France would dominate.  
 Frequently,  right-wing challenges to the left were more violent in nature than the 
verbal sparring described above.  Occident members often staked out areas in the Latin 
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Quarter and attacked militants distributing Vietnam information. A physical battle for 
control of University space, complete with fisticuffs and billy clubs, took place in Paris 
and in other University towns. Occident also kept up its attack on leftist activities outside 
the university, in one instance shredding posters and smashing windows in the cinema 
Studio Git-le-Coeur, which was showing a pro-Vietcong film, Joris Iven's 17ème 
Parallèle. Occident militants put out an announcement claiming responsibility for the 
attack and for a simultaneous one on a Maoist bookstore, warning "The movement 
Occident has decided to make the troublemakers understand that [Occident] will no 
longer allow them to make the roads of Paris resemble those of Saigon."67 This was a 
violent, no holds-barred struggle for possession of Parisian streets and for the very nature 
of France.  
Sparks to a Powderkeg: 
Vietnam, Occident, and the Student Movement Before May '68 
 
 The tinder box of leftist youth movements, right-wing nationalist student activists 
and Vietnam protests came to an explosive head in March and April of 1968. Reactions 
to the Vietnam War played a central role in how May '68 developed during this time. 
Vietnam offered the language to articulate the student fight as a liberation struggle, the 
practice of protest methods, and the knowledge of how to deal with violent 
confrontations. Both the impetus and the interpretation of the events at the Sorbonne on 
May 3rd depended upon tensions set up by Vietnam protests. 
 The major connection between Vietnam and the student movements became clear 
on March 18, 1968, when anti-war militants operating in the early morning hours ignited 
plastic explosives at three American businesses in Paris, succeeding in blowing up the 
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bay window at the TWA offices, scattering its brochures and pictures across the 
sidewalk.68 Two days later, a group of  nearly 300 protestors gathered in front of the 
American Express offices in the Rue Scribe, smashing its windows and spray-painting 
anti-American slogans on its walls in bright red. Confronted by the police, most 
protestors disappeared down neighboring streets and into the metro, but one, armed with 
a spray-paint can, was caught and brought in for questioning.69 Shortly thereafter, police 
investigators arrested six students, including Nicolas Boulet, a prominent member of the 
Comité Vietnam National, in connection with the attacks.70  
 Many on the left immediately perceived the arrests as part of an attempt by 
authorities to repress an activist movement. The CVN published a communiqué to "alert 
public opinion about measures striking militants for Vietnam." It called for its members 
to "mobilize to put an end to the provocations of those in power" and asked that "all 
democratic organizations intervene to get the arrested militants liberated."71 L'Humanité 
joined its voice to those calling for the protestor's liberation, but noted prudently that the 
Communist Party had always "affirmed the necessity in all domains of the largest mass 
struggle possible, and [had always] condemned individual acts which have no other result 
than to shrink the action and provide pretexts for repression."72 But the most memorable 
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response to the arrests came from a previously unknown group of students at a university 
on the outskirts of Paris. On March 22, 1968, one hundred and fifty students at Nanterre 
occupied a faculty conference room on campus to protest against the arrests, which 
included Nanterre students. They called for a strike from classes for the following 
Monday, and held a meeting to discuss both world politics and the situation of students in 
the French university system. Drawing inspiration from Fidel Castro's 26th July 
Movement, they called themselves the Mouvement du 22 Mars.73  
 The chain of events which took place from March 22 to the police invasion of the 
Sorbonne on May 3rd drew upon established tensions and ideas that had arisen in the 
anti-war protests. First, the arrests constituted the collision point of the Vietnam and the 
student movements. Prior to March 22nd, numerous protests had occurred within the 
university and notably at Nanterre -- a student strike had even already taken place -- but 
these actions were university-focused and not connected to the ongoing fight against the 
Vietnam War, although they involved many of the same militants. With the advent of the 
March 22 Movement, the student movement became more international. Part of this had 
been in development -- Daniel Cohn Bendit's close ties to Rudi Dutschke, who had 
argued that the German struggle was one for Vietnam, meant that cross-pollination had 
taken place -- but now in France the two were definitively joined, with the student 
movement linking its own specific concerns to a more general anti-imperialist agenda. 
Moreover, the perceived injustice of the students' arrest allowed the protestors to present 
the French state as unjust and themselves as fighting for a better way.  
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 Protests at Nanterre continued to present an anti-imperialist theme. At a meeting 
on April 1st, a thousand students took over a lecture hall, where they heard Daniel Cohn-
Bendit state their aims: "We want," he explained, " to establish all together a plan of 
action. We have to show the social function of the university. We refuse to be the future 
cadres of capitalist exploitations, and that's why we boycotted the exams which led us to 
this situation."74 The floor was opened to comments, including an informative speech 
from a German SDS leader who explained how his group was fighting against German 
support for the Vietnam War. But the leaders worked hard to insure that the anti-
imperialist line dominated. Calling for this meeting, they had described the student 
movement as an attempt to get political liberty at the university. But, they noted, "We 
will support no freedom of expression for those who are against the aggression in 
Vietnam."75 
 Their protests, although anti-imperialist in themes, gathered no support from the 
Communist Party, who saw them as upstarts, nothing more than kids playing at being 
revolutionaries. L'Humanité mocked the multiplicity of groups at Nanterre which they 
said totaled at most "200 students considered by thousands of others as 'outlandish' and 
offering the press, on a silver platter, a certain image of student political activity. Only 
the Communist students," they proudly noted, "have been able to, on the subject of 
Vietnam, get one thousand students to participate in acts of solidarity."76 Protestors at 
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Nanterre were depicted, as the CVBs had been before them, as fake activists whose 
"outrage gratifie[d] the government, favorise[d] those who are for repression, in a word, 
contributes to isolating the students from the fight for democracy," whereas the 
Communists and the Communist youth represented, as an April 8th Humanité headline 
proclaimed, "the most important political organization of the French youth."77 The 
divisions which had been highlighted by Vietnam War protests came into full force here.  
 Despite the disapproval of the PCF, the intensity of protests stayed high, in part 
because of the constant threat of, or actual experience of, violence from right-wing 
militants, a violence which had played out in Vietnam War protests and which still 
maintained connections to the Vietnam War movement while confronting student events 
at Nanterre. As mentioned above, those involved in the Mouvement du 22 mars 
considered part of their fight to involve quashing pro-U.S. sentiment. The right was 
similarly concerned with keeping Nanterre from becoming the sole domain of the left. 
The FNEF, a right-wing student group at Nanterre with connections to Occident, spoke 
up against "the terrorism and anarchy that overexcited extreme-leftists intend to have 
reign over Nanterre under the pretext of political protests."78 They called for the leftists to 
be stopped, if necessary with outside intervention.79 In April, a fight broke out at a UNEF 
meeting between leftists calling for a politicization of all groups and right-wing 
extremists who had interrupted the meeting; shortly thereafter, the offices of the FNEF at 
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Nanterre were ransacked.80 In response, Occident broke into the CVN's headquarters in 
Paris while most members were out at a protest, attacking the eight members on duty 
there before setting fire to the office.81 Finally, a group of Maoist student activists, 
motivated in part by Occident's destruction of the Maoist Michelet bookstore and also by 
Occident's continual attacks on students, ransacked an art exhibit set up by the Front Uni 
du Vietnam, sneaking in, overpowering those on guard and beating Roger Holeindre 
severely.82 Occident vowed revenge.83  
 Right and left-wing violence added a more drastic dimension to the ongoing 
student protests. After the attack on CVN headquarters, the group's leaders had urged its 
members to "protect themselves;" it was advice that few took lightly.84 Nanterre's campus 
closing came about in part because of the dean's well-justified fear of bloody fights 
breaking out. Prior to the closings, Occident had called for its own protest to go on at 
Nanterre during already planned "anti-imperialist days." They did not envision a series of 
lectures; their militants were armed with iron bars and Molotov cocktails. Left-wing 
groups knew their intent, and were similarly armed; furthermore, since they controlled 
most of the buildings and the roofs, had set up slingshots and even improvised 
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catapults.85 It was preparation for a bloody battle whose lines had been drawn during 
clashes over Vietnam, and by extension over the University and France, in the preceding 
months.  
 With Nanterre closed, action moved to the Sorbonne and all three elements - 
Vietnam, left wing students and Occident - exploded. On May 3rd, Richard Perrin, an 
American deserter and activist against the war living in Paris, received an invitation to 
come to the Sorbonne. He was told students from Nanterre would be there to discuss "the 
problems on their campus." A frequent speaker on Vietnam at leftist meetings, Perrin 
accepted without a second thought, but upon arriving at the Sorbonne found the students 
locked out and was told he would not be able to speak. "Before I could leave," he 
remembered, "a group of right-wing students gathered outside. It wasn't safe to pass 
through a bunch like that. They called themselves Occident and were well known for 
their violent behavior. I thought I'd better wait for things to cool down." The trouble was, 
he ruefully remarked, "it took several weeks for things to cool down."86 Students inside 
the Sorbonne, working from past experience of encounters with Occident, began breaking 
chairs apart to arm themselves. Shortly thereafter, the police showed up within the 
Sorbonne interior, loaded some students into their paddy wagons, and May '68 began in 
earnest.  
Conclusions: The Importance of Vietnam 
 Including Vietnam protests in the history of May '68 is not meant to take away 
from the other aspects which informed its development. Without problems within the 
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French university system, Gaullist distance from reality, or a growing malaise with 
capitalist society, May '68 would certainly not have happened. But without protests over 
the Vietnam War, May '68 would not have existed as it did. Conflicts within left-wing 
groups established the division between old and young, between political and direct 
action, and between leftists and the Communist Party which would influence group 
relations and youth actions at the start of May '68. Constant clashes between the right and 
the left created the tensions and expectations of violence which caused May '68 to 
explode as it did on May 3rd, and helped to frame it as a conflict over the direction of 
France itself. Finally, the Vietnam War protests, especially through the tumult 
surrounding the arrests of militants on March 22nd, provided the language which moved 
the students protests from France-specific concerns to part of a larger anti-imperialist 
fight. Their power was such that Laurent Schwartz, looking back, remarked "I lived May 
'68 several months before May '68."87 
 Viansson-Ponté remained correct in his assessment that the war only really 
mattered to a small group of people, but incorrect in his assumption of how these activists 
would play into the revolution he foresaw happening. More than just a diversion, more 
than a fringe movement, activists involved in the Vietnam War on the left and on the 
right lay at the heart of the development of May '68. In fact, the importance of small 
groups of young people had even been noted at the time. Rivarol noted that while the 
student groups might make up less than a percent of the electorate, they were still 
significant. "While [they] can't do anything in normal times, their appearance shows that 
times are not normal; they predict the criminal madness of great revolutions [...] To 
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ignore them is to be blind to the signs of the times."88 And as a sociologist explained to 
Paris Presse, "Public powers have always denied the importance, or at least the 
significance of student protests. They forget two things: the first is that tomorrow's power 
belongs to today's students. The second is that, if students have never caused a revolution 
alone, revolutions have rarely happened without them."89 For these student groups in 
France in the early months of 1968, their activity and their power came in large part from 
the importance of the Vietnam War to their groups. These protests moved them and 
France forward in an tumultuous way that, contradictory to Viansson-Ponté's claims, 
meant that the country was at risk for anything but "dying of boredom."90 
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Chapter Seven: 
 
The Retour à l'Hexagone: 
May '68 and the Decline of the Vietnam War Movement in France 
 
 At 2:15 in the morning on May 11th, the French police finally made their move. 
Hurling tear gas grenades and brandishing billy clubs, they launched themselves at the 
makeshift barricades of overturned cars and uprooted trees erected by Parisian students 
throughout the Latin Quarter.  Vicious fighting followed, with smoke and tear gas so 
thick that "in some places only those with flashlights could grope their way into combat." 
The New York Times described a scene resembling a battlefield: "Ambulances raced to 
and from the scene with wounded from both sides," Lloyd Garrison reported. "Red Cross 
stretcher bearers braved rocks and tear gas grenades to retrieve casualties between the 
barricades and phalanxes of charging French security forces [...] Countless wounded 
students laying crying for help behind burning barricades[.]"1 When the air finally cleared 
at six in the morning, thousands had been injured and over four hundred arrested. The 
remnants of still-smoking barricades, burned by the students as they retreated, littered the 
streets.  
 Ironically, the Parisian war zone had arisen in part from a desire to make peace. 
Only days before, Paris had been chosen as the site for negotiations between the North 
Vietnamese and the United States. Honored by their city's selection, Parisian leaders 
worried that the student unrest would cause harm even as they assured American and 
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North Vietnamese leaders that nothing would affect the talks. As delegations from both 
countries began to arrive, government officials called upon protestors to protect Paris' 
reputation as a city of peace. A city councilman proclaimed that it was "inadmissible that 
a handful of agitators [....] are giving way to acts of violence" at the exact moment when 
"Paris was seeing its vocation as the capital of peace consecrated."2 The order to remove 
the barricades came after long discussions among officials inspired by the government's 
desire to keep the peace talks safe. The wish to protect the talks was so strong that in 
addition to sending in the troops which stormed the Latin Quarter, the government 
stationed police at nineteen different bridges over the Seine to insure that demonstrators 
could not reach the Right Bank and trouble the delegates.3 But the efforts to protect the 
talks did not stop the students from protesting, and despite the presence of peace 
negotiators on the other side of the river, battles raged on in Paris throughout May. The 
fighting became so bad on the Left Bank that the North Vietnamese delegation left their 
hotel located near the Latin Quarter to move to quarters in the suburbs, commenting, 
"The noise reminded us of the bombing of Hanoi."4 As clashes approached epic 
proportions and workers joined forces with the students, it seemed the Gaullist 
government might fall. "Somewhere in Paris peace is hidden," Parisian resident Michelle 
Merlanger commented to a reporter. "I am afraid the Americans and the Vietnamese will 
find it before the French students do."5 
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 While there were many unexpected facets to the May uprisings, perhaps one of 
the most surprising is that, despite the presence of Vietnam War talks in Paris, French 
activists were not aiming their vitriol at the negociatiors. Indeed no one attempted to 
protest the delegations or interefere with negotiations. In fact, the meteoric rise of May 
'68 events coincided with the precipitious decline of French interest in the Vietnam War. 
This retour à l'Hexagone [return to the Hexagon, a reference to the outline shape of 
France], characterized by an intense focus on French-related events, seemed to indicate 
that the French had finally arrived at a point of interest to them again after a period of 
working in others' affairs since the end of the Algerian War. Yet in reality, the Vietnam 
War had provided key motivation for the French to arrive at '68 and continued to 
influence their self-understanding once events became more exciting at home. In this 
concluding chapter, I will analyze the apparent French loss of interest in the Vietnam 
War, looking at evolutions in activism for de Gaulle, the right, and the left, throughout 
the events of May '68 and in their aftermath. I show that rather than a simple decline of 
interest, the changing attitudes towards the Vietnam War after May demonstrate the 
culmination of reconceptualizations of French national identity, arising from the 
combination of domestic events and international interactions. Although the Vietnam 
War was not as omni-present after '68 as it had been before, it remained an important 
international factor of the supposed return to the homefront of the late 60s and early 70s. 
From "The Cement and the Origin" to Afterthought: 
Shifts for the Vietnam War during May '68 
 
 At the start of May, Vietnam still remained important to the uprising. As late as 
May 10th, the CVN was still distributing tracts among the students urging them to 
participate in their "anti-imperialist summer,"which took place in Cuba and focused on 
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Vietnam.6 Students at Nanterre on May 2nd who invaded and occupied and amphitheatre 
wanted the room in part to show Vietnam War films to their comrades.7 During the 
interminable discussions at Nanterre early on, students proudly proclaimed "We refuse 
the right to speak to anyone who supports [the American] intervention in Vietnam," thus 
making alignment on the Vietnam War a precondition for participation in the May 
movement. Le Monde referred to anti-war protests as "the cement and the origin" of 
May.8 Students also rejected government attempts to quell their uprising in order to let 
the peace talks proceed smoothly. Underlining again the left's unwillingness to allow the 
government's stance on Vietnam to color the rest of the government's policy, the students 
noted that "Those who imagine that this regime will be pardoned for everything because 
conversations on Vietnam are taking place in Paris are mistaken. We're not in the 
business of handing out indulgences."9 Moreover, they challenged the Gaullist 
presentation of Paris as the "capital of peace" and a neutral spot in which negotiations 
could take place. "The portraits of Ho Chi Minh on the barricades and the NLF flags in 
protests show clearly that for us, Paris is not a neutral town in the Vietnam War," the 
students proclaimed.10 They linked their attempted takeover of the city to support of the 
North Vietnamese revolutionaries.  
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 Even those who denigrated the students' actions at the beginning tended to do so 
in the context of the Vietnam War. The agency France-Presse published a report that the 
government "saw in the Latin Quarter protests [of May 10th] the intervention of forces 
hostile to peace" who were attempting to derail the peace talks in Paris.11 Figaro also 
wondered where the "so-called professional agitators" had come from, and argued that 
"the first response one thinks of is that the Chinese, or the pro-Chinese, are at works in 
the wings. They are the only ones we can think of who, at the present time, would wish to 
trouble the atmosphere of the conversation taking place between North Vietnam and the 
U.S. in the hope of peace." The paper noted that "some protestors invoked the name of 
Mao Tse-Tong on their banners." Although the paper's emphasis was on unmasking 
"professional" and possibly foreign agitators, the belief still came through that reactions 
to the Vietnam motivated those acting. By including Chinese and pro-Chinese, Figaro 
allowed for the homegrown Maoist element among the leaders. The insinuation 
subordinated the French interests the students expressed in favor of the larger 
international issue of the Vietnam War.12  
 Casting their net more widely, Rivarol at the start of May saw a panopoly of 
communists at work on the streets of Paris, but still with the same end aim in mind. Pierre 
Dominique (who usually covered the paper's Southeast Asia beat) claimed that the 
students -- "and there were not only students; among those arrested, half of them were 
foreigners" -- had fought like "professionals, not of literature and sciences, but of what 
we call revolution[.]" He saw their May 6th protest as internationally inspired and led: 
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"They marched behind the red flag, singing the "International;" 10,000 of them cheered 
for the Vietcong, Monday night, including in their ranks 2000 pro-Chinese organized and 
trained in street fighting, who destroyed everything they could destroy[.]" Unsure 
whether their leaders came from Peking or Germany (a nod to student leader's Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit's origins), Dominique insisted nevertheless that the goal of the protest was 
to show that the Latin Quarter supported the North Vietnamese.13 By Rivarol's next issue, 
the paper was convinced that the protests existed solely for the purpose of disrupting the 
talks. "We don't at all contest (the word is stylish nowadays) that you can find, among the 
night street walkers, a majority of youths and adolescents concerned about the future 
awaiting them," the editorial board noted. "But [...] we declare that THE ENTIRETY OF 
OPERATIONS HAS BEEN CONCEIVED AND CARRIED OUT BY PROFESSIONAL 
AGITATORS WHO COULD CARE LESS ABOUT THE FRENCH UNIVERSITY." 
Offering up a plethora of possible sources, from "representants of the German SDS (Rudi 
Dutschke), Trotskysts, Spanish anarchists, 'Chinese,' 'Cubans,' or other fellagha," the 
paper insisted that "the 'student unrest' has only been a magnificent pretext for starting an 
insurrection in Paris, AT THE EXACT MOMENT WHEN THE AMERICAN-NORTH 
VIETNAMESE TALKS WERE ABOUT TO BEGIN."14 As far as Rivarol was 
concerned at this point, the protestors' proclaimed domestic concerns only masked an 
international-based communist action.  
 Yet even before Occident's small counter-protest on the 13th, where a handful of 
militants broke off and stoned the Chinese embassy while shouting "Vietcongs, 
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assassins!," it had become clear that Vietnam was slipping in importance.15 The change 
of focus came about for two reasons: first, the fear of police repercussion; and second, a 
reconceptualization of French issues as part of a challenge to imperialism. Worries of 
how the government might react blocked the only May call for a protest aimed at the 
peace talks. In a May 9th flyer entitled "The Vietnamese people will win!," the Comités 
Vietnam de base had exhorted the French to come out in mass to support the Vietnamese. 
Ignoring the French student uprisings entirely, the original call raved about the progress 
the Vietnamese had made, depicted the Americans as fearful and about to lose, and 
insisted --in all caps -- that all "SINCERE FRIENDS" of the Vietnamese should 
demonstrate in front of the North Vietnamese delegations' quarters to show their 
"SUPPORT AND THEIR COMPLETE SOLIDARITY."16 Yet shortly after, the CVBs 
called off the protest. Explaining that their "intention, entirely just, [was] to demonstrate 
our warm support, our unconditional support to our Vietnamese comrades," the CVBs 
noted that nevertheless "the situation in Paris has notably evolved since we took this 
decision." Since the government was dropping hints about professionals aiming to disrupt 
the talks, the CVBs did not want to give them the excuse to act. "A protest in front of the 
Lutetia would without a doubt be repressed with extreme violence," the CVBs admitted. 
Conceding it would be "reckless" to demonstrate, the CVBs acknowledged that the police 
could have used a protest aimed at the talks as a way of "'justify[ing]' the violence of 
recent days, [and] try[ing] to intimidate, to decapitate, and to crush the anti-imperialist 
movement in France." The risk was not worth it, the CVBs decided: "In this 
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confrontation, where we would not have the full initiative, we would without a doubt 
have more to lose than to gain and we would be mistaken to let ourselves get caught in 
this grossière trap."17 Rather than give the French government an excuse to act, and a 
reason to justify its suspicions about the movement, the CVBs cancelled the protest. No 
others were planned. In fact, groups went out of their way to specify that their attacks on 
the French system were not going to disrupt the Vietnamese talks: when the workers 
finally joined up with the students in mid-May, launching a 24 hour strike which 
threatened to shut down Paris, protest organizers planned a marching route that did not 
approach the location of the talks at all.18 Repression at home kept from a direct link-up 
with revolutionaries from abroad. 
 Yet the return to the Hexagon came from more than just fear of police reprisals. 
More significantly, it came from a new perception of the value of French-based protests. 
The foregrounding of French issues appeared as early as the start of May, when Laurent 
Schwartz found himself under attack when he attempted to address students at Nanterre. 
Co-founder of the Comité Vietnam National, long-time fighter against imperialism 
abroad, Schwartz earned the students' ire because he favored selective, rather than 
comprehensive, French university admission policies19. In trying to block him from 
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speaking, a student militant told others present that "the selectionist Laurent Schwartz is 
not part of the working class." Student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit had to step in to calm 
the students, but he did not do so by reminding them of Schwartz' long history fighting 
for the left. Rather, he invoked free speech and the students' right to judge after hearing, 
Cohn-Bendit yelled "Laurent Schwartz must be able to express himself," and bargained 
with the students that after he spoke, they could politically reprimand him. "If then [after 
he's spoken] we determine that he's a bastard," Cohn-Bendit reasoned, "we'll tell him: 
Monsieur Schwartz, you're a bastard."20 Faced with students concerned with French 
issues and focused on the revolutionary possibilities of the French working class, Laurent 
Schwartz's Vietnam War activism did not offer enough anti-imperialist capital to counter 
his perceived bourgeois conceptualizations of French society.   
 The Schwartz action reflected a larger trend: participants in May viewed their 
actions as a continuation of, and on par with, anti-imperialist actions elsewhere, including 
in Vietnam. In its first issue, the student paper Action declared that "In Paris and at 
Nanterre, they are not fighting alone; they are not fighting for themselves. [...] Those who 
fight against the capitalist university have found themselves at the side of those who fight 
against capitalist exploitation." The French fight, they argued, sympathized with the 
Vietnamese struggle and directly challenged the workings of the capitalist system. 
"Today, students are aware of what they want to make of them: cogs in an existing 
system, paid to make it work its best," Action wrote. "Their battle concerns all of the 
workers because it is the workers' fight[.]"21 Leftists belonging to the Fourth International 
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argued that "[t]he students' struggle is placed naturally in the context of struggles which 
are going on across the entire world." They placed the French students on the same level 
as American students fighting against the Vietnam war, of Europeans "in solidarity with 
the Vietnamese revolution, in solidarity with the struggles of all colonized people 
fighting for their emancipation," and with students fighting for the installation of socialist 
regimes in their world. "The students' struggle across the whole world is under the sign of 
Che Guevara's fight," the Fourth International noted, "and is an integral part of the fight 
for the socialist revolution."22 No longer secondary to the Vietnamese rebels, the French 
students could consider themselves on the frontlines of the fight against imperialism.  
 The members of the French Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire took this 
argument for the importance of the students' fight and used it to argue for a need to focus 
on French issues and push for a French proletarian revolution, while additionally 
chastising the French Maoists who had made up the CVBs. "Being content with saying 
that only the proletariat can lead the fight to the end, is the same as being happy with a 
theoretical abstraction in a situation where we have a concrete problem to solve," they 
stated. They claimed the time had come for French students to begin acting on their own 
problems and leading their own fight against capitalism, rather than waiting for others to 
show the way. "In the same way that it was stupid to put one's self at the service of the 
Vietnamese because the Vietnamese can't judge in our place on the possibilities of our 
actions," the JCR argued, "it would also be criminal for the avant-garde to put the 
students in the workers' service instead of using the student movement as a political 
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révélateur for society as a whole."23 The last gasp of the battle between the CVN and the 
CVBs (the Maoist leadership had, due to their theories of revolution, not supported the 
May uprisings, although the grassroots training they had offered provided much of the 
organizing push for May participants), the commentary also emphasized the need for the 
French to look home if they wanted to make a difference. 
 By the end of May, the Vietnam War came in a distant second in the minds of 
French activists. When international students at the Cité dormitories occupied their 
quarters and showed Vietnam War films, they did so not to instruct, but to demonstrate 
their solidarity with, the French.24 Although the CVN called for a meeting about the talks 
on May 27th, it had difficulty interesting participants. "Habitants of the quartier, most of 
you supported the students against police repression; most of you suppored the 
Vietnamese in their struggle for independence," the CVN stated in a phrasing which 
attempted to link the two struggles together and remind activists of their former interests. 
"Peace has not yet been gained," they wrote, "the US has not yet given in to the demands 
of the Vietnamese. THESE PEOPLE STILL NEED YOUR SUPPORT."25 But, as a New 
York Times article showed, the world of the peace talks and the world of May seemed 
miles apart. Writing on May 22nd, Anthony Lewis contrasted a Sorbonne amphitheater 
full of "students in shirtsleeves wav[ing] their fists and shouting their ideas [...] look[ing] 
like a mural of 1789 come to life," with the "caviar and champagne passed among the 
guests at a diplomatic reception" given by the North Vietnamese at the Hotel Lutetia. 
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Noting that the bourgeois activities of the talks seemed like a "stylized shadow play" 
against the backdrop of chaos in France, Lewis remarked that the students were "tangible 
forces for change. For all the reality on the battlefields of Vietnam and the importance of 
these talks, the formalities of the diplomatic process strike an artificial blow."26 The 
diplomatic niceties of the talks, combined with, as Pierre Vidal-Naquet later put it, the 
general sentiment of "let's first settle our own problems," meant that Vietnam received 
little attention.27  
 The changing view carried over into the opposition as well: in its May 23rd issue, 
Rivarol did not mention the peace talks, focusing instead on France. And whereas they 
had earlier insinuated either German or Chinese agents could be involved in leading the 
protests, they now placed Cohn-Bendit firmly under the tutelage of East German 
Communist Walter Ulbricht, a move which, while still insinuating the dangers of foreign 
infiltration, directed worries back to the European continent and away from the Vietnam 
War.28 Occident, encouraging students to join it around May 20th, now situated the threat 
to the west squarely within France. "Students, don't let your future be decided by salon-
style terrorists on a break from their campuses!," the group exclaimed. "If tomorrow 
France became a popular democracy, there would no longer be any issue of reform or of 
contestation. You would only be able to bend to the will of political commissaries[.]"29 
As May slid into June and the protests gradually ended, the French interest on Vietnam 
became switched for a focus on France.  
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"Signs of Goodwill:" Changes in French Government Policies After May 
 In the aftermath of May, the most visible signs of changed attitudes came from 
the French government, in a form of a crackdown on dissent. The first move came in 
early June, when de Gaulle banned seven student organizations at the heart of the May 
events. The groups included two which had played a central role in Vietnam War 
protests: the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire, a Trotskyst groups connected to the 
CVN, and the Union des jeunesses communistes (marxiste-lenistes), a Maoist group 
heavily involved in the CVBs. Although not aiming at Vietnam War activities 
specifically, de Gaulle's ban had serious ramifications on the anti-war movement. The 
dissolution of these student groups removed some of the internal structures which had 
helped organize militants and reduced the number of participants available to protest. 
Moreover, it once again directed activists' energy back on France, by giving them a clear 
enemy to challenge on the homefront. The move did not reduce the groups' members' 
political activism -- Alain Krivine, head of the JCR, would run for president of France in 
1969 -- but it did strongly refocus their activities.  
 But de Gaulle's newfound conservatism extended beyond a simple desire to re-
establish order after the chaos of May, and ventured into the realms of foreign policy as 
well. Through actions specifically aimed at curtailing Vietnamese War protests in France, 
he set about mending fences with the United States and solidifying France's identity as 
"the capital of peace." This time, he aimed his measures not only at French students, but 
at their American counterparts at work in Paris: American expatriate activists, and 
American military deserters and resisters.  
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 The government first went after anti-war protesters in France. Justifying their 
actions through a desire to keep Paris neutral, as well as a fear of Maoists and Trotskysts 
attempting to turn demonstrations into armed uprisings, the Ministers' Council banned all 
public street anti-Vietnam War protests on June 12, 1968. The United States greeted the 
move as a "sign of  French government good-will towards the United States."30 Although 
the government announced the ban too late to stop a planned Mouvement de la Paix 
protest for the Geneva Accords anniversary in July, officials were able to limit the extent 
of the protest and its content, greatly offending the Communist Party. Other groups 
similarly found their protest efforts stymied. When several French activists attempted to 
set up a meeting for American Professor Richard Falk to speak on his views that U.S. 
efforts in Vietnam constituted genocide, the Foreign Affairs Ministry at the Quai d'Orsay 
spoke out against it, emphasizing the French government's "concern of maintaining an 
atmosphere of calm and objectivity around the Paris negotiations."31 When protestors 
challenged the ban of a large-scale protest on November 15, 1969, the government 
reacted sharply, sending in police forces to break up the demonstration, and rounding up 
over 2000 for questioning. The severity of the government's action caused activists to 
complain about "Franco-American collusion" and to point out that de Gaulle was 
suppressing protests against the United States to a greater extent than Nixon himself 
was.32 While after the November 1969 protest the government let up a bit in its 
repression, it still reserved the right to ban certain materials, such as films, from being 
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shown. In a direct contrast to pre-May treatment of protestors, such as Vice President 
Humphrey's visit, the government was no longer allowing activists to demonstrate in a 
way that made the United States uncomfortable or directly contradicted the French 
government's stance on the war.  
 Further hardening its stance, the French government also went after two groups of 
American citizens involved with protests in France: PACS, the Paris American 
Committee to Stopwar; and American military deserters. Formed in 1966, PACS 
provided, as Pierre Journoud has noted, the "join-up between French and American 
protest groups." Consisting of a mix of academics (Harvey Goldberg, H. Bruce Franklin) 
and members of the literary scene (well-known translator Maria Jolas, novelist Ira 
Morris, journalist Scholfield Coryell), all expatriate Americans, the group offered 
multiple information sessions about the war and about anti-war protest activities in the 
States and in France.33 They invited speakers from the U.S., as well as from French 
organizations such as the Russell Tribunal. PACS participated in multiple protests in 
France, generally working with the CVN. The group did not fly under the government's 
radar: during protests against Vice President Humphrey, Stanford professor H. Bruce 
Franklin was arrested and, while in jail, discovered that their group had been infilitrated, 
with French collusion, by the CIA.34 But while the French government had allowed this, 
it never interfered with PACS's activities until after May '68.  
 Although PACS had not been involved in the May uprisings, the group suffered 
the consequences of newly strict government policies in their aftermath. After a July 4th 
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meeting under the title "And Now, Independence for Vietnam," PACS decided to 
organize a larger protest in conjunction with a French group, the Association Médicale 
franco-vietnamienne (AMFV) and the International Center Against War Crimes, both of 
which had emerged from Russell Tribunal activities.35 But the government quickly 
moved to ban the meeting, proclaiming it risked "disturbing public order."36 Inside 
sources told Le Monde officials had blocked the protest because its "public character" 
was "incompatible [..] with the currently ongoing international conversations in Paris." 
(The paper pointed out, however, that a recent meeting in favor of South Vietnam had 
been allowed to proceed without problems.)37 Groups involved quickly cried foul. The 
International Center dismissing the claim of "disturbing public order" as "grotesque." 
Believing instead the government's motivation arose from "external diplomatic pressures 
that we can imagine," the Center saw the move as "indefensible" and urged Frenchmen to 
sit up and notice the "attacks on political liberties" resulting from recent dangerous shift 
in governmental policies.38  The Communist Mouvement de la Paix also spoke out, 
refusing to admit that the peace talks' location justified closing off protest meetings. "The 
choice of Paris as the place for negotiations should not mean, in any sense, that we should 
give up actions in the Capital centered around ending U.S. aggression in Vietnam," the 
MDLP argued. "It means to the contrary an intense activity of all pacifist forces[.]"39 
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  The protests fell on deaf ears, however. On August 9th, police called PACS 
member Scholfield Coryell to the préfecture and revoked his visa, claiming he was 
involved with activities "of the sort to disturb public order."40 On August 19th, the 
ministerial order came down to dissolve PACS. Seen by the International Center as 
"proof of the evolution of the government's international views," the moves against 
PACS showed that the French government had become less tolerant of anti-war activists 
and more concerned about the U.S.41 French militant Jean Chesneaux informed his friend 
Ira Morris that the developments were the result of de Gaulle's momentary loss of control 
in '68: now concerned over his power, he had stopped pushing against the United States 
and started trying to re-establish himself within their circle.42 The revolutionary-
supporting France of earlier days, standing up to American hegemony, seemed to be 
gone. 
 No move more clearly defined the shift towards more positive relations with the 
United States than the drastic change after '68 in France's toleration of American 
deserters and resisters. Since American soldiers had begun appearing in France in 1967, 
helped into the country by French sympathizers, the French government had adopted a 
fairly liberal policy towards them.43 International agreements under NATO meant that, 
upon learning of an AWOL American soldier's presence in France, the French 
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government was obliged to return him to the proper authorities.44 But when French police 
arrested Louis Armsfield, a young African American, in May of 1967, the government 
did not follow policy. Charging Armsfield with vagabondage, police kept him 
imprisoned rather than handing him to NATO official in Belgium, while the French 
government debated his demand for political asylum.45 In the end, after a brief stay in jail 
for the vagabondage crime, French authorities denied Armstrong's political asylum 
request but granted him a residency permit, which allowed him to legally stay in France 
on the condition he find employment and renew his permit every few months.46 Other 
resisters and deserters, including some like Richard Perrin of the well-known dissident 
group RITA (Resisters in the Army), quickly followed suit and obtained their residency 
permits.47 They found the French extremely welcoming. Perrin remarked that " I don't 
recall ever meeting a French person who was critical of the stand I was taking."48 By 
March 1968, the French authorities had granted residency permits to 25 American 
soldiers.49 
 Permission to stay in France came with a warning to "stay out of politics," but 
many soldiers remained active in anti-war activities. As Richard Perrin explained it, ". I 
chose to interpret [the warning] to mean I should stay out of French politics, not 
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American politics. So I was itching to get involved again."50 Perrin and his colleagues 
used their French location to launch RITA, sending out newsletters, contacting 
sympathizers still inside the army, and coordinating movement of dissident troops.51 In 
December 1967, he held a news conference with Stokely Carmichael, in town for the Che 
Guevara Week organized by the CVN. (Worried about upsetting French authorities, 
Perrin specifically limited media invitations to American outlets.)52 French protest groups 
became interested in their plight and, in early 1968, four organizations -- the CVN, the 
Collective Intersyndical Universitaire, the Movement Against Atomic Arms and the 
Mouvement de la Paix -- held a meeting where three resisters requested "material aid" for 
their counterparts in France.53 The four organizations established a fund for any 
donations offered and a network through which French citizens could offer lodging or 
work.54 In April, the joint French-American work grew bolder, when, during a meeting 
presided by Alfred Kastler and Jean-Paul Sartre, eight American soldiers handed over 
their draft cards to be mailed to draft director General Hershey. They then formed a 
"Union of Resisters and Deserters in France" to better work together.55 The continued 
political work finally upset the French officials, who had decided in March 1968 that 
American soldiers "were being used for agitation." On April 2, the Minister of the 
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Interior directed his subordinated to have all politically-active resisters or deserters 
deported.  
 Despite this, Perrin and his counterparts experienced no difficulties until the 
summer, at which point, as Pierre Journoud has pointed out, "the conjunction between the 
events of May '68 and the opening of the Paris Peace Talks [permitted] the Ministry of 
the Interior's services to make their more repressive measures more concrete."56 During 
the May 6th protest, American resister Warren Hamerman was among a "group of 
foreign tourists" who ended up on the wrong end of a CRS police baton. When the police 
later learned of his presence at the protest, they took advantage of his routine permit 
renewal visit to search him. Finding a notebook of anti-war organizations, they told him 
he had fifteen days to find a job or leave the country. They then proceeded to tail him 
around Paris as he looked for work, until he finally left of his own accord. Another 
deserter, Alfred Schmidt, claimed to have made the mistake of asking the CRS for 
directions on how to get out of the May 6th protest, and was promptly arrested. He too 
was told to leave France.57 Richard Perrin departed as well. He recalled that "Any 
foreigner engaging, or even appearing to engage in political activity the French 
government didn't like was deported." Each time he went to renew his permit, the 
interrogation over his work and political activities lasted longer, until he finally felt so 
uncomfortable he left the country.58 The infrastructure of RITA in France was broken.  
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 In a letter to Le Monde, Alfred Schmidt and Warren Hamerman linked police 
reprisals against them to RITA members' decision to announce their support of the 
students on May 28th. But they also felt that the French government had always been 
hypocritical in accepting those who had left the army for political methods and yet then 
attempting to keep them from political activism once arrived. May, they felt, had only 
forced the contradiction to the forefront. "The French government and its police tried to 
have us accept silence as the price of our asylum; this was a price we were not willing to 
pay and that we will not pay," Schmidt and Hamerman wrote. "The time has come to 
make the situation clear. The time has come for the French government to state if it has 
decided to act in a way that reflects its declarations and its statements of faith on the 
Vietnam War."59 But the government had shifted away from projecting a France at odds 
with American imperialism, to focusing on a France that was the locus of peace, and did 
not accept the soldiers' challenge.  
The Awkward Situation of Americans in Paris: 
Changing Attitudes to American Deserters and Protestors 
 
 The plight of American deserters and resisters did not go unnoticed. Some 
soldiers did accept the deal of silence for location and returned to France, where they 
often ended up hanging out with the "Beatniks" on the Left Bank, panhandling for cash. 
No longer of interest to the government since their political actions were quashed, they 
drew the sympathy of some of the luminaries on the left, who in 1969 formed the 
Association pour le soutien et la défense des Américains exilés (Association for the 
support and defense of exiled Americans). Containing such well-known activists as Jean-
Paul Sartre, Laurent Schwartz, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Jean-Pierre Domenach and Nicole 
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Dreyfus, the group attempted to gather funds and other aid for the former soldiers in 
need. But as Pierre Journoud states, "even with this relatively prestigious patronage 
committee, the theme of American exiles made little stir in public opinion, even in 
activist student circles."60 
 In general, activists after '68 lost focus on Vietnam. Occident, whose support of 
American troops came from their belief that Americans fought on the frontlines of the 
war against communism, now had a fight of their own at home. Despite the group's 
violent nature -- quite capable of "troubling public order" -- Occident escaped from the 
original June culling of radical student groups and was allowed to continue on until the 
next school year, when a series of violent attacks, including a raid on the SNESup offices, 
led to its dissolution.61 Following their November 1st ban, the militants split into a 
number of different groups, most notably Nouvelle Droite and the even more violent 
Ordre Nouveau. The groups' targets remained the same -- at their formation meeting, 
Ordre Nouveau members called for Jean-Paul Sartre's head and proclaimed their desire to 
defend the West -- but their focus lay on France and Europe.62 The Vietnam War, when it 
was mentioned by Rivarol, became an issue of foreign countries rather than one of 
foreign policies, no longer connected to France's own situation. By the time the right 
wing groups had unified under the Front National and Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972, their 
main concern lay with guaranteeing "France for the French" against the rising tide of 
North African immigrants. But although Vietnam had slipped from their main issues, the 
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right's experiences in fighting about it, both ideologically and physically, provided the 
impetus to propel them forward into a unified group by demonstrating to them the 
political and militant tactics which worked and did not work.  
 While more interest in Vietnam remained on the left, similar changes had 
occurred. As the UNEF remarked, "In its passage through, May destroyed the permanent 
structures of anti-imperialist intervention."63 The Comités Vietnam de Base took the 
strongest hit, being essentially "liquidated" (fondu) by the May events.64 Although never 
formally dissolved, the groups ceased to exist after May. Part of the reason was, as 
Nicolas Pas has noted, that "the three slogans launched in spring 1967: "NLF will win!," 
"U.S. assassins!" and "McNamara Out!" had been, in the eyes of the militants of the time, 
more or less realized."65 With the Tet Offensive victories and the start of peace talks, 
Maoists believed the Vietnamese had essentially guaranteed victory and the CVBs had 
nothing left to do. As one CVB militant, Antoinette Chauvenet, put it, "In a way, the 
Vietnam committees had fulfilled their aims, because negotiations had started."66 
 Yet the feeling that the Vietnamese no longer needed them was not the primary 
reason for the CVBs' disappearance. As Chauvenet also remarked: "And overall, 
something important was happening in France."67 Beginning in May, Maoists turned their 
attention to the revolutionary potential of the French, primarily through their participation 
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in the établissement movement, wherein militants placed themselves within factories to 
try to radicalize the proletariat. Olivier Rolin, another CVB militant, remembered that 
"Our unique preocuppation as school opened in fall 1968 was to reconstitute the illegal, 
violent and proletarian movement, with the direct objective of urban guerilla warfare." 
Dismissing the CVBs as a passé part of the "intellectual youth," he said that "after May 
we were completely disinterested in Vietnam, except for a few short occasions. [..] 
Factories, it was factories for us: the priority of all priorities."68 But even as the Maoists 
focused in on the French worker, Vietnam remained a reference point which allowed 
them to present their activity as part of a larger international revolutionary movement. A 
flyer for the famous occuption of the Lip factory in France proclaimed "VIETNAM: is 
not the endowment of the Vietnamese. In Franc-Comtoise language, you say 'Lip.'" In an 
interview, Lip organizer Ronguet noted the need to create "multiple Vietnams, the 
factory-Vietnam, the court-Vietnam, the police-Vietnam ... the Lip-Vietnam" in order to 
transition to the ideal society the Maoists envisioned. As he explained to his interviewer, 
"Vietnams should not be simply in factories [...] The day when there are enough 
Vietnams, when power relations are destroyed between the powerful and the governed, 
between the master and his students, between the priest and his congregation, that day, 
we will have fatally changed society."69 The CVBs may have passed away and their 
militants might have left behind Vietnam War protests, but the Vietnam War still 
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infiltrated their means of conceptualizing the French self and elucidiating the 
revolutionary societal identity they strived for in France. 
 The gauchistes' absence caused a void in Vietnam war activities that the French 
Communist Party was only too happy to fill. In the period after May, the PCF once again 
gained hegemony over anti-war protesting in France.  It was not the only anti-war group 
to come through May -- the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire did as well -- but it was 
by far the most powerful, and it considered anti-war action as its "premiere [international] 
task."70  The PCF served as the controlling head of a group of  organizations, ranging in 
number from 41 to 52, which organized actions against the continued fighting in 
Vietnam. The majority of these groups were smaller Communist-led groups, such as the 
Union des femmes françaises, but frequently the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire and 
other non-Communist organizations also participated.71 Protests reflected international 
developments, such as the invasion of Cambodia and Laos and the escalation of fighting 
in 1972, or the 1969 visit of newly-elected President Nixon to France. Rather than a call 
for political activism, however, the Communists tended to limit themselves to requests 
for support, expressions of disapproval of American actions, and, above all, for "material 
aid."72 Through their constant organization of supply deliveries and other aid for the 
Vietnamese, the French Communist Party managed to stake out "an important role at the 
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international level."73 The Party not only set up drives for a variety of materials in France, 
they also intervened with the Soviets on behalf of the Vietnamese and attempted to 
spread information about the Vietnamese war to other third-world countries, notably in 
Africa.74 Their work on these Vietnam-War related activities allowed the French 
Communist Party to establish the international identity for themselves they wanted for 
France: secondary to the USSR, but an essential link in a global network of socialist 
countries.  
 But although the PCF had taken control of French anti-war protests, and although 
the major gauchiste anti-war groups had fallen apart in May '68, the Communists still 
faced trouble on their left where Vietnam was concerned. It took time, however, for the 
far left to be able to truly trouble the PCF. Although the CVN had not disappeared as 
completely as the CVBs following May, its actions and the number of its activists were 
severely curtailed. Laurent Schwartz, who saw the CVN as "one of the frames of '68," 
remembered that former militants "had too much to do. They no longer worked for the 
CVN, they were all busy with actions in France. It was a slowing down, not at all a 
destruction[....]" He noted that the May participants sympathized with the anti-war 
movement, but "they no longer had time, that's all."75 Reflecting on the changes, the 
Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire -- who, after May '68, had lost the participation of 
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the U.N.E.F.76 -- commented that it had "become difficult to mobilizes the masses for 
Vietnam." They traced these changes to the belief of some that the start of negotiations 
indicated a Vietnamese victory, but most specifically to the opportunity May had offered 
to translate the imperialist fight abroad to a battle at home. "Those who were at the 
forefront of solidarity actions, those who were first to cry 'NLF will win,'" the Collectif 
remarked, "saw on the spot [in May] the hope of brin[ing home] the fight to the 
repressive social regime that had brought about [...] one after the other, the wars of 
oppresion and the massacres in Asia and in Africa." The former militants for Vietnam, 
the Collectif explained, "were and still are occupied elsewhere [in France], believing 
nevertheless that the fight is one and the same."77 Militants had abandoned the fight for 
the future of Vietnam in favor of a fight for the future of France.  
 A small but dedicated number of activists, however, pushed constantly to get the 
French left to realize the possibility and necessity of fighting for the Vietnamese as well 
as for the French. The Collectif Intersyndical insisted that "if what is happening in 
France, in Europe, in Latin America, and in the United States shows that it has become 
possible to attack the enemy from the inside, with objectives and means that we would 
not have thought possible only a year ago, it is nevertheless true that international fights 
remain just as important." They noted the danger of de Gaulle's more Atlantic position, 
and argued that "those who fought for Vietnam did so for clearly expressed motives. 
Those motives have not changed."78 Attempting to mobilize participants for a November 
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22, 1968 protest intended to sync up with a same-date American action, the U.G.E. 
leadership reminded militants that they had "A POLITICAL OBLIGATION TO 
EFFECTIVE AND UNLIMITED INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY, NO MATTER 
WHAT THE NATIONAL (or international) CIRCUMSTANCES ARE."79 Noting that 
"the Vietnamese revolution played a déterminant role in the radicalization of the youth, 
and in its separation from the platitudes of the PCF on peaceful coexistence," the UNEF 
argued that students needed to return to a more activist status and that they required "an 
autonomous apparition of revolutionaries with their own slogans which, additionally, 
would show our capacity to hold our own against the forces of repression."80  
 Even more importantly, leftists pushed to regain control over Vietnam War 
protests from the Communist Party. The Parti Socialiste Unifié bemoaned having "lost 
[the] initiative" of anti-war protests "to the profit of the PCF."81 The UNEF worried over 
the PCF gaining "the monopoly over anti-imperialist intervention."82 French Trotskysts 
writing in Cahiers "Rouge" remarked that without anti-war action, "militants risk at the 
end becoming victims of chauvinistic deformations in their daily work." They warned 
that "leaving [international] initiatives to the PCF mutiliates our intervention." 
Complaining that ignoring the Vietnam War took away their chances of challenging 
Soviet-style communism, they questioned "How can we ignore that propaganda in favor 
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of the Indochinese revolution and the colonial revolution in general is a privileged means 
of making people understand through facts what the policies of bureaucratic Stalinism 
and the imperialist crisis of 1970 mean?"83  
 As before 1968, far left activists derided the PCF for its too-soft protest methods, 
which they felt played into the government's attempts to calm down the movement in 
France. The UNEF reminded its members that "the PCF [had searched] by all means to 
demobilized [activists], for years, in order to go along with Moscow's new imperialism 
and the 'splitting' of the world between the USA and the USSR [peaceful coexistence.] 
The PCF TRIED TO MAKE PEOPLE CALL OUT 'PEACE IN VIETNAM' even though 
the slogan of all anti-imperialists has always been 'NLF WILL WIN!'" In the present, the 
UNEF noted, while the PCF no longer called for peace, it "stayed true to the capitulating 
spirit of peace at all costs."84 Although the PSU and the UNEF agreed to participate in a 
multi-group protest against Nixon under PCF control, they described their "great 
deception" when the Communist leaders took the head of protest, clearly getting along 
with the police escort. It only grew when a PCF member "brutally smacked" a PSU 
member who "had dared to call out 'NLF to Saigon!'" As in earlier protests, the 
gauchistes refused to bow to PCF demands. Although the Communists obeyed police 
demands to break up the protest, the leftists explained that "for the militants of May [...] 
such a capitulation was not admissible." Several thousand of them continued the protest 
on their own in a much more activist manner, "yelling slogans against U.S. imperialism 
and its Gaullist allies, hanging NLF or North Vietnamese flags on posts, covering the 
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walls with revolutionary slogans."85 While the leftists were not often able to put together 
such displays of anti-war fervor, their challenges to the Communist party in this area 
reinforced that their conception of what a revolutionary France would entail differed 
dramatically from that of the PCF.  
"Only One Enemy: Imperialism!" The Front Solidarité Indochine 
 At the forefront of the fight to restart the anti-war protest movement in France 
stood the Front Solidarité Indochine (Indochinese Solidarity Front, henceforth FSI).86 
Largely the child of Laurent Schwartz' dedication to the Vietnamese cause, the group 
crystallized both the opposition to Communist Party control and the focus on French 
issues which had plagued far left attempts to mobilize in favor of Vietnam. In the original 
1971 call to join the group, signed by established militants such as Schwartz, Alain 
Krivine, Jean-Paul Vigier, Marcel-Francis Kahn, Pierre Rousset, and Jean Chesnaux, the 
FSI  urged the French to realize the importance of the Vietnam War to their own fight 
and the need to retake control of anti-war protests. Their language demonstrated the shifts 
in identity since May. Whereas before, Vietnam stood at the forefront of all imperialist 
fights, now "the destiny of all the people of the world" was decided "in large part" in 
Vietnam, rather than totally. Moreover, instead of focusing in on the Vietnamese aspects 
of the war, the FSI's call to action immediately highlighted how the war had inspired 
others. They noted that "the heroic resistance of the Indochinese people had precipitated 
[...] American imperialism's crisis" and inspired other third-world fights. Further 
emphasizing the connections with the homefront, the FSI reminded the French that "in 
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Europe, solidarity with the Vietnamese people played an important role in the 
development of struggles in Germany as well as in Italy, and in the May '68 movement in 
France."87 
 Having underlined that this showed a symbiotic relation between support for and 
participation in fighting anti-imperialism, the FSI then directed their call for involvement 
not to the French generally, but specifically to "French workers," thus reflecting the 
change on the French far left to a focus on the French proletariat as a viable source for 
revolution. The FSI additionally attacked, albeit at this point without naming names, the 
too-calm PCF protest style. "Simply taking positions against imperialist aggression does 
not suffice," they proclaimed. "We urgently need to organize, in a permament manner, 
political and material solidarity with the Indochinese revolutionary front, in factories, in 
neighborhoods, in high schools, on university campuses." The call ended by listing their 
causes, including yet another indication of change: amidst the traditional statements of 
support for ceasefires and retreats, the FSI declared their intent to "denounce and to cause 
the end of all direct and indirect complicity of our government" and to "organize in 
France a fight against businesses which feed the American war machine."88 This new 
Vietnam War movement recognized in its program that French identity on the left had 
moved from supporters for revolutionary causes to a belief that they were participating in 
revolutionary action at home. The FSI thus offered the possibility to fight for the 
Indochinese people through France-based actions.  
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 The group which emerged from this original call showed continuity with pre-May 
movements in its setup. By the time it began organizing its first major protest in May of 
1971, the FSI had gathered the signatures of over seventy names on its call. The group 
drew its support primarily from non-Maoist far-left militants. In addition to Schwartz and 
the former CVN members, the list included well-known activists such as Armand Gatti 
and François Maspero, but lacked Jean-Paul Sartre, who since May had been heavily 
involved with the Maoist group around the newspaper Cause du Peuple.89 The FSI 
reached out specifically to like-minded protestors in the Parti Socialiste Unifié and the 
Collectif International Syndicale, and were frequently joined in their protest activities by 
the Trotskyst members of Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvrière as well as the left-wing 
Christian organization Témoignage Chrétien.90 Conceiving of their group as an 
organization that would aid the Vietnamese on multiple levels, providing both political 
support and material aid,  they organized a "Fonds Solidarité Indochine," (Indochina 
Solidarity Fund).91 The joint material and political action carried on the actions of the 
CVN, which had been both politically forward as seen through its emphasis on "NLF will 
win!," and economically supportive, as seen through its participation in the Milliard 
campaign. Also similarly to the CVN, the FSI showed a strong desire to unite anti-war 
groups together in order to create a larger, more powerful movement. They urged groups 
to "link their daily fights with support to the Indochinese revolution, to create support 
committees wherever possible" and especially to "coordinate their action in order to 
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guarantee what we see as essential: the continuation of actions of solidarity."92 
Discussing their success so far in November 1971, following a disappointing turn-out at a 
November 6th campaign, the FSI noted their achievements in establishing multiple 
"grassroots committees" all operating under the "banner of the FSI," but reaffirmed that a 
central goal was to "bring together the other support organizations for the Indochinese 
people into united work."93  
 Yet unity proved the most difficult thing for the FSI to find. After the November 
1971 protests difficulties, FSI supporters in the Ligue Communiste deplored the actions 
of those who "had not seen fit to participate in the mobilization," deriding the variety of 
groups from "the PC who refuses to protest with 'gauchistes'," to the "L.O. [Ligue 
Ouvrière, a Maoist group] who consider Vietnam as too far away from the workers and 
not of interest to them. By trying so hard to not be a step ahead of the masses, we're 
ending up by trailing behind them!"94 Although conflicts with the Maoists still existed, by 
far the primary trouble for the FSI lay with the Communist Party. Adamantly opposed to 
working with the far left, the PCF rebuffed all attempts by the FSI to link their 
movements together. When in 1972 the Jeunesse Communiste organized a protest in 
support of Vietnam under the theme "Youth, it's our brothers they're assassinating in 
Vietnam!," they refused to join their protest up with the FSI.95 The FSI published their 
own call, noting that they found it "regrettable" that the Jeunesse Communiste would not 
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allow the far left into the protest. The FSI chided that "support for Indochina deserves the 
largest and the most militant unity [possible]." Proclaiming that "the current situation 
makes it impossible to wait," they encouraged all militants to participate in a joint protest 
at the same time and place.96 But the FSI was not always able to force unity upon the 
PCF. When the Communists and multiple other organizations planned a "World 
Assembly for Peace" at Versailles in early 1972, André Souquière, a Communist and 
leader of the Mouvement de la Paix, maneuvered so that the FSI would not be allowed to 
participate. The move led Laurent Schwartz, who had been invited as an individual, to 
refuse to come himself. Although he admitted that the conference was an important move 
for the anti-war movement, he argued that for it to "be real success, a unifying attitude 
would have been indispensable." By banning the FSI, Schwartz stated, Souquière was 
"spreading dissent among the enemies of American imperialism." Schwartz told Soquière 
that he "could not come to the reunion as a 'celebrity,' pretending to forget that the FSI is 
not welcome[.]" Schwartz compared the Communist's move to "one of the most hateful 
caricateristics of totalitarian regimes." Twisting the knife even further, he ended by 
assuring Souquière that he still hoped the meeting would be a success, and passed on "my 
support and that of the FSI, and our hope that out of this meeting will come concrete 
action measures towards international campaigns which are more necessary than ever."97 
If unity was not possible in the post-68 era, it would not be because of the gauchistes' 
lack of effort.  
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 In his reproaches to Souqières, Schwartz highlighted the fundamental aspect of 
the FSI: their ability to direct Vietnam War activities into a criticism of the French 
government. "The FSI has led an active and effective fight against imperialism and for 
the support of the Indochinese people," Schwartz told Soquieres; "it is even the only one, 
to my knowledge, which has prepared serious action against French firms or American 
firms working in France en liaison with the Indochinese war."98 A large part of the FSI's 
actions and publications centered around a joint attack on American imperialism and 
French government complicity, and while the group may not have garnered a large 
amount of support, the trends their actions highlighted played into the changes in French 
identity post-May. They challenged the government's attempt to crack down on protests, 
proclaiming that the government's actions placed them in the same league as other 
imperialists. When FSI demonstrators at a Parisian train station were beaten by transit 
police as they handed out leaflets, the FSI denounced them as acting support of the U.S. 
and the South Vietnamese government. "At a time when Thieu is massacring the South 
Vietnamese population in concentration camps, at a time when the American air force is 
bombing the Laotien and Cambodian population," the FSI wrote in a flyer, "it is 
INTOLERABLE that the French police make themselves complicit with the fascists 
Thieu and Nixon by blocking [pamphlet] distribution and anti-imperialist militants' 
freedom of speech." While it was a jump from supporting massacres to blocking 
protestors with flyers, the FSI connected the fights together. "The FSI refuses to be 
intimidated," they declared. "It will continue its militant task of supporting the 
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Indochinese people and [will impose] this freedom of speech."99 Following a different 
government attempt to block a protest in 1973, the FSI published a flyer cheering the 
militants' success. Although "the French government, so-called neutral party in the 
Indochinese war, claimed to block all protests[,]" the FSI noted,  militants had been able 
to reach their political targets, "protests towards the U.S. embassy, with what this entailed 
of a military and political confrontation with the French bourgeoisie."100 The refusal to 
obey protest orders challenged the French government's largely successful attempts to 
reposition Paris as the "capital of peace," but more importantly, the FSI's comments 
linked together the French bourgeoisie with the French government and implied that anti-
imperialist actions such as the protest were part of a movement to challenge bourgeois 
hegemony in France. The protest and its attempted repression  became a manifestation of 
the clash between the left's revolutionary vision for France and the government's much 
more conservative ideas.  
 The FSI extended their attacks on the government beyond their repressive protest 
policy at home, to a denunciation of their international dealings with the war. They 
targeted French firms which profited from the war, and they accused the French 
government of aiding those that did so.101 They accused the French government of 
"provid[ing] arms[,] maintain[ing] diplomatic relations with phantom regimes (Saigon, 
Phnom Penh), support[ing] the economies of these regimes, equip[ping] U.S. bombers, 
export[ing] defoliants," and urged the French to protest in favor of a rupture of diplomatic 
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relations with pro-U.S. regimes and any moneys provided for the U.S. war effort. "Only 
one enemy: imperialism!" the FSI proclaimed, lumping together the French government's 
actions with the American war.102 Attempting in the early 1970s to get the French to 
protest against Nixon, the FSI highlighted the French government's complicity, declaring 
on a flyer that the French government "ALSO HAS INDOCHINESE BLOOD ON ITS 
HANDS."103 Futher tying together the fight against the American war effort and the fight 
against the French government at home, the FSI published two France-centric documents 
in its war education series: "French Policies in Indochina," and "France: Complicit with 
Saigon: The Neo-Colonial Strategy." They accused the French government of using their 
third-world outreach to mask attempts to establish French industries and influence 
abroad. De Gaulle's political actions in Indochina had been bound to fail because he 
himself represented a capitalist regime, the FSI stated, and the government's switch to a 
more neutral position was not a reflection of their ideology but rather of the influence of 
outside events, including the May uprising in France, which had troubled the security of 
the Gaullist government.104 They accused the French government of complicity with 
Saigon, of implicitly supporting Thieu's illegal jailings through France's refusal to 
publicly discuss them, and of violating the Geneva accords signed in 1954 by what the 
FSI saw as the French government's actions in favor of the United States in the years 
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since 1968.105 In their eyes, the FSI's rejection of the French government's attitude 
towards Vietnam demonstrated that again, the fights at home and abroad were connected. 
"When we say that the fight of the Vietnamese people is also ours, we are only learning 
from events," the FSI wrote. "Denoucing Nixon's lies is the first step," the FSI said. 
"Others follow: political and material support to the Indochinese people; the 
denounciation of Nixon's accomplices in our country: companies that work for the 
genocidal war, men and political parties bound to the U.S., and partisans who support the 
Asiatic puppets of Washington."106 Participating in the anti-war movement was a 
necessary step towards throwing off the imperialist bourgeois government at home. 
Conclusion: The End of the War 
 With the end of peace talks in 1973, activism in France dropped away. "In 1973, 
there was the false peace," Laurent Schwartz remembered,"and then, everything was 
considerably reduced, it no longer existed."107 Beginning with the drastic attention switch 
during May '68, the French had moved away from Vietnam-War centered protests and 
towards activism which focused on home. Yet Vietnam was never really absent. In the 
groups which moved completely away from the war, such as the far right and the 
Maoists, the experiences with Vietnam War protests continued to shape their activities 
and play into how they defined their progress. For the French government, the shift 
towards conservatism after May '68 came about due to its desire to regain control and 
because of its recognition that a role as a supporter of revolutions would not work if one 
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did not particularly want or support revolutions at home. Repressive efforts towards anti-
war activities combined with a changed, more positive attitude towards the United States, 
which continued under Pompidou after de Gaulle left, marked the government's attempts 
to use the Vietnam War to position themselves as "the capital of peace." For the 
Communist and the rest of the left, Vietnam remained a battlefield in which their 
competing visions for how a more revolutionary France would look played out, while 
also offering key opportunities to challenge the vision put forth by the French 
government. The fighting between right and left, government and opposition would 
continue long after the peace talks had ceased, as French groups continued to struggle 
over who got to define what France would be. To that end, it appeared the peace that 
Parisian resident Michelle Merlanger said was hidden "somewhere in Paris" had indeed 
been found by the Americans and the Vietnamese first.108 
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Conclusion 
 Writing in 1975, the Comité Vietnam of the Jussieu campus in Paris bemoaned 
the continual distance between French and Vietnamese anti-imperialist struggles. While 
activism had virtually disappeared since the peace accords had been signed, they 
remarked, it had never reached the levels it should have. The Jussieu group admitted that 
solidarity with Vietnamese had had its beneficial aspects, notably in how it provided a 
"subversive ferment in the capitalist world." May '68, they noted, "was only possible in 
France because of the militant combativity of student left-wing groups which had been 
whetted during 1966 and 1967 in often violent battles of solidarity with Vietnam."1 But 
even in radical protest movements like this, the Comité Vietnam of Jussieu felt that 
militants had failed to make a true connection between French and Vietnamese issues. 
Complaining that militants consistently "practiced an exterior solidarity towards the 
Vietnamese," the group explained "Very rarely were there attempts to link the fight 
against American aggression in Vietnam and the fights of the popular masses in France, 
led by their own interior objectives."2 In their view, the French had been fighting for the 
Vietnamese without really considering France.  
 The Comité was right that for the most part, solidarity with the Vietnamese did 
not translate into a mass movement in France that, as the Comité put it, would "put into 
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question the very functioning of capitalist society."3 But they were mistaken in believing 
that French movements around Vietnam operated with their gaze turned perpetually 
outwards. From the start of large-scale Vietnam War activities in France in 1965, 
activists continually brought French issues into question as they battled over the future of 
Southeast Asia. On the left and the right, and in the Gaullist government, they worked 
within a frame of action constituted by memory of past French activities, notably 
concerning the colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria. Their discussions about the 
contemporary situation in Vietnam both drew from and played into political and social 
developments within France. Their dialogue (and fisticuffs) with each other over Vietnam 
spurred each group to greater activism and further consideration of how they saw 
France's identity. Because of the strong interest of the Gaullist government in the 
Vietnam War, protest activities offered a key arena in which opposition groups could 
express how their conceptions of France differed from that of those in power. When 
arguing for what the end result for Vietnam should be, activists in France were often also 
discussing what they felt France's role in the world should be. While perhaps not a 
sufficiently militant evaluation of France's situation to please the Jussieu group, large 
amount of the externally directed drive for Vietnam War based activities arose from 
French activists' reflections on France's internal situation. 
 Militants on the French far right plunged into activism around the Vietnam War 
as a way to "defend the West wherever it fights" against a looming communist threat, and 
as a means of re-asserting the occidental French identity they felt had been lost along 
with France's major colonies at the start of the Sixties. Beginning with Tixier-
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Vignancour's support for South Vietnam on the campaign trail, and continuing with 
Occident's often violent attacks against NLF supporters on campus, the far right strove to 
reject the influence of Gaullism and communism in France. In his arguments against de 
Gaulle's neutralist foreign policy, Tixier-Vignancour used the Vietnam War in order to 
fully articulate how his ideas for France differed from de Gaulle's. Linking his support for 
American troops to support for a free world, Tixier-Vignancour argued for a France 
which embraced its Western, white heritage and refused any support of socialism or 
communism. Far-right activists for Vietnam continually pushed against the Gaullist 
attempts to reach out to the third world, embracing instead a conception of French 
identity locked firmly within the Atlantic and European world and placed above other 
civilizations. Repeatedly, they portrayed this activism as a continuation of the struggles 
fought during France's wars in Algeria and Indochina, and the connection showed in the 
prominent actions of such war veterans as Roger Holeindre. In fighting for an American 
victory in Vietnam, the far right tried to re-fight French battles lost elsewhere.  
 In addition to using Vietnam to grapple with issues of French international 
identity, the far right also used it to tackle French intellectual identity. Lucien Rebatet's 
response to Armand Gatti's play, "V Comme Vietnam," showed the right's belief that they 
too could and should produce engaged literature, which would help the right gain 
intellectual hegemony. Occident continually fought left-wing students for control of 
university campuses, arguing against Marxist influence on future generations. In their 
attempts to repress left-wing activism, they specifically targeted leftwing Vietnam War 
protestors. While the violent means with which Occident generally operated precluded 
any real intellectual debate, the continual conflicts between right and left students 
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motivated political activism on both sides and pushed them to further develop their 
political ideas. Although in the aftermath of May '68 Occident was forced to disband, the 
far right remained motivated by the same principles. Their experience with Vietnam War 
protests reinforced their beliefs and gave them valuable insight into reaching the masses, 
which would later be used in the much more successful Front National.  
 The far right's belief that France was coming under -- or was already under -- the 
influence of communist countries such as the Soviet Union reflected the hopes of the 
French Communist Party. Dominant in protests at their beginning and at their end, the 
French Communist Party used their participation in the French anti-war movement to 
establish France as a supporting member of a circle of socialist/communist countries, 
secondary to the USSR.  In keeping with Moscow's policy of peaceful coexistence, the 
PCF took a stance in favor of the Vietnamese but avoided from the start taking any 
radical stands, neither calling outright for an NLF victory nor voicing strong support for 
anti-American violence. While pressure from their left caused the PCF to begin cheering 
"NLF will win!" around 1968, their main objective remained humanitarian and moral, 
rather than political, support, guided by the Soviet Union's line. They projected a France 
whose international role lay in bolstering other similarly-minded nations through 
humanitarian aid,  while following Moscow.   
 In its attempts to establish its vision for France, the PCF directly challenged the 
Gaullist government. Repeatedly, they used their attacks on de Gaulle's foreign policy as 
a way to go after his capitalist regime. PCF politicians and activists highlighted the 
hypocrisy in de Gaulle's rebukes against American imperialism when he himself 
maintained French colonial possessions overseas and kept close ties with American 
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business interests. They tried to undermine the validity of de Gaulle's calls for peace by 
focusing in on his desire to get nuclear power for France, which the PCF felt would upset 
world balance. In this way, they argued that the international role they envisioned for 
France, and demonstrated through their Vietnam War protest activities, would provide 
better for world peace than the grand France wanted by de Gaulle.  
 In working to put in place their present-day identity, the PCF continually drew 
upon the past. The party placed the contemporary Vietnam War activities into a long line 
of anti-colonial, anti-imperial actions, dating back to the French war in Indochina (and 
sometimes evoking the Communist role in the French resistance as well). They argued 
against de Gaulle's presentation of himself as a leader for the Third World through his 
decolonization actions in Algeria. For the PCF, if the Third World was to look to France, 
it should do so through the Communist party, which had repeatedly stood up for it while 
the government in power was attempting to maintain French power in places such as 
Algeria and Indochina. In this way, they tried to  tie France's image among 
revolutionaries to work by the French Communist Party, not the French government. By 
repeatedly invoking past protest actions during colonial wars and during World War II, 
and by continually involving past anti-colonial protestors such as Henri Martin, the PCF 
bound their contemporary action on the Vietnam War to an understanding of French 
history which placed the progressive elements of French identity firmly under 
Communist control.  
 While the PCF had been able to maintain control over the anti-war fight before 
1966, it consistently lived with the fear of being surpassed in its anti-imperialist actions 
on its left. Like the Communist Party, the French far left envisioned a France linked in 
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with other socialist and communist nations. Like the Communist Party, the far left drew 
upon a history of anti-colonial actions to establish the validity of their pro-revolutionary 
Vietnam stance as opposed to that of the French government's.  Yet unlike the PCF, the 
far left had no interest in maintaining the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence. They 
instead openly called for a Vietnamese victory and the violent overthrow of American 
imperialism. Their more drastic protest activities and their more radical slogans and 
beliefs invigorated the anti-war movement, drawing in more of the disenfranchised leftist 
youth and many of the big name fellow-travelers who found the PCF too bureaucratic and 
too hesitant for their likes. In this way, the far left's support for Vietnam not only pushed 
for Southeast Asia's independence from American control, but for the French left's 
independence from French Communist control.4  
 While the PCF kept the same vision of French identity throughout the anti-war 
movement, the French far left's view of France's role altered after the May events. At the 
start of protests, the far left pushed for a France more revolutionary than the one 
envisioned by the PCF, but still in a secondary role. Although Maoist and Trotsksyst 
activists differend on the form French aid would take, both felt that rather than being 
revolutionaries themselves, the French would offer political support to others. But the 
combination of participation in Vietnam War protests (particularly as they grew more 
radical throughout 1967 and the start of 1968) and the experience of May 1968 led the 
French far left to a reconceptualization of French identity wherein the potential for 
revolution lay in France itself. Many domestic factors played into the advent of the May 
events, but the Vietnam War provided the vocabulary for recasting French activities as 
part of a larger anti-imperialist movement, and anti-war protests provided May activists 
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with the ability to deal with violence (brought on in no small part by their interactions 
with Occident) and with the training to maintain and support grassroots activist groups. In 
moving France to the fore after May, the far-left activists left behind their anti-war 
activity, but Vietnam still proved important to their understanding of France. They used it 
as the measuring stick to determine how their own activism was progressing. Maoists in 
the établi movement demonstrated their belief in the strength of radical movements in 
France by equating them with the fighting in Vietnam. Those who still remained active in 
anti-war protests, like the Trotskyst Front Solidarité Indochine, used their anti-war 
activity as a means of directly challenging the capitalist French government and 
bolstering the French left. Participation in Vietnam War activities helped shape the 
French left's sense of self and provide them with the means of constructing a French 
identity that was more active and more revolutionary. As activist Alain Krivine later 
reflected, "[I]t was as if Vietnam provided the impulse for something else, and then that 
something else happened."5 Vietnam offered the impetus to arrive at a new idea of 
France. 
 But even though the French left arrived at a revolutionary identity for France after 
'68, they were unable to fully implement this identity because power remained with the 
French government. The Gaullist government had also had its conceptions of France 
shaped through and altered by actions around the Vietnam War. A key part of de Gaulle's 
foreign policy from 1966 to the start of 1968, the Vietnam War gave the French 
government the opportunity to stake an important role for France in international 
interactions. Drawing on the prestige garnered by having extracted France from Algeria, 
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de Gaulle used his calls for neutrality in Vietnam as a means of establishing France as a 
beacon towards which emerging third-world countries could turn. Standing on anti-
colonialist turf that the left considered to be traditionally theirs, de Gaulle created a 
Vietnam War policy that not only placed France in the spotlight again but also stymied 
the French left in its attempt to challenge his hegemony.  
 The government revised its understanding of French identity, however, as the war 
progressed and as challenges from the French left mounted. Throughout 1967, leftist 
groups upped the level of their rhetoric and the ferocity of their challenges to de Gaulle 
and the Gaullist state. Several of the resulting incidents, most notably the protests against 
Vice President Humphrey's visits and the attempt to organize the Russell Tribunal on 
French soil, forced the French government to take a stricter stand against anti-war 
protests in France. The repression showed changes in de Gaulle's conceptions of France. 
Whereas his depictions of France at the start of his Vietnam War involvement offered up 
a country which had thrown off its chains itself and supported those who wished to do so 
as well, his experiences with protesting students showed that he was unwilling to let the 
theories of revolution he supported abroad take hold at home. The growing unwillingness 
to deal with revolutionary tendencies in France, coupled with the choice of Paris as the 
site of negotiations, moved de Gaulle from a France at the forefront of countries fighting 
for change, to a France more openly aligned with the United States, more repressive at 
home, and that overall was "the capital of peace." In the aftermath of '68, the French 
government moved even more towards  the United States, as the French right and the 
French left moved away from Vietnam as a central focus point. Pompidou would 
continue focusing on maintaining an international role for France as arbitrer of peace, 
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distancing himself from the direct intervention which had characterized de Gaulle's pre-
1968 efforts.6 The France which emerged through the government's actions at the end of 
the Vietnam War in 1975 had a strong international role as a creator of peace, although it 
lacked the grandeur de Gaulle had originally sought.  
 This French international identity in 1975 was not fixed, nor was it the only 
identity at play. Continual contestation at home from the left and the far right put multiple 
identities into play, forcing them each to reconsider themselves in the light of their 
understandings of the past and their reactions to present-day situations. Yet while the 
identity which the Vietnam War helped shape was not permanent, the effect of the 
Vietnam War on France is nonetheless important. Through our fuller understanding of 
French actions around the Vietnam War, we gain a better understanding of how France 
developed in the key post-colonial period following the end of the Algerian War. 
Studying Vietnam War protests sheds light on the emergence of the May 1968 events. It 
shows the foreign factors which provided the impetus for change at home. It highlights 
the importance of internationally focused social protest movements to French identity 
during the years between the French-centric events of the Algerian War and 1968. By 
bringing out the dynamic, dialogic way in which interacting groups debated and changed 
ideas of French identity through their actions around the Vietnam War, this dissertation 
has demonstrated the multi-faceted aspects of national identity creation and highlighted 
the connections between 1960s France and the international world. Our examination of 
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the centrality of the Vietnam War to France in the 1960s makes it clear that, as Sartre had 
said, Vietnam was fighting for the French.  
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